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ABSTRACT
GEOPOLITICAL RIVALRY IN THE CASPIAN-CAUCASUS REGION AND THE
DILEMMA OF INTERSTATE COOPERATION
Nurettin Altundeger
Old Dominion University, 2007
Director: Dr. Steve A. Yetiv

This dissertation develops a unique way o f analyzing the interstate relationship in
the Caspian region over the development o f Caspian oil resources. Based on three
different independent variables, this dissertation seeks to understand the main reasons
behind the absence o f interstate cooperation in the Caspian Sea region.
Among the variety of factors that might have affected the nature o f interstate
relationships and cooperation in the region, national interest considerations among the
littoral states and external powers involved in the affairs o f the Caspian Sea region
proved to be the most important factor(s) that explain the lack of cooperation in
developing the Caspian oil industry. While competition for influence and resources
impeded the establishment o f an environment conducive to interstate cooperation, the rise
of military conflicts and widespread wars also contributed to the deterioration o f the
international environment for the development of the Caspian oil industry. The lack of
effective international institutions and the failure o f the Caspian states to come up with a
regime or a system of governance that would normalize interstate relationships in the
region further reduced chances for a smoothly functioning oil industry in the region.
Although the advances made— after more than a decade— in the development of
oil industry and transportation systems stands as a success, the current level of
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development hardly satisfies the littoral states and those o f external powers as well as oil
companies.
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1
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION: COOPERATION AND CONFLICT IN THE CAUCASUS

It has been more than a decade that the Caspian-Caucasus region has received
considerable attention partly because o f its vast oil resources.1 Although the existence of
the rich hydrocarbon resources has been known for centuries, the breakup o f the Soviet
Union and the emergence o f independent states around the region sparked a big
competition among the regional and great powers o f the world for the exploitation o f the
petroleum reserves.

Major industrial countries including the United States saw it as an

opportunity to diversify the importation o f oil through the creation o f multiple oil
resources, so that the Middle Eastern monopoly and the potential for blackmailing
problems would ease, if not disappear.

•5

The intense struggle for the control of the

resources in the Caspian region is often seen as a replay o f the nineteenth century “Great
Game” with the variation that the key players have changed.4 Tsarist Russia was
succeeded by the Soviet Empire in 1917 and then Russia after 1991, and the role o f the
British Empire was taken over by the United States. The twentieth-century version o f the

T his D issertation fo llo w s the format requirem ents o f The C h ica g o M an u al o f S tyle 14th E d itio n by The
U niversity o f C hicago Press.
1 T he Caspian Sea is an en clo sed body o f water roughly 7 0 0 m iles from north to south and 2 5 0 m iles
across, lying directly b etw een the states o f Central A sia and the Transcaucasus. It is a salt-w ater body
connected to the B lack Sea by the V o lg a and D on rivers. A fter the collap se o f the S o v iet U n ion , the
Caspian Sea is adjoined by five states; Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Iran and Russia. On the
issue o f rising im portance o f the region in the international arena, see G ennady Chufrin, ed., The S ecu rity o f
the C asp ia n S ea R eg io n (N ew Y ork, Oxford: Oxford U niversity Press, 2 0 0 1 ).
2 A n gelik i Spatharou, “G eop olitics o f Caspian Oil: The R ole o f the Integration o f the Caspian R egion into
W orld E con om y in M aintaining Stability in the C aucasus,” in The P o litic s o f C a sp ia n Oil, ed., B ulent
G okay (B asingstoke: Palgrave, 2 0 0 1 ), 20.
3 B y 2 0 1 0 , the Caspian could represent 3 percent o f glob al o il output and 5 percent o f non-O PEC
production. “O pening the Caspian Oil T ap,” B u sin ess Week, 2 4 D ecem ber 2 0 0 1 , 29.
4 M ichael P. C roissant and B u len t Aras, eds., O il a n d G e o p o litics in the C a sp ia n S ea R egion (W estport,
CT: Praeger, 1999).
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2
Great Game has a number o f players, including Russia, Turkey, Iran and the West. Not
only governments are involved, but foreign and multinational corporations as well.5
Former Soviet republics in the Caspian region were optimistic about future
developments in terms of the extraction o f the petroleum resources, such that these
petroleum reserves could serve as a medium for prosperity and economic well being after
long years of subordination and underdevelopment. Although at the beginning, all the
states in one way or another related to the region and its oil reserves were optimistic
about the exploitation of the vast resources and their transportation to the world oil
markets, the new developments and discoveries, as well as the policies o f littoral states
and involved parties, proved that it was not as easy as it looked. Even they realized that
the exploitation of the Caspian oil is far more complicated than anyone contemplated at
the beginning.6 The complexity of the region stems from the fact that the Caspian basin
is one the most heterogeneous regions in the world in terms of ethnicity, language and
7

•

♦

culture. The power vacuum after the erosion o f Soviet power and unsettled disputes
among the countries in the region further complicate the development o f a stable military
o

and political environment.
Given the present politico-military environment in the Caspian basin, I will
explore the underlying reasons for the lack o f cooperation among the major players in the

5 M ehm ent D ikkaya, “Turk Cum huriyetleri Enerji Kaynaklari: Y en i Buyuk Oyunun T em el D inam ikleri,”
A kadem ik A ra stirm a la r D e rg is i 1, no. 3 (N ovem b er/D ecem b er 1999).
6 Gary K. B ertsch et al, C ro ssro a d s a n d C onflict: S ecu rity a n d F o reig n P o lic y in th e C au casu s a n d C en tra l
A sia (N ew York: R ou tlege, 2 0 0 0 ).
7 For more details on the social and cultural structure o f the Caspian region, see Hrair R. D ekm ejian and
Hovann H. Sim onian, T ro u b led W aters: The G e o p o litic s o f the C a sp ia n R egion (London, N e w York: St.
Martin's Press, 2 0 0 1 ).
8 G okay, The P o litic s o f C a sp ia n O il.
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region.9 Extraction and transportation of Caspian oil has the potential to provide
economic development for the region and prosperity for the people, yet even after more
than a decade, Caspian states could not develop and construct a viable physical and
political environment for the development o f the existing petroleum reserves. After
gaining their independence, Caspian states have worked very hard to use the oil resources
for their economic development.10 Since they did not have the technical and financial
resources to develop their reserves, Caspian states turned to the major oil companies for
help. International oil companies also wanted to work with the regional states and get
their share o f the Caspian oil reserves. Despite a desire o f both regional states and oil
companies, the extraction and transportation o f Caspian oil to world markets could not be
achieved in the way they wanted.11 In general, what we observe is a desire o f regional
states, western oil companies and the United States with respect to the extraction of
Caspian oil and its transportation to the world markets. The main question I ask is: why
have states not cooperated on the issue of developing Caspian oil despite the fact that
regional states are willing to offer their oil resources in a speedy fashion to the world
markets?
The finding o f this work is that, despite the expectations o f greater cooperation in
the developing Caspian region oil, such cooperation did not come to pass. This raises an
interesting question: why did cooperation fail when it could have benefited so many
parties?

9 M ajor players in the Caspian Sea region include littoral states and som e external pow ers that are involved
in the affairs o f the Caspian region. A m on g them are R ussia, the U nited States, Turkey and international
oil com panies invested in the region.
10 Faruk Arslan, “A zerbaycan E konom isinde G ecis D o n em i,” H a za r B ilim sa n a t ve K u ltu r D e rg is i 1
(Spring 2 0 0 0 ).
11 Cynthia C roissant, A zerb a ija n , O il a n d G e o p o litics (C om m ack, N Y : N o v a S cien ce Publishers, 1998).
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Among a number o f factors that have affected developments in the region, the
race for domination and control o f the region seriously hampered prospects for
cooperation. While each state pursued policies that would guarantee their superior status
in the region, they also tried to prevent others from gaining power. Therefore the main
focus in regional affairs shifted to achievement o f a higher status rather than involvement
in activities that would economically improve the region. The discussions over the legal
status of the Caspian Sea, and the direction o f the main export pipelines, simply reflected
the choices of the states in terms o f achieving and maintaining a superior status in the
region.
Turmoil and instability in the region could also be considered factors that had a
great impact on regional cooperation over the development of the Caspian Sea oil
resources. The wars in the region not only depleted the national resources that could
have been used for economic development, but also made it almost impossible for
neighboring states to cooperate on other issues. The wars in Chechnya and NagornoKarabakh have directly and indirectly affected the prospects for cooperation among the
Caspian states.
Lack of institutionalization has been considered as another important factor
affecting the interstate relationship in the region. As neoliberals assume, institutions can
have positive a impact on the achievement o f cooperation among the states in
international arena. Absence of an institutional arrangement and the inability o f existing
organizations in the region to contribute positively to the developments in the region have
made the cooperation among the Caspian states less likely.
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Having stated that cooperation in the region over the Caspian oil industry
development has failed, we should indicate that there is a difference between
achievement of cooperation in the region and the expectations prior to the start o f the
developments after 1991. At the very beginning, all parties were very optimistic about
the future o f the region and the possibility o f oil development and the wealth that would
accrue with the extraction of huge amounts o f oil. Compared to expectations, the current
level of cooperation among states could be labeled as a failure. However, partial success
was achieved in several areas that have become important milestones in the Caspian oil
development. The completion o f Caspian Pipeline Consortium and Baku-Ceyhan
pipeline could be categorized as important successes in terms of achieving interstate
cooperation over Caspian oil development. The difference should be viewed from the
perspective o f expectations during the 1990s, and the current level of success. The
improvements made in the Caspian oil industry were only achieved after almost two
decades of interstate interaction and long and difficult negotiations.

EXPLORING WHY COOPERATION HAS FAILED
We can hypothesize that cooperation in the Caspian region has been difficult
because o f the rivalry among the regional and external powers and competition over
resources. The term “rivalry” is used here to explain the competition over the
share/control of the natural resources. Geopolitical rivalry refers to the establishment of a
zone of economic, political and military influence in the Transcaspian region. On the
other hand, political rivalry is used to describe the disagreements among the internal and
external players, which have prolonged the negotiations over the development o f Caspian
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011 industry. Rivalry also differs from conflict in the sense that it does not involve
military confrontation or armed conflict. Actors inside and outside the region see the
region as their sphere of influence. Increasing assertiveness of Russia within the
Commonwealth o f Independent States (CIS) sphere, and the role o f the United States as
an influential actor in the region and its desire to protect its interests, have created
economic, political and geopolitical rivalry among the actors.12 As Iran and Turkey
joined in the game with their own policies and expectations as important players in the
region, the situation in the region became more complicated with respect to the settlement
ij

of the issues among the players.

Within that framework, I will particularly focus on

Turkey and Iran to identify their role and also their relationship vis-a-vis each other in the
absence o f cooperation in the region. Although we can identify major similarities
between the policy objectives o f these countries, some o f the priorities and primary goals
are totally different and most of the time, conflicting. Besides the external players, the
choices and the inclinations of the littoral states also played their role in the big game and
complicated the settlement o f conflicting issues among the major actors.
The confusion over the legal status of the Caspian Sea and the persistent
disagreement among the bordering states could be explained within the context of
geopolitical rivalry and competition over resources that in the end present a great obstacle
to the establishment of a fully developed regime, one that would set the rules for the use
of the Caspian Sea and the exploitation o f the resources among littoral states. The
disagreements and the choices o f the states with regard to the legal status o f the Caspian
Sea as a lake or a sea, reflect the political choices and economic interests o f the littoral
12 Suat Ilhan, “Jeopolitik G elism eler ve Turk D u n yasi,” A v ra sy a E tu d leri 2, no. 3 (A utum n 1995): 30.
13 Bayram Sinkaya, “Turkey-Iran G eop olitical C om petition over Central A sia and Caucasus: 1 9 8 9 -2 0 0 1 ,”
M id d le E a st T ech n ical U n iversity (January 20 0 4 ): 77.
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states. The concepts o f “delimitation” and “condominium” are used by different states to
achieve their own objectives in the Caspian region. Delimitation suggests the division of
the sea and sea shelves whereas condominium refers to the management o f the whole
Caspian Sea and its basin by the participation of the littoral states. Under condominium,
each state technically would have equal voting power in the management o f the Caspian
Sea; however, powerful states are expected to exert more pressure on other states over the
decisions to be made. For this reason, influential and dominant states such as Iran and
Russia prefer condominium over delimitation, expecting that they could impose their
orders in such an environment. The other less powerful states (Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan
and Kazakhstan) favor delimitation o f the Caspian Sea.14
The emergence o f a Russian monopoly clearly jeopardizes regional development
and distribution o f wealth among the peoples o f the region. When we talk about the
distribution of wealth and the sharing o f resources, we need to highlight the issue of
pervasive ambiguity with regard to the management and control of the Caspian Sea and
its oil resources. The absence of a clear regime and rules that would lay out the
foundation for the use of the Caspian Sea area among the bordering states is currently one
of the biggest problems in the region.
A relative absence o f international institutions might be considered (though this
remains to be explored) as a factor that affects the degree o f cooperation among actors.
One of the outcomes of the lack o f institutional establishments could be the perpetuation
o f an environment in which actors choose to compete with each other rather than
cooperate. International Relations (IR) theorists, especially institutionalists, argue that the
14 W e must consider that the respective p o licies o f the littoral states and the outsider pow ers have changed
over time. T he evolu tion o f the p o licies o f the states and the factors that caused the change w ill be
explored in the com in g chapters.
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existence o f international institutions could enhance the likelihood o f international
cooperation.15 Although some countries o f Caucasus and Central Asia belong to CIS, it
should not be considered an institution where members play an equal role. CIS was
established with Russian pressure, mainly to re-establish Russian influence over the
region after the dissolution of the Soviet Empire. Management o f the regional issues in
fact becomes easier under an institutional framework, especially if the participation o f the
involved countries is important and consensus is necessary. The Organization of
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) could be seen as an example in this context.
Although institutions may not play much o f a role in resolving issues immediately, their
importance and contribution could increase over time, as can be seen in Europe and the
number of organizations currently active in that continent. The absence o f international
institutions in the region is related to the fact that most countries in the region gained
their independence just after the end o f the Soviet Empire. Establishment o f patterns of
international relations and foreign policies could take some time in the region. Although
the Caspian-Caucasus states are not expected to adapt to a new environment and develop
institutions in a short period of time, establishment o f some sort o f institutions could help
to develop friendly relations in coming years.
Another issue that could be analyzed within this context is the ambiguity
pertaining to the legal status o f the Caspian Sea as one o f the factors that gave rise to the
emergence o f balance-of-power politics in the Caspian region. Since the interests o f the
littoral states on this issue do not coincide with each other, the rivalry over the control of
resources paved way for the emergence o f an alliance that created balance-of-power

15 See Oran R. Y ou n g, In tern a tio n a l C o o p era tio n : B u ild in g R eg im es f o r N a tu ra l R eso u rces a n d the
E n viron m en t (Ithaca: C ornell U n iversity Press, 1989).
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politics, with Russia and Iran on one side and the other littoral states with the United
States, Turkey and Western states on the other.16 The rise o f groupings among states
could be construed as complicating the settlement of the existing issues in the region.
One of the interesting aspects o f the alliance between Russia and Iran is that Iran as a
theocratic state chooses to stand by Russia rather than aligning with the other Islamic
countries (Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan). As we know, Iran’s stance in
international politics is quite different since the Iranian Revolution. Iran considered
religious themes as its guide in internal politics and foreign policy formulations.
Resistance and fighting against the West have long dominated Iran’s political agenda.
However, recently we have noticed that there is a shift in Iranian politics such that they
are no longer primarily guided by religious motives. The agreement between Russia and
Iran is as much a reflection o f their national interests as the alliance among the other
littoral states.
Another aspect of the geopolitical rivalry and competition over resources is the
issue of pipelines, which has been a major source of conflict and competition among the
states that have interests over the transportation o f the Caspian oil through their territory.
The transportation of Caspian oil through pipelines is o f utmost importance for the oil
producers in the region (other than Russia and Iran, since they already have an
established system for their reserves and their own transportation system). For
Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan the only outlet for carrying their petroleum to
consumers is the pipelines. The choices o f the Caspian states and other external players
are driven mostly by their own economic and political interests. However, feasibility of

16 Seen as a natural process in international relations, the alliances am ong the states have changed over tim e
as their interests m oved to other directions because o f the n ew d evelopm ents in the region.
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the suggested routes, and their costs and safety, are very important for the construction
and for the future transportation of the Caspian oil.
Second, other than the political and geopolitical rivalry as potential reasons for
the lack of cooperation in the Caspian basin, wars and ethnic clashes have always been a
serious source o f instability and disturbance. The Caspian region is one o f the most
heterogeneous regions in the world, with multiple ethnic structures and highly complex
formations. As Gokay mentions, “the Caspian-Caucasus is a region o f complexities, rich
in diversity of peoples, nations and language. Hardly anywhere can one find a territory of
a comparable size as heterogeneous in terms o f language, religion and culture.”

17

The

cultural, religious and ethnic diversity is one o f the greatest factors perpetuating
instability in the region, causing internal as well as international wars. From the time of
the establishment of independent states after the collapse o f the Soviet regime, the region
has witnessed bloody conflicts and suffered from both internal and interstate wars. The
ongoing war between Russia and Chechnya, Azerbaijan and Armenia, and the internal
clashes in Georgia, are examples of the potential for real conflict. More importantly,
these conflicts have not been resolved among the actors despite the passage o f years since
their emergence.
In addition to the potential for conflict in the region, security and peace
arrangements are so precarious that conflicts can be triggered by an outsider agent and
can be used for political reasons. One o f the greatest obstacles for the extraction o f oil
reserves and their utilization in the development of the economies o f the regional
countries could be the lack of political stability in the Caspian region. Establishment of a

17 B ulent G okay, “T he Background; H istory and P olitical C hange,” in The P o litic s o f C a sp ia n O il (N ew
York: Palgrave, 2 0 0 1 ), 1.
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politically stable environment could help the development of friendly relationships
among the countries of the Caspian region, which would contribute positively to the
extraction and transportation of Caspian oil. Direct or indirect foreign investment requires
a stable internal and international political system. In fact, foreign investment and
financial support are essential to Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan, since these
countries do not have the necessary resources to develop their energy reserves. Under the
current politico-military environment, is it possible for them to establish a well-working
economic and political system that will be conducive to the extraction and importation of
the hydrocarbon resources?
The absence o f democracy and rule o f law in the Caspian states, and the nature of
the domestic politics of the littoral states, could be seen as important factors in
determining the nature o f the interstate relationship in the Caspian region.18 The absence
of a rule o f law and the lack of legitimacy on the part o f the ruling elites, who could not
gain public support, may have caused constant turmoil within this region. In addition,
former Soviet republics do not have a democratic regime, and the absence o f the rule of
law is a fact o f their governance. The regimes in these states are not quite stable. When
we look just at the political change, for example, Azerbaijan, within one decade, had
three different administrations whose successors brought new agendas and new priorities,
and different ways o f resolving their issues. Although these seem to be internal affairs of
those states, they directly affect Western interests thorough hampering investments for
the development o f oil reserves. The continuation of existing problems hamper direct
foreign investment from the oil countries and block international monetary aid for the

18 A quick glance at the inform ation provided by the reports o f the Freedom H ou se reveal that the Caspian
states have a long w a y to go in dem ocratization and d evelopm ent o f dem ocratic institutions.
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projects. The internal problems o f these countries, and the political impotence and
incompetence o f their leaders, are among the problems that need to be solved for a
smooth functioning of the oil industry and transportation of the oil to world markets.
The importance o f oil in world politics is obvious. All industrial countries depend
on the importation of oil from the Middle East and other producers. If we consider that
the oil resources o f the world are limited, no matter how big or small the resources are we
can understand why countries attach so much importance to issues related to securing the
flow of oil. It is in fact an issue of survival for many industrialized nations and their
economies, including the United States, which is highly dependent on the importation of
oil despite its known reserves.

COOPERATION IN THEORY
Exploring these problems is an important step to resolve them. In that sense,
dealing with the issues that produce competition rather than cooperation is an essential
step that could contribute to their settlement. Whether states inherently compete or
cooperate with each other is an essential discussion in International Relations theory. The
founder o f Realist Theory, Hans Morgenthau, argues that states in the international arena
cannot trust anyone but themselves. This is accepted as the governing rule in
international relations that breeds hostility and w ar.19 Morgenthau also argues that power
politics and balance o f power are the defining characteristics o f international state order,
which decreases the possibility of cooperation among states.20 Power and national interest

19 Hans J. M orgenthau, P o litic s a m o n g N ation s; the S tru g g le f o r P o w e r a n d P e a c e , 4 th ed. (N e w York:
K nopf, 1967).
20 The N eorealist scholars continue along the sam e line and argue that states operate w ithin an anarchic
international order w here the basic understanding w ithin that system is com petition rather than cooperation.
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are among the most important concepts in realist theory. Since states are like those of
egoist individuals, conflicts and wars are inevitable.21 While Realists/Neo-realists argue
that states within an anarchic environment compete with each other, Institutionalists
argue that this is not a universal phenomenon. Under certain circumstances, anarchy can
be ameliorated and cooperation can be achieved.22 Supporters o f this idea argue that
institutions can help states to come together and thereby increases the likelihood of
cooperation among them.

23

While analyzing the causes o f the lack o f cooperation among

internal and external powers in the Caspian region, I will be drawing on the theoretical
discussions about state behavior and more specifically, on the concept of cooperation.
While analyzing the reasons for the lack o f cooperation among major players, I will refer
to the thoughts developed by major IR schools.
First is the systemic approach o f Neo-realism that focuses mainly on the systemic
effects o f anarchy on state behaviors. In the Caspian context, the rivalry among major

Kenneth N . W altz, T heory o f In tern a tio n a l P o litic s (R eading, M A: A d d ison -W esley, 1979). In addition,
W altz argues that states w ithin an anarchic environm ent have to com p ly w ith the rules o f anarchy and take
precautions, otherw ise th ey w ill be penalized by the system . K enneth N . W altz, “A narchic Orders and
B alance o f P ow er,” in N eo rea lism a n d its C ritics, ed., R obert O. K eohane (N e w York: C olum bia
U niversity Press, 1986).
21 For a more insightful com parison o f realist and Institutionalist approaches, see D avid B aldw in, ed.,
N eo rea lism a n d N eo lib era lism : The C o n tem p o ra ry D e b a te (C olum bia U n iversity Press, 1993); H elen
M ilner, “International T heories o f C ooperation A m o n g N ations: A R ev iew E ssa y ,” W o rld P o litic s 4 4 , no. 3
(A pril 1992): 4 6 6 -9 6 .
22 A prom inent scholar, R obert Jervis, also argues that anarchy prevails in international relations; how ever,
under certain circum stances system ic effects o f anarchy can be am eliorated and cooperation could be
achieved. R obert Jervis, “C ooperation under the Security D ilem m a ,” W o rld P o litic s 30, no. 2 (January
1978): 1 6 7 -2 1 4 .
23 For more inform ation on h o w institutions increase cooperation, see Robert 0 . K eohane, Joseph S. N ye
and Stanley H offm ann, eds., A fter th e C o ld War: In tern a tio n a l In stitu tion s a n d S ta te S tra te g ie s in E urope,
19 8 9 -1 9 9 1 (C am bridge, M A: Harvard U n iversity Press, 1993). S ee also Judith G oldstein and Robert O.
K eohane, eds., Id e a s a n d F o reig n P o licy: Beliefs, Institutions, a n d P o litic a l C h an ge (Ithaca: Cornell
U niversity Press, 1993); R obert O. K eohane, ed., N eo rea lism a n d its C ritic (N e w York: C olum bia
U niversity Press, 1986); Robert K eohane, A fter H egem on y: C o o p era tio n a n d D is c o r d in the W orld
P o litic a l E co n o m y (Princeton, 1984); Y oung, In tern a tio n a l C ooperation', K enneth A . O ye, ed.,
C o o p era tio n u n der A n a rch y (Princeton, N.J: Princeton U n iversity Press, 1985); R obert O. K eohane,
“International Institutions: T w o A pproaches,” In tern a tio n a l S tu d ies Q u a rterly 32, no. 4 (D ecem b er 1988);
R obert O. K eohane and L isa Martin, “T he Prom ise o f Institutionalist T heory, R esp on se to John J.
M earsheim er,” In tern a tio n a l S ecu rity 2 0 , no. 1 (Sum m er 1995).
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players over the Caspian region, and the competition over the natural resources, could be
explained through the basic premises o f neo-realist assertions. The second school of
thought on the concept o f cooperation is the Institutionalist approach, which asserts the
possibility o f cooperation under institutional framework. The lack o f institutional
establishment in the region and subsequent competition could be analyzed within this
framework.24
The importance o f the study is to incorporate different IR theory approaches and
to analyze the policies of the major players and the outcomes that are associated with it.

IMPORTANCE OF THE REGION
The Caspian Sea has been controlled by Russia and Iran for more than a century.
Even at a time when nobody knew oil reserves existed in the region, the sea was of
strategic and economic importance for the bordering countries. Through a mutual
agreement with Iran, Russia had the right to maintain a naval force in the Caspian Sea
and both states enjoyed economic activities, namely fishing. The extraction o f oil in the
Caspian region, especially in Azerbaijan, started around the 1870s—1880s. When the
Bolsheviks came to power, there were 28 oil and gas reserves operated by Russia, with
the help of foreign investors from Europe.25 Most o f the Russian wells drilled by those
foreign investors were located in the Caspian Sea region. The Soviet oil industry worked
well compared to the world standards during 1850s-1870s. However, over time the
Soviet oil industry was unable to keep up with new developments in the oil extracting
industry, and the incompetent Soviet administrations failed to use the resources
24 For a detailed com parison o f R ealist and Institutionalist perspectives, see John J. M earsheimer, “The
F alse Prom ise o f International Institutions,” In tern a tio n a l S ecu rity 19, no. 3 (W inter 1994).
25 G okay, “T he B ackground; H istory and P olitical C hange,” 10.
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efficiently. As Gokay put it, “the most pressing aspect o f the petroleum industry in the
Soviet Union in the late [18] 80s was the fact that Soviet technology seriously lagged
behind that o f the West, the oil extraction technology was underdeveloped. Soviet drill
pipes and bits were o f such poor quality that the drilling process had to be stopped for
repairs.”

Of

In fact, the lack of progress and underdevelopment in the Soviet petroleum

industry was the sign o f a general slowdown in the Soviet socialist system. As the
country lost its power to advance in different areas, the loss was reflected in the oil
industry as well. This is one o f the factors that made Russia weak in international
competition over many issues. The point is, Russia still has the ambition to dominate the
Caspian Sea region, but does not have the financial and technological resources to
maintain its desired course o f action.
Returning to the development o f the issues in the Caspian Sea region, we may
assert that the breakdown of the Soviet Empire started a new era and a new history for the
littoral states o f the Caspian Sea. The fall o f the Soviet Empire was followed by the rise
of newly independent states in the Caspian Sea region. The area once controlled by the
Soviets and Iran now is controlled by five states: Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan,
Iran and Russia.
Although the Soviet Empire has done some oil extraction in the Azerbaijani
fields, most of the oil reserves remain untouched. The reason is that Russia is also among
the main oil producers in the world, with its own oil reserves. The Soviet Empire did not
depend on the Caspian oil because they could also drill for and transport their own oil to
internal and international markets. One o f the biggest problems with the Caspian oil is
transporting it to world markets, due to its geographical location. After this brief
26 Ibid., 12.
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introduction to the history of the development of the petroleum industry in the region, we
turn now to the issue o f the importance o f Caspian oil in the world markets.
One of the first questions we ask is, is Caspian oil really important— in the sense
that it would make a difference to the world’s oil consumers in terms o f pricing and
reliance on multiple resources rather than relying only on the Middle Eastern
petroleum.

27

The Caspian Sea is the largest non-OPEC oil source in the world.

Development o f oil industry and export in the region will definitely contribute to overall
energy security in the world.28 In fact, talking about oil and world politics is almost
equivalent to talking about Middle East and the petroleum resources in the Middle East.
Elowever, the proven and estimated reserves in the Caspian Sea region have the potential
to divert our attention from the Middle East to the Caspian Sea.

90

Estimates o f proven

and potential reserves throughout the whole region, except for Russia and Iran, add up to
190 billion barrels of petroleum.30 Kazakhstan has more oil reserves than were estimated
during the period o f Soviet Empire. After Russia, Kazakhstan is the second richest in
terms of oil among the Soviet republics, with its estimated and proven oil reserves
between 95-101 billion (bn) barrels in addition to large gas resources. Azerbaijan also
has large oil resources compared to its small territorial size: around 31-39bn barrels of
estimated oil reserves with 35 trillion cubic feet (tcf) o f natural gas. Turkmenistan is also
among the countries with high natural gas and petroleum resources, estimated to be
27 Ism ail Hakki Iscan, “K uresel D eg isim in Getirdigi Y en i Stratejilerle Enerji G u ven ligi Sorunu ve
Turkiye,” A v ra sy a E tu d leri 2 2 (2 002): 112.
28 Hearing before the U nited States Senate, Subcom m ittee on International E con om ic P olicy, Export and
Trade Prom otion o f the C om m ittee on Foreign R elations, U.S. E n erg y S ecu rity: R u ssia a n d the C a sp ia n , 30
April 2 0 0 3 , 4.
29 A lthough w e talk about the im portance o f the Caspian oil, it is no w ay com parable to the M iddle Eastern
oil reserves. The point here is that the Caspian oil reserves are also considerable w hen it co m es to
investm ent and future establishm ents.
30 M ehdi Parvizi A m ineh, T o w a rd s the C o n tro l o f O il R eso u rces in the C a sp ia n R egion (N e w York: St.
M artin’s Press, 1999), 80.
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around 34bn barrels o f oil and 159tcf o f natural gas, which makes it the third highest in
the world. Russia and Iran are among the largest oil and natural gas suppliers. Russia
ranks number one in terms of natural gas reserves and exports, with reserves o f 1.700tcf.
Russia is the 9th largest oil producer in the world, with 50bn barrels of reserves. The fifth
country, Iran, ranks as the 2nd largest natural gas exporter in the world after Russia. Iran
has about 10 percent o f the world’s oil resources, making it fifth in the w o rld .31
Although we have said that the Caspian Sea region has a large volume o f oil and
natural gas reserves, other views suggest that the estimated reserves are exaggerated, and
that the Caspian Sea region has less than the current statistics show.

-39

(See tables 1 and

2.) Although the total oil reserves o f the Caspian Sea region are far less than the reserves
in the Middle East, their potential and extraction are important for several reasons.33
First, these reserves are important for the former republics and their economies.
These reserves seem trivial compared to that o f the total world reserves, but the existing
oil resources in the Caspian Sea would be more than enough to develop the region
economically and bring prosperity to its people.

31 U nited States Energy Inform ation A dm inistration. A vailab le 1 0 n lin el:< h ttp ://w w w .eia.d oe.gov/> [2
February 20 0 7 ]
32 A n adolu A jansi, “Hazar Petrolu S oylen d igi Kadar D e g il,” 2 4 April 1998.
33 Som e experts on the region com m ented “the global strategic sign ifican ce o f the Caspian region with
respect to energy resources pales in com parison to that o f the Persian G ulf.” Richard S ok olsk y, and Tanya
C harlick-Paley, N A T O a n d C a sp ia n S ecu rity: A M ission to o F ar? (Santa M onica, CA: R A N D , 1999), 80.
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Table 1:
Proven Oil Reserves: Caspian Countries

Russian Fed.
Turkmenistan
Kazakhstan
Azerbaijan

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

59.22

59.62

63.21

68.48

72.44

0.55
25.02
7.0

0.55
25.02
6.9

0.55
39.62
7.0

0.55
39.62
7.0

72.46
0.55
39.62
7.0

74.44
0.55
39.62

0.55
39.62
7.0

7.0

Source: BP Statistical Review o f World Energy 2006, Unit: In Billion barrels
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Graph 1: Proven Oil Reserves: Caspian Countries (View in 3D Graph)
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Table 2:
Proven Gas Reserves: Caspian Countries

1999

2000

2001

2002

2004

2003

2005

46.9
2.85
2.0

46.7
2.86

46.8
2.9

47.82
2.9

2.0

47.8
2.9
3.0

48.0
2.9

2.0
1.37

47.0
2.9
3.0

1.37

1.37

1.37

3.0
1.37

3.0
1.37

Russian Fed.
Turkmenistan
Kazakhstan
Azerbaijan

1.37

Source: BP Statistical Review o f World Energy 2006, Unit: In Trillion Cubic Meters
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Graph 2: Proven Gas Reserves: Caspian Countries (View in 3D Graph)

It is also important to have multiple channels of oil production and extraction in
the world, since the potential exists to reduce oil prices by eliminating the Middle Eastern
monopoly. The importance of the Caspian oil also stems from the fact that it could
reduce the oil importing countries’ dependence on Middle Eastern petroleum, thereby
decreasing the possibility o f blackmail by the OPEC countries. The oil crisis o f 1973 is a
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great lesson for oil consumers, especially industrialized countries. Given that existing
petroleum reserves in the world as a whole are limited and will come to an end in the
future, regardless o f the large Middle Eastern and other oil sources in the world, the
world will need to utilize every possible resource, since life on earth is very much
dependent on petroleum and its derivatives.34 The estimated oil reserves in the Caspian
region (around 200 billion barrels (bbl)) are far greater than Iraq, whose deposits of
113bbl rank second in the world after Saudi Arabia’s 262 bbl.35 See tables 1 and 2 for
more accurate data on the proven oil and gas reserves in the Caspian region compared to
optimistic estimates.

METHODOLOGY
The dependent variable o f this study is the lack o f cooperation among major
players in the Caspian Sea region, on the issue o f Caspian oil. I intend to find the reasons
behind the lack of cooperation and slow development o f issues in the Caspian region as
they relate to Caspian oil resources. In exploring the dependent variable, I will examine
three major variables, as it is generally accepted that social events cannot be explained by
a single variable. The overall picture may only be understood through the investigation
of a set of variables. There could be a number o f important variables at play at different
times, with a varying degree o f impact on the question asked. Since it is not feasible to

34 A s o f the year 2 0 0 0 , the planet is b elieved to have a total rem aining oil reserve b etw een 1 2 5 0 -1 9 5 0 bbl.
L ooking at the total estim ated Caspian o il o f around 100 bbl, the im portance o f Caspian o il b ecom es clear.
Nathan Perz, “T he Caspian B asin and Shifting U .S . P o licy in Central Asia: The Future o f War for O il,”
S yn th esis/R eg en era tio n (Spring 2 0 0 3 ).
35 The figures and numbers that have been presented here are subject to change as n ew explorations take
place in the region. T he main cause o f the variations b etw een numbers w ill be analyzed in the com ing
chapters, as it relates to one o f the p o licies o f the littoral states— that in order to attract foreign investm ent
som e peop le argue the numbers have been deliberately exaggerated.
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consider all the possibilities and variables, this study will concentrate on the variables
that are most important in explaining the central question.
In the following chapters, the level o f cooperation and its impact on the overall
development o f the Caspian oil industry will be investigated with reference to:
•

political/geopolitical rivalry among the players over regional influence and the
control o f oil resources in the Caspian Sea region;

•

armed conflicts among the regional players and military confrontations; and

•

the presence and effectiveness o f international institutions.

Definition o f Cooperation: Cooperation or Conflict (A Theoretical Approach)
There is agreement on the concept o f cooperation by both neorealists and
neoliberalists. According to Keohane, “cooperation occurs when actors adjust their
behavior to the actual or anticipated preferences o f others, through a process of policy
•5 r

coordination.”

The neorealist Joseph Grieco defines cooperation in a similar way:

“international cooperation may be defined as the voluntary adjustment by states of their
policies so that they manage their differences and reach some mutually beneficial
outcome.”

Both definitions involve a certain level o f goal-directed behavior. Second,

they also imply that actors engaged in cooperation retrieve gains or rewards from it,
although the gains received are not necessarily equal in size or kind, but must be achieved
by each party.
The concept o f cooperation is also regarded as “the opposite o f competition or
conflict both o f which involve goal-seeking behavior that aims to reduce the gains
36 Robert K eohane, A fter H eg em o n y, 5 1 -5 2 .
37 Joseph M . G rieco, C o o p e ra tio n A m o n g N ations. E urope, A m erica a n d N on T a riff B a rrie rs to T rade
(Ithaca, London: Cornell U n iversity Press, 1990), 22.
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T
O

available to others or restrain their want satisfaction.”

According to Keohane,

“Cooperation is directly related to discord, and they must be understood together. Thus,
to understand cooperation, one must also understand the frequent absence of, or failure of
cooperation.”39 This perspective suggests that without conflict or competition, there is no
need for cooperation. However, cooperation or conflict should not be seen as the only
alternatives to states’ behavior.

Unilateral action, where some states could choose to

follow without paying any attention to the impact on others, could also be a course of
action outside the perimeters o f cooperation and conflict. Therefore, cooperation should
be understood in terms o f policy adjustment to reach mutual gains. However, the main
issue that needs to be dealt with is the likelihood of cooperation on the issue o f Caspian
oil and other related matters. Analyses o f circumstances under which states are most
likely to cooperate or compete give us more insight into understanding the concept of
cooperation.
The first independent variable is the political/geopolitical rivalry among the
players over the control of oil resources and regional influence in the Caspian Sea region.
While geopolitical rivalry refers to the establishment of a zone o f economic, political and
military influence/control over the region, political rivalry refers to the disagreements
among internal and external players, which also involves the states’ assertiveness over
the policy choices that serve their interests. It also differs from conflict in the sense that
rivalry does not involve military confrontation and armed conflict.

38 H elen M ilner, Interests, Institutions, a n d Inform ation. D o m estic P o litic s a n d In tern a tio n a l R ela tio n s
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton U n iversity Press, 1997), 7 -8 .
39 Robert K eohane, “International Institutions: T w o A pproaches,” in The In tern a tio n a l P o litic a l E co n om y
a n d In tern a tio n a l In stitu tion s, vol. II, ed., Oran R. Y ou n g (Cheltenham : Elgar, 1996), 291.
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Actors inside and outside the region see the region as their sphere o f influence,
which makes it hard to cooperate on issues such as oil. Geopolitical rivalry over
resources could be analyzed under two different areas o f study. The first area that
characterizes the main dynamic o f the subject is interstate rivalry over the legal status of
the Caspian Sea. The second issue, which represents the core o f the hypothesis, is the
long-lasting controversy over the transportation o f the Caspian oil and the construction of
pipelines. By taking the issue o f rivalry and competition as an independent variable, I
intend to find out its impact on the level o f cooperation— more specifically why states
choose to compete over the control and extraction o f Caspian oil— and how it affects the
overall picture with respect to the development of Caspian oil. The analysis of
geopolitical rivalry and competition over the economic resources in the Caspian basin
will be investigated with reference to major IR schools o f thought. In terms of
methodology, a comparative approach with the incorporation o f realist and institutionalist
points of view will be adapted to investigate the impact o f geopolitical rivalry and
competition among players in the absence o f cooperation over the utilization o f the
natural resources in the Caspian region. While the main focus o f the analysis is on the
central questions posed at the beginning, this part o f the study provides some insights into
the application o f realist and institutionalist theories to the realities o f the Caspian region.
Realists assert that power politics, competition and anarchy are the main elements of
interstate relationships. The analysis o f the reasons and impact o f the geopolitical rivalry
in the Caspian basin would be a test for the general realist assumptions in a regional
context. The same analysis applies to other schools o f thought that will be used in this
study, as an explanatory component of the main dynamics of the issues that will be laid
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out in detail in the coming chapters. While the core o f the study centers on the main
research questions and answers, this section will also reveal some information about the
applicability o f an institutionalist approach and its explanatory power in individual
contexts. Analysis o f the states’ policies and their respective choices over
existing/potential issues will be used to determine the impact o f differences and
variations in the general level of cooperation.
The second independent variable is armed conflicts and military confrontations
among the regional players. By analyzing the military confrontations and armed conflicts
that have taken place in the transcaspian region, I intend to find out their impact on the
level of development o f Caspian oil resources. After the breakup o f the Soviet Empire,
the region witnessed bloody conflicts and wars. These deep-rooted conflicts and military
confrontations caused political and economic instability in the region. It is an accepted
premise that economic developments and business activities need a stable environment to
grow. The war between Azerbaijan and Armenia, ethnic conflicts in Georgia and
Chechnya, and the mistrust between Azerbaijan and Iran are conflicts that have the
potential to disrupt any major economic enterprise in the region, and in the end may pose
an obstacle to the development o f Caspian oil and other projects related to its
exploitation.
The third independent variable that will be employed is the level of
institutionalization and the lack and ineffectiveness o f institutional arrangements in the
region, and its impact on the level of cooperation among states. In using that as an
independent variable, I intend to measure the impact o f the level of institutionalization on
cooperation among states, and to find out how the absence of institutional arrangements
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affects the development of the Caspian oil industry. Within the same framework, regime
analysis will be used to supplement the main discussions centered around institutional
establishments. As is the case with institutions, regimes are also said to be an important
factor in the achievement of interstate cooperation. Regimes are generally accepted to set
ground rules that help the emergence of interstate cooperation. The institutionalist school
argues that cooperation among states is easier under an institutional framework. Neo
realists disagree, asserting that international institutions rarely contribute to political
stability and do not have any major influence on issues o f war and peace; therefore
institutions do not have a considerable impact on the level of cooperation among states.40
In this framework, existing institutions and organizations among the Caspian states and
external players will be studied. The number of operating institutions and their influence
over the political and economic issues will be investigated.
In exploring these independent variables, I expect to explain the reasons for the
lack of cooperation among internal and external actors and the slow development of
issues in the Caspian Sea region. I will use primary and secondary sources in my
analysis o f the relationship between dependent and independent variables. In my study, I
will use Turkish materials on the issue o f Caspian oil and the Caspian region to enrich my
research, bring additional perspectives, and to learn the role of Turkey in the greater
picture. In addition, I will utilize books published on different aspects of the Caspian
region/oil and ongoing events. In order to analyze the stages o f developments and
initiatives that are related to the central question o f this work, I will use newspapers,
journals, primary writings and speeches o f leaders as well as other relevant sources of
40 For a detailed neo-realist perspective see M earsheim er, “T he F alse Prom ise o f International Institutions.”
S ee also In tern a tio n a l S ecu rity 2 0 , no. 1 (Sum m er 1995) for follow -u p d iscu ssion s w ith counter arguments
from contending sch o o ls o f thought.

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.

information. I will also use information from Internet websites that specifically
document the developments in the region and publish articles on different aspects of
Caspian oil and the Caspian states. Among electronic resources that I will use are the
foreign broadcasts and newspapers as translated by the Foreign Broadcast Information
Service (FBIS), Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Caspian Business Report, Caspian Oil
and Gas, Caspian Oil Industry News, Oil and Gas Journal and Caspian World. Some
Turkish resources that are worth mentioning here are the Zaman Gazetesi—which has
excellent coverage o f Turkey— and the Central Asian World, both o f which are available
in Print at Old Dominion University library and online. Among other Turkish resources
are: Milliyet Gazetesi, Ayin Tarihi (which has a wide array of Turkish and Turkic world
accounts), and Avrasya Etudleri, an academic journal in Turkish that covers the
developments in Central Asia and Caucasus from a variety of viewpoints.
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Figure 1: The Caucasus and Central Asia
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CHAPTER II
HISTORY OF OIL DEVELOPMENT IN THE CASPIAN BASIN

The region around the Caspian Sea has been a focal point since the early times in
history. As an area that has been inhabited by many cultures and civilizations, the region
has become an arena for competing imperial forces.1 The region has attracted many
people from all around the world because o f its natural resources. In addition to the
resources that attracted people to the region, the Caspian Sea and the surrounding area
became a passage between from northern and eastern Europe to East Asia. In this
chapter, I discuss the history o f oil development in the Caspian Sea region as it relates to
the current developments and interstate relationships. In order to understand today’s
socio-political environment in the Caspian region, we need to look at the historical
developments in the region. Some o f the issues that the Caspian states face today are
directly and indirectly related to the interstate relationship dating back to the times of
early oil discoveries.
There is a longstanding connection between the Caspian region and oil.
“Knowledge about the existence o f oil— white and black— and of natural gas dates back
to antiquity.”2 There are reports of Caspian oil as early as the sixth century

BC.

Zarathustra (Zoroaster) was said to have traveled to see the fires with his own eyes. The
ancient literature o f Greece and Rome contains many references to the oil and gas o f the
Baku area. Herodotus complained in 450

BC

about the evil smoke o f the Persian oil and

1 A rch eological evid en ces reveal traces o f human settlem ents in the South Caspian that date back to the
prehistoric tim es.
Shirin Akiner, ed., The C aspian : P o litics, E n erg y a n d S ecu rity (London:
R outledgeC urzon-T aylor Francis Group, 2 0 0 4 ), 3.
2 H ooshang A m irahm adi, ed., The C a sp ia n R egion a t a C ro ssro a d : C h a llen g es o f a N ew F ro n tier o f
E n ergy a n d D e v elo p m e n t (Palgrave M acm illan, 2 0 0 0 ), 89.
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described the production of oil and salt from springs and wells.3 Heating by the use of
natural gas was a common feature in Baku during the times of the Sassanids who ruled
Azerbaijan in the fifth century.4
In the thirteenth century, Italian traveler Marco Polo passed through northern
Persia and wrote that “on the edge o f Armenia in the direction of Georgia there is said to
be a fountain from which oil spurts in voluptuous quantities, so much that one could fill a
hundred shiploads at the same time with them. This oil is unfit for consumption, but it
bums in an excellent way and moreover serves as a remedy against camels’ scabies.
Folks from remote areas come here to fetch this oil, since in none o f the surrounding
lands oil of this caliber can be found.”5
Despite the fact that we have numerous reports and sources that talk about the
Caspian oil and the wells in Baku, the export o f oil and its use in trade was not
completely known. What we know for sure is that hand-dug wells produced limited oil
and it was used for medicinal purposes, cooking, heating houses and lighting in the
homes. There are, however, reports o f Caspian oil and its use in trade after the
seventeenth century, especially the oil wells in Baku and the prospering life in the city.6
It is interesting, however, that the real importance o f the oil was not fully understood
until it was discovered that oil could be used as a fuel for transportation. After that

3 M ichael P. C roissant and B iilent Aras, eds., O il a n d G e o p o litic s in the C a sp ia n S ea R egion (W estport,
CT: Praeger, 1999), 3.
4 In term s o f trade, both asphalt and lamb oil from A psheron (the peninsula on the southern shore o f w hich
Baku is situated) must have been w id e ly used in the region through the M iddle A g es. A ccord in g to m ost
sources, this w as the main source o f B y za n tin es’ fuel supply, w hich w a s u sed am ong other utilities, to heat
the bathhouses o f C onstantinople and as am m unition for land and maritime flam e-throw ers. “Caspian Oil
and Gas: T he Supply Potential o f Central A sia and T ranscaucasia,” In tern a tio n a l E n erg y A g e n c y (Paris:
The A g en cy , 1998), 3 0 -3 1 .
5 Ibid., 34.
6 G okay, The P o litic s o f C a sp ia n O il, 3.
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realization, heavy competition started between the people and the nations over control of
the oil reserves.7

RUSSIAN CONTROL OF THE REGION
In 1723, Tsar Peter the Great annexed parts o f the Persian controlled eastern
Transcaucasia, including Baku. Although the existence o f oil and gas was known at that
time, the extraction and use of oil was not a highly popular industry, since the oil wells of
Baku were too isolated from world oil markets. After the annexation o f Baku Peter the
Great, who knew the importance o f oil, started drawing up plans for Russia to acquire
white oil. Although the Russian plans to use Caucasian oil ceased after the death of the
tsar, control o f the region was completed after the defeat o f Baku Khanate. The treaty of
Gulistan in 1813, between Russia and Persia, marked a turning point in the history of
Caspian oil, as the monopoly rights o f Khan to extract and use the oil passed to the
Russian government.8
At the beginning o f the Russian period “there were eighty two wells in Baku and
the other oil springs along the eastern shore. On Cheleken Island in the Caspian Sea, oil
was obtained from about 3500 pits and seepages in 1838. The product was used for
lighting and as a substitute for tallow ... the annual production o f Baku oil was reported
in 1843 as 3.4 million kg (28,000 barrels) o f (black naphtha) and 14.143 kg (106 barrels)
of (white naphtha).”9 During the initial years o f Russian control, the oil wells o f Baku
contracted to private entrepreneurs for four years period for 13,000 pounds. Because of
the length of the lease term, entrepreneurs did not have the incentive to invest heavily in
7 “Caspian O il and G as,” 41.
8 Am irahm adi, The C a sp ia n R egion a t a C ro ssro a d s, 91.
9 C roissant and Aras, O il a n d G e o p o litic s in th e C a sp ia n S ea R egion , 6.
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the extraction of oil and development o f the areas, which in the end led to poor use of
available resources. The contractors tried to get the most out o f the wells but invested
very little because of the four-year lease system. The Russian government suspended the
lease system in 1825 and started extracting Baku oil on its own. Because o f the primitive
methods o f oil extraction, oil production remained low and in 1850, the government once
again switched to a contractor system. After 1872, the Russian government introduced a
single contractor system to attract companies and individuals with substantial capital.
The term o f the lease increased to 24 years, and the highest bidder would run the oil wells
of Baku. With a combination of public auction and a royalty system, the new system
continued until 1917.

THE FIRST OIL BOOM
With the new system in place, two factors that contributed to the development of
the Caspian oil industry were the acquisition o f new drilling technology and increasing
global demand for oil. Abolition of the state monopoly worked in favor o f Caspian oil
development. Production increased by 10 percent between 1871 and 1872, and doubled
the next year. By the end of the nineteenth century, the Caspian oil production rose 165fold.10 Along with the systemic and technological developments, there were major oil
discoveries around Baku, in Balakhany, Surakhan, Sabunchy and Zabrot. Russia became
the world’s largest oil-producing country in 1898 and held that position until 1902. The
peak year was 1901, during which half o f the world’s petroleum came from about 1900
wells in the Caucasus, from an area of less than six square miles. The oil fields o f Baku

10 Am irahm adi, The C a sp ia n R egion a t a C rossroad, 91.
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district on the Aspheron Peninsula, the great Bibi Eibat, Balakhany and Sabunchy
Ramany fields, supplied 95 percent o f the total production.11
In describing the successful development of the Caspian oil industry under
Russian control, the contributions o f several individuals were important in pushing the oil
industry forward. The transcaspian company o f Kokorev and Gubonin was responsible
for the construction of the first factory for acquiring paraffin and kerosene in 1859. The
construction o f oil distillation machines by Jasad Malikov in 1863 increased the oil
distillation installments in Baku by 1873.

i^

Reports written by the famous Russian

chemist Dimitri Mendelyev also contributed to the abolition of state monopoly after his
visits to the United States. This proved to be an important step in the development o f the
Russian oil industry in the Caspian region. The creation o f the Baku Oil Producers
Society after three oil conferences in 1884, 1885 and 1886 was also an important
achievement in the Caspian oil industry’s development, as this society became a
iq

stabilizing factor for the smooth functioning of the Caspian oil industry.
As the oil industry developed, it also transformed the region around it into a
wealthy town. “In the mid-nineteenth century the city covered some 60 hectares and had

11 G okay, The P o litic s o f C a sp ia n Oil, 6
12 C roissant and Aras, O il a n d G e o p o litic s in the C a sp ia n S ea R egion, 7.
13 “T he organizational sk ills o f the Baku O il Producers S o ciety helped foster a more confident attitude in
the R ussian o il industry. T he creation o f the “ Statistical O ffic e ” in 1889 w as one o f the m ain achievem ents
o f the society. This contributed sign ifican tly to the rationalizing o f the oil industry in R ussia. Prior to this
date, exact statistical data w as hard to obtain, and w as based as m uch on estim ates as hard information.
A fter 1889, the grow th o f the R ussian oil industry and its expansion could be m apped in detail. The society
also contributed to the social and cultural d evelop m en t o f Baku, financing the construction o f sch ools,
roads, a pharmacy, a hospital and also funding teachers, doctors, nurses and o ffic e stu ff.” C roissant and
Aras, O il a n d G e o p o litic s in the C a sp ia n S e a R egion , 8.
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a population o f around 13,000. By 1907/8, it encompassed an area o f 1,100 hectares and
had a population o f 248,300.” 14

Russian Oil Industry and the Role o f Foreign Entrepreneurs
The abolition of the state monopoly began an era o f competitive private
enterprise, which caused an explosion o f entrepreneurship. As the new drilling
technology was brought in, there were more than twenty small refineries in Baku in 1873.
Two o f the most important foreign figures in the history o f Caspian oil were the
Nobel brothers, who arrived in Baku shortly after 1873. The Nobel family immigrated to
Russia from Sweden, and was involved in the production o f artillery, cannons, and
underwater mines for the Russian army. Ludwig Nobel continued the legacy o f his father
and acquired a huge contract from Russian government to manufacture rifles. He sent his
eldest brother Robert to Baku to investigate the use o f wood from walnut trees in the
Caspian region. Upon his arrival in Baku, Robert was caught up in the fever o f the Black
Town and without consulting his brother he bought a small refinery for the money he was
given to buy walnut wood. With additional funds from his brother, Robert quickly
modernized the refinery. In a very short time he became the most successful oil
businessman in the town. In 1876, Ludwig Nobel himself came to Baku. As a successful
businessman in Petersburg, and with his high-level connections in the Russian
government, Ludwig Nobel became the oil king o f Baku in a very short time.
14 A kiner, The C a sp ia n , 5. She also adds that the city life o w es a great deal to the w ealth that cam e from oil
m on ey w hich also transform ed the intellectual life in the city. “It w as an extraordinary fusion o f old and
new , o f East and W e s t ... in 1873, the first national theatre w as opened and, in 1894 the first public library.
The First A zerbaijani opera w as perform ed in 1908. E ducational establishm ents offered different typ es o f
instruction and a variety o f field s o f study (traditional, European, secular, religious and various
com bination o f these spheres), w h ile learned so cieties debated p hilosophical, social and political topics.
C ivil institutions w ere d evelop ed , including trade and p rofessional organizations, such as the Producers
A ssocia tio n for the oil industry.” Ibid., 5 -6 .
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Transportation of the oil was the weakest link in the Baku oil industry. Most of
the oil was carried in wooden barrels by boats to Astrakhan and transferred to barges for
a long journey over the Volga River. In 1878, the Nobel brothers’ company introduced
the first tanker, Zoroaster, which was followed by many other ships. In addition to these
developments, the establishment of pipelines from oil wells to refineries cut the cost of
oil production by 50 percent and made the brothers’ oil company highly competitive. By
1883 the Nobel brothers provided over 50 percent o f the kerosene to Russia.15 This was a
great success for them and an important development for the Caspian oil industry.16
As production increased, the Nobel brothers were forced to seek out new markets.
Transportation of Caspian oil presented serious challenges, as it was easier to get
American kerosene to some parts o f Russia from 8,000 miles away than to get Caspian
kerosene from 340 miles away. Nonetheless, “during the next twenty five years, the
Nobel industry drilled more than 500 wells, employed as many as 12000 men in their
petroleum business and produced about 150 million barrels of petroleum.” 17 As the
company o f the Nobel brothers produced half o f the Russian kerosene, they told their
stockholders that they pushed American kerosene out o f the Russian market.
While the Nobel brothers contributed greatly to the expansion and development of
Caspian oil, Rothschilds was the second company to engage in the oil business that
helped to advance the industry. In 1883, a loan from Rothschilds to the Baku-Batum
railroad almost entirely changed the oil business, as it opened a door to outside world
markets, especially Europe. The project was carried out by two producers (Bunge and

15Am irahm adi, The C a sp ia n R eg io n a t a C ro ssro a d s, 94.
16 The rapid d evelop m en t o f L udw ig N o b e l’s o il em pire in the first ten years o f its ex isten ce has been
described as one o f the greatest triumphs o f b usiness enterprise in the 19th century. D an iel Y ergin, The
P rize: The E p ic Q u est f o r Oil, M oney, a n d P o w e r (N e w York: Sim on and Schuster, 1990), 59.
17 C roissant and Aras, O il a n d G e o p o litic s in the C a sp ia n S ea R egion , 9.
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Palashkovsky), but was interrupted by the war between Russia and the Ottomans. With
the involvement o f Rothschilds in the project, they became the second largest company in
the Caspian region after the establishment o f the Caspian and Black Sea Petroleum
Company— known as Brito for its Russian initials— in 1883.18 In addition to these
foreign involvements, two British oil companies participated in the Caspian oil industry
and drilled the largest oil wells outside o f Baku in Groznyy in 1883. By 1910 the oil
production from those wells reached 8.8 million barrels.19
Russian oil production steadily increased with the help o f foreign companies and
was able to compete with American oil in the world oil markets. In 1911, fields in
Kazakhstan, on the other side of the Caspian Sea, were developed, while Turkmen oil
production started in 1900 in the Chelecken field. Some small fields in Fergana Valley in
Uzbekistan came into operation in 18 85.20 Up until World War I, a large, well-managed,
well-financed oil industry was in place in the Caspian Sea region. When the war broke
out, the oil industry in the Caspian Sea was moving forward in an orderly fashion.

Soviet Period: Caspian Oil
World War I and the Russian revolution had a great impact on the world’s oil
industry and also the Caspian region. The stability that existed in the region and in the
Caspian oil industry was deeply shaken by the developments after World War I and the
Bolshevik revolution. After long battles between Russian, Turkish-Ottoman, British and
Azeri armies, on April 28, the Red Army advanced to the outskirts o f Baku and the Azeri

18 In 1911, R oyal D utch-Shell C om pany bought R othschilds Brito and becam e the second largest com pany
in the region.
19 Edgar W esley O w en, Trek o f the O il F in ders: A H isto ry o f E x p lo ra tio n f o r P etro leu m (Tulsa: A m erican
A ssociation for Petroleum G eo lo g ists, 1975), 2 6 2 .
20 D ekm ejian and Sim onian, T ro u b le d W aters, 17.
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government fell under the Red Army’s pressure.21 On May 4, the Bolsheviks captured
and confiscated the last oil property in Baku, and the entire oil industry and oil
production fell into the hands of the Soviets.22 The Soviets confiscated all the private
holdings and by a decree by Lenin himself, all the oil industry in the Soviet-controlled
territory was nationalized.

Despite heavy government control o f the Caspian oil and the

Soviet oil industry, during the years of NEP (New Economic Policy) Lenin kept the doors
open for foreign companies in order to acquire western capital and technology. The
Soviets negotiated with Royal Dutch-Shell over the operation and development o f the oil
industry in Azerbaijan; however, the negotiations and open-door policies ended with
Stalin’s arrival in Politburo.
In the Soviet Empire in the following decades, intensive social engineering was
implemented to sovietize the republics. The imposition of a centrally planned economy
with a strong regional specialization left Azerbaijan as one of the leading centers o f oil
production in the Soviet Union.24 Up until World War II, the Baku petroleum industry
maintained its dominant position. Sixty percent o f Soviet petroleum needs in 1931, and
80 percent in 1940, were supplied by the Baku fields. Gradually however, a decline set
in, perhaps due to the Soviet decision to invest in strategically safer fields in Ural-Volga

21 C om plete chaos and disorder dom inated the Caspian region during the years o f 1 9 1 8 -2 1 . After
A zerbaijan, A rm enia and G eorgia declared their independence, the Ottoman army entered Baku. A s the
O ttom ans w ere under pressure in alm ost all the flanks, the city w as captured b y the British troops. For a
b rief period, the B ritish tried to keep the city and the oil industry under control by im posing martial law. In
order to maintain the export o f Baku oil, the British also established military control over the Baku-Batum i
railw ay and the seaport on the B lack Sea.
22 Jamil H asanov, “T he Struggle for A zerbaijani O il at the End o f the W orld War I,” C a spia n C ro ssro a d s
M agazin e 2, no. 4 (Spring 1997).
23 Charles V an Der L eeu w , O il a n d G as in the C au casu s a n d C aspian : A H isto ry (N ew York: St. M artin’s
Press, 2 0 0 0 ), 95.
24 Akiner, The C a sp ia n , 7.
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and Western Siberia.
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Especially after the German attempt to control the Caspian oil

during World War II, the Soviet government realized that it would be much safer to open
up new sites that were more difficult for foreign access and annexation.

9f\

In fact, after

the death o f Lenin, the West did not have a serious involvement in the entire Soviet land.
However, some argued that “the Soviet regime deliberately prevented the Caspian energy
resources from being developed, and deprived Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan of
the opportunity to reach for substantially higher standards o f living.”27 Until World War
II, Russian oil production increased due to the investment in oil drilling technology and
the high level o f importance attached to the oil industry by the Soviet administration.
After World War II, the Soviet oil industry’s attention shifted to other oil reserves
in the empire. As the drilling in some parts o f Ukraine, Siberia and the Volga-Ural area
produced huge amounts o f oil reserves, Caspian oil production declined in both volume
and importance. During the five-year plans o f the Soviet administration, the oil industry
advanced in many areas, especially in the area o f drilling and employment o f new
technologies by Soviet geologists and geophysicists. After the death o f Stalin in 1953, as
production increased and surpassed domestic usage, the Soviet government began
exporting oil to Europe.
Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, Russian oil production increased greatly;
however, Russian oil technology remained behind that o f the West. The Russian oil
industry experienced serious problems in all areas, e.g. drilling technology, pipes,

25 Robert E. Ebel, “The H istory and P olitics o f C hechen O il,” C a sp ia n C ro ssro a d s 1, no. 1 (W inter 1995):
9 -1 1 .
26 In 1942, German forces under H itler’s com m and m ounted operation “E d elw eiss” in an attempt to seize
control o f the C aucasian oilfield s. H ow ever, in the m id -1 9 4 0 s th ey w ere stopped at Stalingrad b y the Red
A rm y. A kiner, The C a sp ia n , 8.
27 Robert V . B olersk y, “R ussia, the W est and the Caspian E nergy H ub,” M id d le E a st J o u rn a l 4 9 , no. 2
(Spring 1995): 218.
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storage, etc. One major issue was the fact that Soviet oil technology was almost 25 years
behind American and Western oil technology. This caused inefficient extraction and
refining o f the oil, and the pipelines could not handle the high volume o f oil being
transported. Despite the existing problems, the reason that the Soviets produced such
great amounts o f oil was the availability o f vast reserves in the Soviet land. However, as
the cost o f oil production increased due to the inefficiency in all areas o f the oil industry,
the Soviets had difficulty competing with American and European oil companies in the
world oil markets, despite the huge amounts o f oil production.

By the mid-1980s, the

Russian Federation had taken a comfortable lead in the combined Soviet Union oil export
capacity. In 1987 it produced 569 million tons o f an all-union output o f 624 million tons,
but the cost was so high that it was struggling to compete on the world market. In fact, it
was not the only sector in the Soviet Union that was having serious problems; the whole
Soviet economy was under distress because o f numerous fundamental problems related to
the social economy o f the Soviet communist system. As with the general decline in the
Soviet economy, oil production also declined all over the Soviet Union, including the
transcaspian region.

29

As the Soviet Union moved toward disintegration, in 1991, the last year o f the
Union, “Azerbaijan’s oil production stood at 234,000 barrels per day (b/d), Kazakhstan’s
at 532,000 b/d, Turkmenistan at 108,000 b/d and Uzbekistan at 57,000 b/d. Russian
production in the north Caucasus area adjacent to the Caspian was 134,000 b/d. These
numbers added up represented some 10 percent of total Soviet oil production and a

28 V an Der L eeu w , O il a n d G a s in th e C a u ca su s
29 A s a result o f steady depletion o f the o il
exploration efforts, the petroleum industry w as
U nion agreed that there w as enorm ous room for

a n d C a sp ia n , 116.
field s through overexploitation and underinvestm ent in
in d ecline. E conom ists both inside and outside the S o v iet
im provem ent. G 6kay, The P o litic s o f C a sp ia n O il, 15.
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modest 1.64 percent of words oil production. O f a total Soviet gas production o f 642
billion cubic meters (cm) in 1991, 147.3 bcm came from Caspian riparian and adjacent
regions with the following distribution: 84.3 bcm for Turkmenistan, 41.9 bcm for
Uzbekistan, 8bcm for Azerbaijan, 7.9 bcm for Kazakhstan, and 5.9 bcm for North
Caucasus. The contribution o f Caspian area to world gas production was 7 percent, much
higher than the Caspian’s share o f the world oil output.”30

DEVELOPMENT OF CASPIAN OIL
The interest in the Caspian region and Caspian oil steadily increased, especially
after the collapse o f the Soviet Union. First among the actors that have shown strong and
continued interest in the region and oil are the governments of the littoral states, who
considered Caspian oil an important tool for economic recovery and future prosperity.
Second, politicians from OECD countries wanted to see the development o f Caspian oil
as an alternate source for energy security. The third group to show interest in the Caspian
oil was the Russian oil industry, which wanted to recoup the expenses that they poured
into the development o f Caspian oil. Russian politicians also continuously monitored and
actively engaged in the developments regarding Caspian oil. They considered the
growing Western presence as a geopolitical threat to Russian interests in the region. The
fifth and last group is made up o f Western oil companies seeking to acquire major
petroleum contracts in the Caspian.31

30 D ekm ejian and Sim onian, T ro u b led W aters, 1 7 -1 8 .
31 Ottar Skegan, “ Survey o f C aspian’s Oil and Gas R esou rces,” in The C a sp ia n R eg io n a t a C ro ssroad:
C h allen g es o f a N ew F ro n tier o f E n erg y a n d D evelo p m en t, ed. H ooshang A m irahm adi (N ew York: St.
M artin’s Press, 2 0 0 0 ), 56.
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Energy development in the Caspian Sea region has progressed through different
and distinct phases following the independence o f the Soviet republics o f the Caspian
region.
The first years o f independence between 1992 and 1996 were considered rough
times for energy development in the Caspian region. Hostility, misunderstanding and
pessimism prevailed in the business as well as in political circles. The Western oil
companies had to face the legacy o f Soviet business culture in the Caspian states and
opposition from Russian government and oil industry. However, progress has been made
in some areas and some Production Sharing Agreements (PSA) and Joint Ventures (JV)
have been signed. Although difficult and slow during the first years o f these agreements,
the PSAs and the JVs from these years proved to be major milestones o f the Caspian oil
development.
The second phase o f the developments, between 1996 and 1998, was symbolized
by a high level o f optimism, and Caspian oil became a popular subject among the circles
of oil business professionals and regional governments. Expectations were high during
these years, and the Caspian oil in some circles was presented on a par with Middle
Eastern oil and from time to time with Kuwait or United Arab Emirates.32 (See graph 3
below.) However, as the studies and explorations continued and more accurate data have
been gathered, the rosy picture portrayed especially by the governments o f the Caspian
states, started to fade as the challenges for Caspian oil development became more and
more apparent. After 1999, a more sensible approach took place with more and more

32 A nthony H ym an, “K uw ait by the C aspian,” The M id d le E ast, no. 238 (O ctober 1994); Lorie Laird, “Is
Kazakhstan the N e w K uw ait?” E u ro p e, no. 341 (N ovem b er 1994); H ans N ijen h u is, “Azerbaijan: K uw ait o f
the C aucasus, ” W o rld P re ss R eview 4 2 , no. 1 (January 1995); Christ K utschera, “Azerbaijan: K uw ait o f the
C aucasus,” The M id d le E ast, no. 2 5 4 (M arch 1996).
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realistic business understanding.

Developments that were already underway continued,

but things did not move as quickly as they were initially expected to. Meanwhile, in the
northern and southern parts o f the Caspian Sea, new giant oil reserves were discovered
(Kasghan in Kazakhstan and Shah Deniz in Azerbaijan) along with many dry wells in
which Western oil companies invested millions o f dollars to explore.

S2004
■ 2005

U.A.E

Kuwait

Iraq

Iran

Saudi
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T.Cas
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Graph 3: Caspian vs. Middle East (Oil Reserves Comparison)
Source: BP Statistical Review o f World Energy 2006

CASPIAN OIL: RESERVES AND ESTIMATES
The estimates o f Caspian oil and gas vary significantly. According to Ottar
Skegan, this is because o f “a lack o f a reliable information and different interpretations of

33 A kiner, The C a sp ia n , 91 92.
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the existing data. Estimates also show changes from one year to the next not wholly
explained by new discoveries and production; the pool o f geopolitical and reservoir
information keeps growing, warranting sometimes major revisions o f prior
conclusions.”34
In addition to the technical difficulties inherent in the process o f estimating oil
and gas deposits, geopolitical and economic motivations of regional and international
actors increased the controversy about the existing oil and gas reserves in the Caspian
region. Geologically, the Caspian region is largely unexplored; relatively little oil and
gas data exist on the region. Industry has been reluctant to bear the exceptionally high
cost of acquiring and generating basic exploration data in the region. Costs are high
because the Caspian Sea depth changes rapidly and violent, frequent southeastern storms
impede navigation and drilling operations in the northern and southern parts o f the sea.35
There are several reasons for the exaggerated display o f the Caspian oil reserves
by the local governments. First, the Caspian states did not have the capital to invest in
the development o f oil fields, especially the ones offshore, so they depended on foreign
investment to develop the oil fields. To attract foreign investment and oil companies, the
Caspian states exaggerated the possible oil reserves. Second, these countries being newly
independent and economically in bad condition, needed something they could use to
spread hope to their people for a brighter future.36

34 Skegan, “ Survey o f C aspian’s Oil and Gas R esou rces,” 56.
35 Bernard E. G elb and Terry R ayno T w ym an, eds., The C a sp ia n S ea R egion a n d E n erg y R eso u rces (N ew
York: N ovin k a B o o k s, 2 0 0 4 ), 14.
36 Kenan C elik, C em alettin K alayci, “A zeri Petrolunun Dunu B ugunu,” Jo u rn a l o f Q a fq a z U n iversity 2, no.
2 (1999): 63.
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After the signing of the Contract o f the Century37 between Azerbaijan and a
consortium o f eight oil companies in September 1994, the energy resources in the
Caspian region were presented to be another Middle East, Saudi Arabia or Kuwait.38
From time to time, the numbers and comparisons changed but the focus remained
on Caspian oil as an important source o f petroleum and natural gas. As we mentioned
above, the data presented by different companies, agencies and governments significantly
varied from year to year but during these times, especially from 1994 until 1997/98,
people were optimistic about the development o f Caspian oil. Governments and
politicians who came up with huge numbers and estimates of Caspian oil reserves
justified their claims on the ground that the oil-rich Middle East had been thoroughly
explored with high-tech petroleum exploration techniques, but that the Caspian Sea
region remained largely unexplored.
As new studies and seismic data emerged, the expectations about Caspian oil
T
Q

dampened.

In addition to the newly published data, the subsequent drilling failures

changed the general euphoria and put Caspian oil on a par with the North Sea. More
37 Signed on 20 Septem ber 1994 b etw een A zerbaijan and foreign oil com panies, 8 b illion dollars w ere
allocated for investm ent over 30 years, during w hich 511 tons o f oil were expected to be produced from the
three offshore fields (A zeri-G u n esh li-C h ira g ). T he contract is based on production-sharing principles,
w ith a distribution o f percentages as follow s: SO C A R (A zerbaijan) 20% , British Petroleum (U K ) 17.127% ,
A m oco (U S A ), 17.01% , L ukoil (R ussia) 10%, P ennzoil (U S A ) 9.82% , U n ocal (U S A ) 9.52% , Statoil
(N orw ay) 8.563% , M cD erm ott International (U S A ) 2.45% , R am co (Scotland) 2.08% , Turkish State Oil
Com pany (Turkey) 1.75% , D elta-N im ir (Saudi Arabia) 1.68% . A zerb a ija n In tern a tio n a l 2, no. 4 (W inter
1994). A vailab le [Online]:
< http://w w w .az.er.com /aiw eb/cateaories/m agazine/24 fold er/24 a r tic le s/2 4 aioc.htm l> [31 O ctober 2 0 0 5 ],
38 In the 1990s, CIA energy analysts helped fuel expectations for M iddle East reserve equivalent in the
Caspian, w ith predictions o f 2 0 0 billion barrels yet-to-find.
Terence A dam s, “Caspian Energy
D evelop m en t,” in The Caspian: Politics, E nergy a n d Security, ed. Shirin A kiner (London:
R outledgeC urzon-T aylor Francis Group, 2 0 0 4 ), 92.
39 T he first study by W ood M ackenzie, a Scottish consulting com pany, revealed that the com bined proven
oil and gas reserves o f Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and U zbekistan w ere 68 b illion barrel (bbl)
equivalent. O f this amount, the total for oil w as 25 .2 b b l, 65 percent o f w hich b elon ged to Kazakhstan
(16.43b b l) and the rest to A zerbaijan (6.5b b l), Turkmenistan ( 0 .9 lb b l) and U zbekistan (1.3 7 b b l). T w o later
studies published in April 1998 b y R ice U n iv ersity ’s Baker Institute and International Institute o f Strategic
Studies o f L ondon (IISS) confirm ed W ood M a ck en zie’s figures. D ekm ejian and Sim onian, T ro u b led
W aters, 30.
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realistic data about the existing Caspian oil and gas reserves are expected to surface in the
coming years as more detailed studies and exploratory drills are done in the Caspian
Sea.40 Recent publications report more or less similar data about the existing oil and gas
reserves in the Caspian Sea region. (See Table 3 for proven and estimated oil and
reserves in the Caspian Sea and the amount of oil and gas production.)
Until more realistic and reliable estimates o f Caspian energy resources emerge,
“oil companies, investors and policy makers are bound to be at the mercy o f overly
optimistic and pessimistic assessments, often prompted by the geopolitical calculations of
political and economic elites, lobbyists, and sensationalist media.”41

COST OF ENERGY DEVELOPMENT IN THE CASPIAN SEA
One o f the important factors affecting the oil business in the Caspian Sea region is
the cost o f oil production. The arrival o f foreign investment in the Caspian region was
influenced by many factors, and the cost-profit analysis affected the decisions o f oil
companies and financial institutions that provided monetary support for the projects
undertaken by governments and companies. Because o f the geological and climatic
conditions, the cost o f oil drilling in the Caspian Sea is relatively high. One reason is that
most of the oil deposits in the Caspian Sea are offshore, therefore modem and expensive
systems are required, which contribute to the overall cost o f oil production. There are
reports that a single offshore exploratory oil well costs a minimum o f 20 million dollars,

40 A m on g the credible resources that publish data related to oil and gas reservoirs in the w orld and the
Caspian are: E nergy Inform ation A dm inistration (E IA ), B P Statistical R ev iew o f W orld Energy, and Oil
and Gas Journal.
41 D ekm ejian and Sim onian, T ro u b led W aters, 33.
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possibly as much as 200 million dollars. Failure o f these exploratory offshore oil
drillings would cost up to 300-500 million dollars.42
The second factor that increases the cost of oil production is the necessity to build
long and expensive pipelines. In order to remain commercially competitive, the global
oil price must be above $ 18—$20 per barrel. Per barrel cost of oil production is $10.7$12.5 for Azerbaijan and $12—$14.3 for Kazakhstan. Although these figures are slightly
lower than North Sea oil production costs, they are far higher than the costs o f oil
production in the Middle East. Today a fully built up cost for Caspian oil is roughly $12
to $15/bl. This compares to the high end of a North Sea barrel, but is still some two to
three times more expensive than an equivalent OPEC barrel in the Persian Gulf.
Nevertheless, in the near future, Caspian built up costs will fall into the $8—10/bl band,
which should keep the Caspian globally competitive.43

42 A dam s, “Caspian Energy D ev elo p m en t,” 92.
43 “D o w n sizin g the Caspian: OPEC & the R ealities o f Caspian Oil to the Y ear 2 0 1 4 ,” A P S R eview O il
M arket T rends 5 7 , 24 Septem ber 2 0 0 1 , 13. R elative per barrel co st o f petroleum production in som e OPEC
countries: Iraq $1, K uw ait $3, Saudi A rabia $ 2 .5 -$ 4 .0 , V en ezu ela $5, Gabon $ 8 , Iran $8. D ekm ejian and
Sim onian, T ro u b led W aters, 3 4 -8 .
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Table 3:
Proven and Possible Oil and Gas Reserves and Production in the Caspian Sea
OIL

Proven Oil R eserves
C ountry

Low

Possible

High
12.5

Azerbaijan
R eserves
B illion
Barrels (bbl)

Total

Man______

0.1

Kazakhstan

9

29

n.3

0.546

1.7

I /bekisiun
Total Caspian Sea
Keeion

0.3

0.594

17.246

44.194

H igh

30

44.5

15

15.1

92

41

7

Kussia

Turkmenistan

Low

38

■ .5

! 32.546

. 33.7
32.594

186

167.246
I.ow

Production
1000 barrels
per day

________
61

194.194

High

(. ouniry

1992

2000

Azerbaijan

222

309

319

789

Kazakhstan

■ i,

718

1.221

748

R ussiaA

0

0

0

200

Turkmenistan

110

157

260

475

1000

Czlvkistan
t otal Caspian Sea
Region'

66

152

150

225

1000

927.3

1.335.9

1.950.2

2,437

5.890

2004

2010

1290

N/A

I r a n ___

2400

GAS
Proven
R eserves

C ountry
Azerbaijan
R eserves
Trillion
C ubic Feet
(tcf)

: 30

Kazakhstan
Russia^___________

I '/hvkisuin

Total R eserves

35

65

88

153

0

Iran

Turkmenistan

Possible
R eserves

wI

N A

N /A

N/A

| 71

I59_

_:.2.50

; 66.2

35

11) I
_J-------

232

328

I 560

- j — — ---------

Total Caspian Sea

Production
(tcf/y)

Country

1992

Azerbaijan

0.28

2000

2004

j 0.20

0.19

0.6

0.56

1.24

4.24

Iran
Kazakhstan

0.29

Tm

Russia
Turkmenistan

2.02

| .89

2.07

I z.bekisuin____

1.51

1.99

2.12

Total Caspian Sea

4.10

■ 4.39

4.9 4

9.6 1

Source: Reserves, OGJ; Production, EIA; Forecasts, EIA.
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CHAPTER III
GEOPOLITICAL RIVALRY AND COMPETITION OVER RESOURCES: THE
LEGAL STATUS OF THE CASPIAN SEA

More than a decade after the signing o f the first major oil contract (1994) in the
Caspian Sea, the legal status of the Caspian Sea remains an issue of state confrontation.
The dispute over the legal status o f the Caspian Sea represents a classic example o f states
pursuing self-interest, which inhibits a general sense o f cooperation. Since the
dissolution o f the Soviet Empire, the riparian states o f the Caspian Sea have been
involved in discussions (oftentimes controversies) regarding the control and management
o f the resources in the Caspian Sea. The absence o f a clear and accepted regime
governing the affairs o f the Caspian Sea has caused long debates among the littoral states.
Since the use o f the mineral resources was vital, especially for the newly independent
states of the Caspian Sea, the geopolitical and economic issues remained on the political
agenda for a long time.
In this chapter, I will mainly focus on the legal dispute over the Caspian Sea
within the context of states seeking domination in the region and pursuing self-interest
policies that favored themselves economically and politically. The issue o f the legal
status of the Caspian Sea has widely been covered and studied by the scholars; however
those studies rarely analyzed the issue from the perspective of international relations
theories. I think the long-lasting controversies among the littoral states o f the Caspian
Sea could be better analyzed and understood by employing some international theories,
especially the failure of the states to come up with a clear cut solution in such a long
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period o f time. In addition, the Iranian factor will be studied in detail in this chapter,
since Iran is one o f the major factors affecting the legal status dispute during the last
decade.1 Analysis o f the policies of individual states and the motives behind their
policies will reveal much about the essence o f this legal dispute, the absence o f a genuine
interstate cooperation in the Caspian Sea, and its impact on the development o f Caspian
oil industry.
Before analyzing the policies o f individual states and their impact on general
cooperation in the Caspian affairs, I will cover some basic issues that would help to
understand future developments with respect to the legal status o f the Caspian Sea.

The Caspian Sea
The Caspian Sea is an enclosed body of water roughly 700 miles from north to
south and 250 miles across, lying directly between the states o f Central Asia and the
Transcaucasus. It is a salt-water body connected to the Black Sea by the Volga and Don
rivers. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Caspian Sea is adjoined by five states:
Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Iran and Russia. Despite the fact that the Caspian
Sea has geographical divisions (i.e., North Caspian, Middle and South Caspian) formal
delimitation is a major issue o f concern, as some o f the littoral states are strongly opposed
to it. It should be noted that the positions of the some o f the littoral states changed over
time, depending on the new developments and the interstate interaction; however the
main issue of formally delimiting the Caspian Sea among the littoral states remains
unsolved.

1 Gokhan C etinsaya, “R afsancani’den H atem i’ye Iran D is P olitikasina B akislar,” in Turkiyenin K om sulari,
ed. M ustafa Turkes and Ilhan U z g e l (Ankara: Im ge Y ayinlari, 2 0 0 2 ), 2 9 3 -3 2 9 .
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DELIMITATION VS CONDOMINIUM
Delimitation o f the Caspian Sea refers to the sectoral division o f the sea into
national zones, with each state having sovereign rights over their sectors as they would
have on their territories. Condominium, on the other hand, refers to the control and
management of the sea by the participation o f the coastal states. All decisions and
policies regarding the use o f the sea would be made jointly by the littoral states.
Condominium is a system of joint governance, with each member having the same rights
and an equal amount of influence.
The littoral states of the Caspian Sea supported either one o f these options, or
sometimes an amalgamation o f the two systems, depending on the developments, after
the break up o f the Soviet Union. Another aspect o f the legal status o f the Caspian Sea
is the applicability o f the UNCLOS (United Nation Convention on the Law o f Sea,
1982).3 Proponents of delimitation often assert that Caspian Sea is a sea and the
UNCLOS rules should apply.

2 W hile influential and dom inant states prefer condom inium , exp ectin g that th ey w ou ld im pose their orders
in such an environm ent (therefore Iran and R ussia favor the concept o f condom inium ), the other less
pow erful states (A zerbaijan, Turkm enistan and Kazakhstan) favor delim itation o f the Caspian Sea.
Som e o f the U N C L O S provisions related to Caspian Sea are as follow s:
A r ticle 2: T his sovereign ty extends to the air space over the territorial sea as w ell as to its bed and subsoil.
A r ticle 3: E very State has the right to establish the breadth o f its territorial sea up to a lim it not ex ceed ing
12 nautical m iles, m easured from b aselin es determ ined in accordance with this C onvention
A r ticle 56: S overeign rights for the purpose o f exploring and exploiting, con servin g and m anaging the
natural resources, w hether livin g or n on -livin g, o f the waters superjacent to the sea-bed and o f the sea-bed
and its subsoil, and with regard to other activities for the econ om ic exploitation and exploration o f the zone,
such as the production o f energy from the water, currents and winds;
A r ticle 76: T he continental sh e lf o f a coastal State com prises the sea-bed and subsoil o f the submarine
areas that extend beyond its territorial sea throughout the natural prolongation o f its land territory to the
outer edge o f the continental margin, or to a distance o f 2 0 0 nautical m iles from the baselin es from w hich
the breadth o f the territorial sea is measured where the outer ed ge o f the continental margin d oes not extend
up to that distance.
A rticle 122: For the purposes o f this C onvention, 'enclosed or sem i-en closed sea' m eans a gulf, basin or sea
surrounded by tw o or more States and connected to another sea or the ocean by a narrow outlet or
consistin g entirely or prim arily o f the territorial seas and e x clu siv e econ om ic zo n es o f tw o or more coastal
States.
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The main issue is whether the Caspian Sea should be considered a lake or a sea.
Since that agreement would determine the outcome accordingly, the coastal states o f the
Caspian Sea are divided into two main groups, each supporting different strategies to
resolve the legal dispute. Russian and Iranian administrations advocated the idea that the
Caspian Sea is a “lake,” whereas the other bordering states strongly oppose that, asserting
that the Caspian Sea is a “sea.” If we look at the historical practices o f the bordering
states, we see that Russia and Iran considered it a lake and made several agreements on
the economic utilization of the area. There is no formal agreement between Russia and
Iran that divides the Caspian Sea between the two nations or creates areas o f influence.
The usual practice was to come to an agreement on emerging issues through bilateral
agreements. This practice is called “condominium” because the specific region or sea is
administered by the participation of the involved actors rather than dividing it among the
members. However, if we accept the Caspian Sea as a sea, then the articles of
international treaties should apply and it becomes permissible to divide the sea into
national zones where individual states would have full sovereign rights on the use and
exploitation of the territory. It would be the responsibility of the states to explore or to do
anything they considered necessary, as any sovereign state would control its territory, sea
and sea shelves.4
The government of Azerbaijan leads the claim that the Caspian Sea is subject to
delimitation and that the UN 1982 convention on law of sea is applicable to the Caspian
Sea.5 The provision set forth by the convention entitles the states to “claim up to 12
miles sovereign territorial sea between 200 and 250 miles o f continental shelves
4 S. C olakoglu, “Uluslararasi Hukukta H azar’in Statu Sorunu,” A. U. S .B .F D e r g is i 53, no. 1 -4
(January/February 1998): 108.
5 “Status o f Caspian Sea is G oin g to be C hanged,” A ze ri Tim es G a ze te si, 12 January 2 0 0 0 , 2.
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depending on the configuration o f the continental margin and 200 miles Exclusive
Economic Zones (EEZ).”6 Azerbaijan is supported by Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan
since their interests also fall within this category. Having laid out the fundamentals o f the
controversy among the littoral states, let us now look more into the supporting arguments
from both sides.
Russia draws on the examples from other cases that are similar to this one.
However, the Russian claims fall short when we look at the similarities and differences of
those cases. The case of the Gulf o f Fonseca between Al-Salvador, Honduras and
Nicaragua is brought forward by Russia and Iran, that an international court o f justice
favored condominium over the dispute. But the difference is that the Gulf merely
belonged to one nation (Spain) before that. In the Caspian Sea, we have Russian and
*7

Iranian control throughout its history.

The Azeri government also brings examples from

all over the world that support the delimitation o f the Caspian Sea among the bordering
states. Some examples are: the lake o f Victoria, the lake o f Malawi, and the great lakes
of North America, where the bordering states divided the sea proportionate to their
coastlines.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE LEGAL DISPUTE
Historically, the Caspian Sea belonged to Russia and Iran. However, their
presence in the Caspian Sea has never been an equal partnership nor has any clear regime
existed to determine the usage of the sea surface and the seabed. Another important

6 Cynthia M . C roissant and M ichael P. Croissant, “T he L egal Status o f the Caspian Sea: C on flict and
C om prom ise,” in O il a n d G e o p o litics in the C a sp ia n S ea R egion, eds. M ichael P. C roissant and B iilent
Aras (W estport, CT: Praeger, 1999), 25.
7 Aleksandr A k im ov, “O il and Gas in the Caspian R egion: A n O verview o f C ooperation and C on flict,”
P ersp e c tiv e s on C e n tra l A sia (June 1996).
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aspect o f history in the Caspian Sea is that Russia dominated the region and the Caspian
Sea, which was confirmed by the treaties between Russia and Iran. Iran was never a
naval power in the Caspian Sea and its activities were limited, for the most part, to
navigation and fishing. “For Russia, the Caspian Sea was a route to the South, giving
easy access to Iran’s northern territories. Peter the Great established the first Russian
naval base on the Caspian at Astrakhan in 1723 and occupied the five Persian provinces
on the south and east banks of Caspian Sea.... The Caspian route also enabled the
Russian army to occupy the Iranian territories o f Derbent and Baku in 1796, and to send
troops to Russia-Iranian war fronts during the Caucasian wars o f 1804-12 and 1826o

28.” Iran and Russia always refer to the treaties o f the past between Iran and Russia/
USSR as a basis for the establishment o f a regime in the Caspian Sea. One reason is the
absence o f any major division of the Caspian Sea in the past, which they want to adapt to
today’s environment. Russia and Iran tried to rationalize their adherence to a joint
management o f the Caspian Sea and its resources on the basis of the treaties that both
states respected. The first Russian-Iranian agreement on the status o f the Caspian Sea is
the Peace Treaty o f Golestan (Gulistan) on 12 October 1813. The treaty provided equal
access to Russian and Iranian merchant vessels. However, only Russian warships were
granted the exclusive right to sail the Caspian Sea.9 The Peace Treaty o f Turkmenchai,
22 February 1828, confirmed the same status described in the Gulistan Treaty o f 1813.
The 1828 treaty provided additional rights to Iranian merchant vessels to enter Russian

8 A li Granm ayeh, “ Legal H istory o f the Caspian S ea,” in The C a spia n : P o litics, E n erg y a n d S ecu rity, ed.,
Shirin Akiner (London: R outledgeC urzon-T aylor Francis Group, 2 0 0 4 ), 17.
9 A ccording to A rticle 5 o f the Treaty: the R ussian flag shall fly over R ussian w arships, w hich are
permitted to sail in the C aspian as before, no other nation w hatever shall be allow ed w arships in the
Caspian. G ranm ayeh, “L egal H istory o f the Caspian S ea,” 8.
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rivers to receive assistance if needed.10 The rules laid out in these treaties governed the
conduct o f economic activities between Iran and Tsarist Russia, through the nineteenth
century.
After the revolution in Russia, the new Soviet regime took a different path from
tsarist Russia and denounced the legacy of Russia to maintain supreme status in the
Caspian Sea over Iran. The most important change came with the Treaty o f Friendship
between Persia and the Soviet Union on 26 February 1921. Article 11 o f this treaty
removed the privileges given to Russia by Article 8 o f the Turkmenchai Treaty, to
maintain a naval presence in the Caspian Sea.11 Another cornerstone o f the historical
developments between Russian and Iran regarding the management and the use o f the
Caspian Sea is the Agreement on Trade and Navigation o f 25 March 1940. Long talks
between the two sides took place under the pressing needs of the coming World War II.
The USSR needed to secure the Eastern flank by making sure that the Caspian Sea would
not be used by a third power.12 While the provisions regarding the rights o f the signing

10 Through the Treaty o f Turkm enchai in 1828, the R ussians gained the upper hand in the Transcaucasus
area; the treaty gave them the northern part o f the land and Persia got the southern half. Persians were
forced to ced e the Khanates o f Erivan and N akhichevan to the R ussians. T he borders drawn at that tim e are
still valid today
11 “T he tw o high contracting parties shall enjoy equal rights o f free navigation on the sea under their ow n
flag, as from the date o f sign in g o f the present treaty.” B ahm an A ghai-D iba, The L a w & P o litic s o f the
C aspia n S e a in the T w en ty-F irst C entury: The P o sitio n s a n d Views o f R ussia, K azakh stan , A zerbaijan ,
Turkm enistan, w ith S p e c ia l R eferen ce to Iran (B ethesda, M D: Ibex, 2 0 0 3 ), 20.
12 “The 1940 C onvention provided for a host o f co-equal Iran-Soviet activities in the Caspian Sea,
including the freedom to navigate and to sabotage. Each party also reserved a 10 m ile-w id e area o f f its
coast for ex c lu siv e fisheries. H ow ever, the C onvention m ade no reference to either party's territorial
sovereignty in the Caspian. The C onvention h ow ever did inform an exch an ge o f diplom atic notes, dated
M arch 25, 1940, in w hich each party referred to the Caspian Sea as an ‘Iranian and S o v iet se a .’ The British
Foreign O ffice's gratuitous translation o f the note referred to the Caspian as a sea w hich the parties ‘hold to
b elon g to Iran and to the S o v ie t.’ T he text o f the note, h ow ever, m akes it clear the parties did not intend to
create a condom inium or to express recognition o f a prescriptive form o f co-ow nership. T he note sim p ly
referred to the Iran-Soviet character o f the sea in the context o f regulating third-nationality activities in the
C aspian.” “L ost at Sea, Iran's revolvin g legal p osition in the Caspian Sea,” The Iranian, 2 9 O ctober 1998.
A vailab le [O nline]: < http://w w w .iranian.com /G uiveM irfendereski/O ct98/C aspian/> [12 February 2 0 0 7 ].
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states for fishing, transportation and trade remained same, the treaty provided a 10nautical-mile exclusive zone for the bordering states.13
By looking at the treaties between the two parties and the conduct of affairs
between Iran and Soviet Russia, it is possible to draw some conclusions that might shed
light on the current discussions pertaining to the legal regime o f the Caspian Sea. Based
on the articles from these treaties we can assert that the Caspian Sea has been defined as
an exclusive zone for two littoral states wherein each state had equal rights for fishing,
transportation and trade. The treaties also focused on the prevention o f a possible
infiltration by hostile powers. Both states offered assistance to each other’s vessels in
case of emergencies, and they also agreed to cooperate on the issue o f pollution.
However, none of the above treaties or the Soviet-Iranian relationship on the Caspian Sea
amounts to sufficient evidence for delimitation or condominium. Historically, neither
Iran nor Russia/USSR tried to create a legal regime for the management o f the Caspian
Sea. As Rodman Bundy notes, “ .. .terms such as condominium or sovereignty simply do
not appear.” 14
Given the historical background o f the current discussions, it is difficult to make a
case for condominium or delimitation. The best way to describe the current status would
be Sui Generis.15 If history is any guide, it was the pressing need o f new developments

13 T he 25 M arch 1940 U SSR -Iran Treaty briefly provided that “com m ercial ships o f one party w ould be
treated in the ports o f the other party the sam e as its national ships; each Party reserved the right for its
ships to fish w ithin 10 nautical m iles o f its coast; pursuant to the principles o f the 1921 Treaty, on ly S oviet
and Iranian ships could navigate the Caspian Sea. A ccord in g to the 1940 Letters, the Caspian S ea w as
regarded by the Parties as a ‘S o v iet and Iranian S ea ’.” “Caspian B asin D elim itation and Joint D evelopm ent;
O ptions and C onstraints,” A vailab le [Online]:
< http ://w w w .iea.org/textb ase/w ork /2002/casp ian /Irin a% 20P A L lA S H V lL I% 20R U L G % 2011110 2 .p d f> [22
D ecem ber 20 0 5 ],
14 Rodman R. B undy, “T he Caspian— S ea or Lake? C on seq u en ces in International L aw ,” C e n tra l A sia
Q u a rterly (Sum m er 1995): 4.
15 Ibid. A lso see A gh ai-D ib a, The L aw & P o litic s o f the C a sp ia n S e a in the T w en ty-F irst C entury.
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that changed the course o f management o f the Caspian Sea and the treaties between two
states codified these needs. Although these agreements will remain as a base for the legal
regime in the Caspian Sea, they need to be replaced to the satisfaction o f the littoral states
through mutual cooperation.

IN SEARCH OF A NEW REGIME IN THE CASPIAN SEA
The breakup of the Soviet Union increased the number o f littoral states, in one
night, to five. In fact, that is when discussion of the legal regime o f the Caspian Sea
started. Although by the Alma Ata Declaration on 21 December 1991, the ex-Soviet
republics confirmed their adherence to the international agreements signed by the Soviet
Union, the discussions over the regime in the Caspian Sea continued for more than a
decade.16 One o f the main reasons for the dispute over the legal regime in the Caspian
Sea is the existence of huge oil reserves. The desire on the part o f the new littoral states
to exploit the available resources is especially high because of their dependence on the
revenues from oil production.17 Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan perceived the
oil and gas reserves as their only conceivable way to economic development, although
these concerns of the new littoral states are not shared by Russia and Iran.

18

Discussions

over the legal status o f the Caspian regime increased after the breakup o f the Soviet
16 The A lm a A ta D eclaration, signed by elev e n heads o f state o f former S o v iet republics on 21 D ecem ber
1991, stated, “W ith the form ation o f the C om m onw ealth o f Independent States the U S S R ceases to exist.
M em ber states o f the C om m onw ealth guarantee, in accordance w ith their constitutional procedures, the
fulfillm ent o f international ob ligation s, stem m ing from the treaties and agreem ents o f the former U S S R .”
A vailab le [O nline]: < http://w w w .countrv-data.com /frd/cs/belarus/bv appnc.htm l> [22 D ecem ber 2 0 0 5 ].
17 A vra sy a D o sy a si TIKA B u lten i 128 (M arch 20 0 0 ): 2. S ee also “A zerbaycan,” A v ra sy a D o sy a si (January

2000 ).
18 R ussia and Iran do not have considerable o il and gas resources in the Caspian S ea but th ey have
trem endous am ounts o f reserves elsew h ere in their territories. R ussia is the 9 th largest o il producer in the
w orld w ith its 50bbl o f reserves, and Iran ranks as the 2 nd largest natural gas exporter in the w orld after
R ussia. Iran has also 10 percent o f the w o rld ’s o il resources, w hich m akes it the fifth largest in the world.
U nited States E nergy Information A dm inistration. A vailab le [Online]: < h ttp ://w w w .eia.d oe.gov> [26
O ctober 2 0 0 6 ].
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Empire. Attitude and conduct of the coastal states affected the developments with regard
to the establishment o f a new legal regime in the Caspian Sea. Numerous opinions and
suggestions dominated the political agenda throughout the decade. Some o f the littoral
states supported the idea of delimitation o f the Caspian Sea into national zones. Others
pushed for a joint sovereignty and suggested that the Caspian Sea should be managed by
the participation o f all littoral states rather then dividing it into national sectors. Over
time, some states preferred to extend their sovereignty unilaterally, as they saw it fit to
their economic and political interest. As expected, the various opinions and policy
choices created an environment not conducive to cooperation. In order to understand the
aspects of cooperation over the legal status o f the Caspian Sea, we must examine the
policies and respective interests o f the littoral states. Developments over time also
changed the direction o f the polices and choices o f the littoral states and in the end,
affected the very nature o f the issue.
As previously mentioned, some o f the littoral states were eager to develop their
resources in the Caspian Sea and therefore wanted to solve the remaining issues quickly.
However, the developments in the coming days showed that cooperation among the
riparian states in the region has been slow to emerge. In the next section I focus on the
reasons behind the slow development o f cooperation, by looking at the policies o f the
states of the Caspian on the legal status issue.
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AZERBAIJAN AND THE CASPIAN SEA
Azerbaijan (Baku) historically has been one of the centers o f the Russian oil
industry.19 Among the five littoral states, Azerbaijan has been the strongest and most
enthusiastic supporter o f delimitation of the Caspian Sea. Starting with its independence,
Azerbaijan focused on the application o f the sovereign rights o f each littoral state to
exploit the resources of the Caspian Sea within their own national zones.

90

For

Azerbaijan, the most important aspect o f the legal status o f the Caspian Sea is the
exploitation o f the oil and gas reserves. (See tables 4 and 5 on the oil and natural gas
reserves in the Caspian Sea.) Other issues, e.g. fishing, transportation and environmental
protection, remain respectively secondary.

91

The Azeri position on the Caspian Sea is

directly related to the dependence o f the Azeri economy on the petroleum revenues.22 As
may be the case with other littoral states, Azerbaijan’s policy on this issue is an example
o f states pursuing self-interest in the international arena, as described by the neorealist
theoretical approach. To support its position, Azeri politicians referred to “the pattern
derived from the division o f comparable bodies of inland water, such as Lake Superior,
Huron, Erie and Ontario between the United States and Canada, Lake Chad among Chad,

19 For more inform ation see Chapter II.
20 Khoshbakht Y u sifzad e, S O C A R V ic e President for G eo lo g y and G eop h ysics, states that “The Caspian
Sea has been divided in this w a y for 19 years— so that A zerbaijan had about 8 0 ,0 0 0 sq. km., Turkmenistan
alm ost the sam e, Kazakhstan had 1 13,000 sq. km ., and R ussia had 6 4 ,0 0 0 sq. km. o f the Caspian floor.
There w as com p lete unanim ity am ong all the States regarding the d ivision at that tim e.” Khoshbakht
Y usifzad e, “T he Status o f the C aspian,” A zerb a ija n In tern a tio n a l (W inter 1994): 30. A vailab le [Online]:
< http ://w w w .azer.com /aiw eb /cateaories/m agazin e/24 fold er/24 articles/24 statuscaspian.htm l>
[22
D ecem b er 2 0 0 5 ].
21 K hoshbakht Y u sifzad e also argues that “there is a sign ifican t difference b etw een the fish in g rights and
mineral rights in the sea. T h ose w h o have little k n ow led ge o f legal aspects o f the sea u sually con fu se the
fishing rights w ith the right o f using the mineral resources. In the international arena, the d ivision o f sea
floors am ong the countries for using the mineral resources has long been a com m on practice. If, for
instance, the fishing rights o f a certain country are lim ited to 12 m iles, this d oes not m ean that its mineral
resources m ust also be restricted to the sam e boundary.” Ibid., 30.
22 A ccord in g to E nergy Inform ation A g en cy , more than 90 percent o f the A zeri export is o il and natural
gas.
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Niger, Nigeria and the Cameroon; Lake Geneva between France and Switzerland; Lake
Constance among Austria, Germany and Switzerland.”23
In the case of those lakes mentioned above, the coastal states used a median lineequidistance method to divide the body o f water into exclusive national zones of
jurisdiction that would cover surface, air and subsurface o f the lakes. Azeri officials also
refer to the 1975 division o f the Caspian Sea into economical regions among the exSoviet republics under the leadership o f the Soviet oil industry, which neither Russia nor
other republics opposed at that time.24 The aforementioned points constituted the basis of
Azeri approach to the legal dispute over Caspian Sea. For the most part, Azerbaijan
turned out to be the only actor in the region that did not change its position. Throughout
the decade Azeri officials publicly opposed any other solution to the Caspian Sea legal
dispute, especially the Russian and Iranian initial push for joint management of the sea
and the Russia-Iranian claim that the 1940 agreement should be considered as a basis for
further developments in the Caspian Sea.

9S

23 Scott H orton and N atik M em ed ov, “L egal Status o f the Caspian Sea,” in The C a sp ia n R eg io n a t a
C ro ssro a d : C h a llen g es o f a N ew F ro n tier o f E n erg y a n d D eve lo p m e n t, ed. H ooshang Am irahm adi
(Palgrave M acm illan, 2 0 0 0 ), 268.
24 R oland Sinker, “The M anagem ent o f a Transboundary E nergy Resource: T he O il and G as o f the Caspian
S ea,” in The P o litic s o f C a sp ia n O il, ed. B ulent G okay (N e w York: Palgrave, 2 0 0 1 ), 61.
25 “A t present, the 1921 and 1940 treaties betw een Iran and the S o v iet U nion, govern the legal status o f the
Caspian. T h ese treaties have not yet been form ally invalidated, because no n ew docum ent has been
prepared to provide a b asis for the Caspian legal regim e. There are no zon in g, sectoral d ivisions or
dem arcation o f boundaries ... unilateral actions w ithout due attention to the rights and interest o f all the
littoral countries w ill on ly aggravate the situation and have negative ram ifications for all.” G eorgi
Tichanov, “A m erican Interests in the Caspian Sea R eg io n .” A vailab le [Online]:
< http ://w w w .iies.org/O L D S ite/en glish /train in g-con f/con feren ce/con f98-p ap er/p d f/tich an ov.p d f>
[14 O ctober 20 0 5 ].
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Table 4:
Oil Reserves: Caspian Region (Billion Barrels)
World Oil
Oil & Gas Journal
Year End 2005_______ January 1, 2007
Turkmenistan
Azerbaijan
Kazakhstan

0.600
7.000

0.546
7.000

Russia

30.000
60.000

39.620
74.436

Iran

136.270

137.490

a W orld Oil 2005
■ Oil & Gas J. 2007

Turkm enistan

K azakhstan

Iran

Graph 4: Oil Reserves: Caspian Region (billion barrels) (View in 3D Graph)
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Table 5:
Natural Gas Reserves: Caspian Region (Trillion Cubic Feet)
BP Statistical Review 2005
Oil & Gas Journal
Year End 2005_______ January 1, 2007
Turkmenistan
Azerbaijan
Kazakhstan
Russia
Iran

102.370
48.361
105.900
1,688.046

1,680.000

943.922

974.000

100.000
30.000
100.000

16001400-

1000 I BP S tat. R. 2005
800-

I Oil & Gas J. 2007

600
400-

200

Azerbaijan

K azakhstan

R ussia

Graph 5: Natural Gas Reserves: Caspian Region (trillion cubic feet) (View in 3D Graph)

On the other hand, Azerbaijan actively participated in the conferences and other meetings
concerning the Caspian Sea. On many occasions, Azeri officials expressed their desire to
cooperate with other littoral states on the issues o f ecology, prevention o f pollution and
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other environmental developments.26 Azeri attitude on the Caspian legal status has been
less cooperative despite the official and non-official statements, which expressed a
positive attitude toward cooperation with littoral states over issues concerning the
Caspian Sea. The Tehran Conference is an example of this kind o f an attitude that
created a deadlock on the developments concerning the legal status o f the Caspian Sea.
The Tehran conference was organized by Iran in 1992 to create a regime or a treaty on
regional cooperation in the Caspian Sea. One o f the main themes supported by Iran and
Russia in this conference was the establishment of an organization, by participation o f the
littoral states, to manage the issues o f the Caspian Sea without going through
delimitation. Decisions were to be made jointly and each state would have the power to
veto. Azerbaijan quickly opposed the Russian-Iranian approach and announced that
Azerbaijan would not be a part of this organization.

77

The same persistent Azeri attitude

was also apparent in Moscow in 1994 and Ashgabat in 1995. Azeri officials clearly
stated that they would not sign any treaty that proposed joint sovereignty or resource
sharing. It is clear that the idea o f joint management worked against Azeri interests, and
Azerbaijan was not willing to share the resources in the Caspian Sea with other littoral
states. Azeri officials kept pushing for the division o f the sea, as that was the only option
that favored Azerbaijan in terms o f petroleum reserves.
Having been very keen on the sectoral division o f the sea, Azerbaijan moved on
to the production sharing agreements with Western companies, to develop offshore fields

26 T he single and unique environm ent o f the Caspian S ea w as also reaffirmed in the declaration signed by
the heads-of-state o f Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and R ussia on 14 O ctober 1993. G eorgi
T ichanov,
“A m erican
Interests
in
the
Caspian
Sea
R eg io n .”
A vailab le
[O nline]:
< http://w w w .iies.org/O L D S ite/en glish /train in g-con f/con feren ce/con f98-p ap er/p d f/tich an ov.p d f>
[14 O ctober 20 0 5 ],
27 Sinker, “T he M anagem ent o f a Transboundary E nergy R esou rce,” 62.
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in the Caspian Sea. In 1994, the Azeri government finalized the agreement on the
development of Azeri, Chriag and Guneshli oilfields with an international consortium of
oil companies headed by British Petroleum.28 These fields were 70-120 miles east of
Baku and some were beyond the median line. For a long time, Azerbaijan claimed a
superior claim over the Caspian Sea, on the grounds that Baku was the center of the
Soviet oil industry and played a preeminent role in the development o f the Caspian
oilfields.

29

Azerbaijan granted similar licenses to oil companies to develop other
o rj

potential oil and gas deposits.

As the contracts were implemented, enormous activity

began in the area. New equipment was brought in, new surveys o f the area were carried
out, and staff were trained.31 As these activities continued, the legal dispute entered
another stage where the huge investment could no longer be ignored. As Roland Sinker
explained, “the implications of these activities, the longer these activity continues, the
harder it is to envisage an arbitration tribunal on the status of Caspian ignoring the fiscal
realities o f this investment and the agreements leading to it.... Azerbaijan’s attitude and

28 Signed on 2 0 Septem ber 1994 b etw een A zerbaijan and foreign oil com panies, 8 b illion dollars were
allocated for investm ent over 30 years, during w hich 511 tons o f oil were exp ected to be produced from the
three offshore field s (A zeri-G u n esh li-C h ira g ). The contract is based on production-sharing principles.
29 A zeri President A lie v com m ented that “in drafting the d iv isio n principle, w e should recogn ize the degree
to w hich every littoral country has d evelop ed the s h e lf and the value o f the sea for each country.” Q uoted in
Granm ayeh, “L egal H istory o f the Caspian S ea,” 21.
30 “A zerbaycan’in Petrol A nlasm alari,” A v ra sy a D o sy a si, no. 2 (O ctober 1997).
31 Karabagh and Shah D en iz field are am ong the deposits A zerbaijan opened for developm ent. In 1996, a
consortium o f w estern o il com panies and R ussia and Iran w ere g iv en a contract to develop 1.8 b illion
barrels o f the Shah D en iz o ilfield . H ow ever, on 23 February 1999, CIPCO president Jam es T illey said,
“W e found gas, w e found oil and w e found gas condensate— but w e didn't find enough o f it. There w as
quite a gap b etw een w hat w e found and w hat w ou ld be com m ercial, W e needed roughly to find tw ice as
m uch.” Jam es A . T illey, “Karabakh Prospect: N o longer in operation after February 2 3 , 1 9 9 9 ,” A vailable
[Online]:
< http://w w w .azer.com /aiw eb /categories/m agazin e/62 folder/62 articles/62 socar cip co.h tm l>
[3 Septem ber 2 0 0 6 ],
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conduct are effectively endorsing the current legal regime for the Caspian Sea as one
based on delimitation.”32

BY WAY OF IRAN: IRAN’S QUEST FOR DOMINATION IN THE CASPIAN SEA
Throughout the decade after the dissolution o f the Soviet Empire, Iran emerged as
a clever negotiator in the affairs o f the Caspian region. Despite heavy pressure from the
United States to exclude Iran from any oil Business, Iran managed to exert influence over
the developments in the Caspian region, especially on the issues o f the Caspian Sea legal
status and pipeline negotiations. Iran successfully used its opposition to the division of
the Caspian Sea, both the surface and the seabed, into national sectors among the littoral
states.
Iranians call the Caspian Sea “Khazar: or the Sea of Mazandaran, and perceive it
as a sea belonging to the people living on its coasts. Historically the sea belonged to
Russia and Iran and the use of the sea was governed by treaties signed between the two
nations. The breakup o f the Soviet Union increased the number o f littoral states but
according to the Iranians, nothing had changed except the number o f states surrounding
the Caspian Sea. The same rules and agreements applied as the ex-Soviet republics o f the
Caspian region signed the Alma Ata Declaration, which confirmed the validity o f the
treaties and agreements signed by the Soviet Union. The main Iranian view on the legal
status of the Caspian Sea rests on the applicability of the former treaties between the
Soviet Union and Iran, particularly the 1921 Treaty o f Friendship and the 1940 Treaty of
Commerce and Navigation. Two main themes from those treaties were put forward by

32 Sinker, “T he M anagem ent o f a Transboundary E nergy Resource: the O il and G as o f the Caspian S ea,”
63.
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the Iranians as a foundation for the legal status o f the Caspian Sea: the premise of
equality and the exclusion of third-party foreign nationals from the Caspian Sea.33
During the early years o f succession, Iran, along with Russia, stressed joint utilization of
the sea as the legal basis for the rights and responsibilities o f the littoral states.34 Through
the coming years, Iran played an active role in the negotiations.35 In 1992, the Caspian
states gathered in Tehran with the Iranian initiative, which marked the first step toward
creation o f a regional organization to coordinate all activities, including fishery,
transportation, oil and gas exploration, and the prevention of pollution and the protection
o f the ecological system. Iran took part in all o f the regional activities and conferences
related to the Caspian Sea. To consolidate its position on the legal dispute, Iran worked
closely with Russia. Iran, with Russia, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan supported the 1994
Moscow conference and the 1995 Biological Resource agreement. Iran on many
occasions asserted that unilateral claims o f ownership and division are unlawful and
unacceptable.

Iranian scholars focused on the legal discussions, with reference to the

past and existing treaties, and claimed that “with a reasonable degree of certainty, Iran
and Soviet Union never acted in any manner to indicate a delimitation o f the Caspian Sea
into their areas o f jurisdiction, they never thought in terms of dividing Caspian’s surface
or seabed ... the remaining query as to the supposition of a joint Iran USSR ownership or

33 S ee M oham m ad A li M ovahed, “Iran’s V ie w on the L egal R egim e o f the C aspian S ea,” in The C a spian
R egion a t a C ro ssro a d : C h a llen g es o f a N ew F ro n tier o f E n erg y a n d D evelopm en t, ed. H ooshang
Am irahm adi (N ew York: St. M artin’s Press, 2 0 0 0 ).
34 Ibrahim Karagul, “Turk Rus C ep h elesm esi,” Yenisafak, 19 O ctober 2000.
35 For a detailed Iranian v ie w on condom inium , see M . D abiri, “The Legal R eg im e o f the Caspian Sea: A
B asis for P eace and D ev elo p m en t,” J o u rn a l o f C e n tra l A sia a n d C a u ca sia R esea rch (Tehran) (Sum m er
1994): 1 -2 0 .
36 For more details on the Iranian and R ussian response to A zeri initiatives, see A gh ai-D ib a, The L aw &
P o litic s o f the C a sp ia n S e a in the T w en ty-F irst C entury, 3 5 -3 8 , 9 2 -1 0 6 .
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condominium over the Caspian becomes all the more purposeful.”37 However, “Brice
Clagged supplied an extensive legal argument against the Iranian position for
condominium: ‘initially, it may be noted that, while certain writers have discussed the
theoretical possibility o f common ownership o f lakes and inland seas no such
condominium appears even to have existed.’ He further notes that a leading scholar
(Verzije), after an exhaustive study concluded that ‘examples o f common ownership do
•j o

not to my knowledge actually exist.’”
Iran’s opposition to the Azeri and Kazakh position on the legal status of the
Caspian Sea continued throughout the decade. Despite the discrepancy on the Russian
view from time to time, Iran maintained its tough stance and the legal dispute remained
unresolved. This in fact gave way to unilateral and occasionally bilateral initiatives in the
Caspian Sea, leaving a common solution to the problem unsuccessful. As Paul Gregory
explains, “the viability o f a comprehensive regional approach depends upon a reasonable
degree o f common interest. As noted above, the Caspian Sea littoral states have
divergent goals and objectives that have become more apparent in the coming years. The
lack of progress on a formal unanimous agreement has become increasingly apparent.
Those Caspian states with rich national sectors and in need of massive capital injections
have less interest in a common settlement.”

TQ

One reason for the absence of cooperation

on this issue is the littoral states’ self-interest economic and political policies. Iran, as
one of the OPEC countries and with the second largest natural gas resources in the world,

37 M ovahed, “Iran’s V ie w on the L egal R egim e o f the Caspian S ea,” 279.
38 Paul R. Gregory, “D ev elo p in g Caspian E nergy R eserves: T he L egal E nvironm ent,” in C asp ian E n ergy
R esources: Im p lica tio n s f o r th e A ra b G u lf S ta tes (Tauris: Em irates Center for Strategic Studies, 2 0 0 2 ), 33.
39 Gregory, “D ev elo p in g C aspian E nergy R eserves,” 34.

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.

66
tried to maximize its economic gains in the Caspian Sea.40 First, a regime o f joint
sovereignty or sharing o f the resources on an equal percentage basis would give Iran 20
percent o f the Caspian resources, while delimitation o f the sea would only provide a 1214 percent share. A regime based on condominium would leave Iran better off
economically and politically while leaving Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan, respectively,
worse off, as some of the resources would have to be shared by Iran. In addition to the
distribution o f the resources in percentage, a delimitation based on national zones would
leave Iran worse off, since most o f the proven and productive oil and gas deposits are
located outside the Iranian national sectors.41 After 1997, Iran slowly moved from
condominium to equal share o f the Caspian Sea among the coastal states, with each state
getting 20 percent of the sea.42 This indicates that Iran clearly followed a policy o f selfinterest to maximize its gain. When Iran purchased a quarter o f Azerbaijan’s share in
1994 in the consortium, Iran temporarily reversed its position and agreed to be part o f the
project that was based on delimitation. However, Iran reverted back to its classical

40 See n. 14.
41 A s G eoffrey K em p notes, Iran has a strong interest in claim ing a share o f the seabed beyond its ow n
sector because the main o ilfield s lie in the m iddle o f the sea, o f f A zerbaijan. T he least prom ising waters
are those o f f Iran. G eoffrey K em p, “Iran and Caspian Energy: Prospects for C ooperation and C on flict,” in
C aspian E n erg y R esou rces: Im p lica tio n s f o r the A ra b G u lf S ta tes (Tauris: Em irates Center for Strategic
Studies, 2 0 0 2 ), 57. Iran's lon g-recogn ized sector o f the Caspian S ea covers 12 to 14 percent o f its surface
area. The collap se o f the U S S R has changed neither the size nor the status o f the Iranian sector. H ow ever,
Iran now dem ands either a condom inium (or jo in t sovereignty) that w ould allo w it to claim equal proceeds
from all energy d evelop ed at the seabed, regardless o f its investm ent in that d evelopm ent or the expansion
o f its sector to at least 2 0 percent o f the surface area and seabed. That territory includes part o f the oil-rich
A zerbaijani sector. A riel C ohen, “Iran's C laim O ver Caspian S ea R esources Threaten E nergy Security,”
A vailab le [O nline]: < h ttp ://w w w .h eritage.org/R esearch /M id d leE ast/b gl582.cfm > [29 A ugust 2 0 0 6 ],
42 President K hatam i in a sp eech in sum m er 2 0 0 0 , expressed that Iran exp ects a system o f d ivision that
w ould leave it w ith a share o f not less that 2 0 percent, and i f the regim e is to divide then the seabed and the
surface should eq u ally be divided. A gh ai-D ib a, The L aw & P o litic s o f the C a sp ia n S ea in th e T w en ty-F irst
C entury, 37.
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opposition when, as a result o f American pressure, Iranian participation was not ratified
by the Azeri parliament.43
The second aspect o f the Iranian opposition to delimitation is related to political
and geopolitical considerations. In a regime o f joint management, strong states, e.g. Iran
and Russia, would have a better chance to influence the direction o f developments and
policies of the coastal states. As has been the case for more than one occasion in the
Caspian region, Iran and Russia would use their influence and veto to prevent any
activity or development in the region, especially if the outcome is not desirable for them.
Russia and Iran have expressed their discomfort with growing Western involvement in
the development of the oil reserves in the Caspian and in the Transcaucasus region. The
policies o f the United States in the region in support o f Azerbaijan and other republics,
and of oil companies, were interpreted differently by Russia and Iran, although the U.S.
attitude toward Russian policies was constructive. This would exclude only Iran, as the
relations between these two nations has been poor for quite a long time. The United
States always followed a policy that would keep Iran in check and make sure Iran did not
get any part in the regional establishments, especially in oil deals related to production
and transportation.44 Russia was never happy seeing a strong state in the region, as it
prevented Russia from acting freely. Russia also had no interest in seeing these former
dominions in the Caspian region grow more and more independent, as that conflicted
with the Russian goal of reestablishing its old hegemony over the region. In a regime
where each member has veto power, Iran would control the economic and political

43 Sinker, “The M anagem ent o f a Transboundary E nergy R esou rce,” 7 1 -7 2 .
44 It w as the ob jective o f the A m erican governm ent that by fo llo w in g a p o lic y o f containm ent, Iran m ight
change its support for international terrorism and acquisition o f w eapons o f m ass destruction. Talbot
Flashm an and Paul G ob le, “From M yths to M aps: A m erican Interests in the Countries o f Central A sia and
the C aucasus,” C a sp ia n C ro ssro a d s M a g a zin e 3, no. 1 (Sum m er 1997).
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developments in the region, especially in Azerbaijan, since Iran has no interest in seeing a
neighbor become economically and politically strong. Iran has long worried about the
Azeri population in the northern parts o f the country.
A strong and influential Azerbaijan may pose a threat to the unity o f Iran.
Because o f this concern, Iran has long followed policies that would keep Azerbaijan in
control. A strong relationship with Russia on many issues, and support for Armenia in
the conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia over Nagomo-Karabagh, though, clearly
contradicts the theological foundations o f an Islamic state. An alliance with nonMuslims against Muslims in a war is mainly directed at preserving national and territorial
integrity in the north.45
Another factor that would explain the Iranian position on the legal dispute is the
involvement o f the United States.46 In collaboration with Russia, Iran has been trying to
counter the American influence in the region since the presence o f the United States and
that of the West is seen as a threat to Russian and Iranian interests. However, it is the
general trend between the United States and Iran and the ongoing hostility and mistrust
that guides their policies in the Caspian Sea. as each party tries to push for options that
would exclude the other. A regime o f condominium would eliminate more and more
U.S. involvement in the Transcaucasus and the Caspian region, while a regime of
delimitation would confirm the U.S. presence in the Caspian Sea basin through its
support for the newly developed countries and the oil companies. For these reasons, Iran
45 Iran has constantly w orried about the A zeri population in the Northern provinces. There are alm ost 15
m illion ethnic A zeri, nearly tw ice as m any as in Azerbaijan, and they also constitute one fourth o f the total
Iranian population.
46 The basic aim s o f A m erican p o licies in the region is “prom oting stability, securing uninterrupted flo w o f
oil to the w orld market, exclu d in g Iran from oil business and preventing any sin gle (R ussia) state
dom inating the entire region and Caspian o il.” (S ee “Hearing on the U .S . R ole in the C aucasus and the
Central A sia ,” testim on y o f F ederico Pena, Secretary, D epartm ent o f Energy, C om m ittee on International
R elations, 30 A pril 1998.)
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and Russia strongly criticized the Azeri initiative in 1994 to establish an international
consortium to develop three Azeri offshore oilfields.47
Despite the unilateral initiatives and Russian compromise in light o f the policy
shift starting in 1995 and 1996, Iran remained as the only state supporting the idea of
condominium. As with new developments, Russia dropped its initial tough stance and
worked with the littoral states to find bilateral solutions to the demarcation o f the Caspian
seabed. In 1995-96, Russia slowly moved to the idea of sharing the seabed and allowing
35-40 miles of national zones. During 1995-96, Russia and Kazakhstan, Russia and
Azerbaijan, and Kazakhstan and Iran held bilateral meetings to find a solution for the
legal status of the Caspian Sea. Most o f the meetings and conferences did not produce an
actual solution apart from the parties’ acknowledging the need to work closely with each
other to find a solution to the legal dispute.

After 1996, the Caspian states also

followed the same pattern. Despite the fact that disagreements among the littoral states
remained at the political level, there are instances o f high tension between the coastal
states emanating from the absence o f a regime governing the use o f the Caspian Sea
resources. One o f the most serious confrontations occurred between Azerbaijan and Iran
in July 2001, when two Azerbaijani survey vessels were forced out o f a contested zone by
an Iranian gunship.49 The area would fall into the Iranian sector if the 20-percent rule

47 See Nur-M uham m ad N oru zi, “C ontention o f Iran and Turkey in Central A sia and the C aucasus,” Am u
D a ry a 4, no. 5 (Sum m er 2 0 0 0 ).
48 In bilateral negotiations, each side expressed their intention to form a regim e that could be acceptable to
all parties. In a jo in t statem ent on 11 M ay 1996, Iran and Kazakhstan agreed that “the parties consider that
drawing up and con clu sion o f the con ven tion on the legal status o f the Caspian sea, on the basis o f a
con sen su s b etw een the fiv e coastal states, is a task o f utm ost im portance w hich m ust not be d elayed .”
V yach eslav G izzatov, “N eg otiation s on the L egal Status o f the Caspian Sea 1 9 9 2 -1 9 9 6 : V ie w from
Kazakhstan,” in The C aspian : P o litics, E n erg y a n d S ecu rity, ed. Shirin A kiner (London: R outledgeC urzonT aylor Francis Group, 2 0 0 4 ), 356.
49 The A lo v , A raz and Sharg contract area covers approxim ately 1,400 sq. km and is about 120 km
southeast o f Baku in depths b etw een 3 0 0 and 800 m eters. P rospective reservoirs are exp ected to be found
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was applied; however, Azerbaijan claims that the area falls within the Azeri sector and
Azerbaijan has a right to survey/develop the area. A warplane also flew over the same
location to show Iranian determination on the issue. The BP-operated vessels had to
retreat from the contested zone; however, this has created a major diplomatic and
political crisis between the two countries. Although the issue was settled later with the
efforts of Azeri President Haidar Aliev, the neighboring countries expressed their concern
over Iran resorting to force to find its way out of the legal dispute in the Caspian Sea.50
Meanwhile, Turkey openly criticized the Iranian move in the Caspian Sea and in support
o f Azerbaijan, the Turkish Foreign Ministry stated that Turkey was prepared to send
troops to Azerbaijan if necessary.51 Turkish F-16s flew over Baku in an air show and the
Turkish Chief o f Staff General Hussein Kivrikoglu visited Azerbaijan after the incident.52
These developments added another dimension to the dispute and increased the already
heightened tensions.

The work carried out by BP in the Alov-Alborz field was put on

betw een 2 ,5 0 0 and 6 ,5 0 0 m eters b elo w the sea's surface. N o w ells have been drilled in the contract area,
w hich is the largest b lock granted in Azerbaijan's sector o f the Caspian S ea and reflects the size o f the
geo lo g ica l structures contained within its boundaries. A vailab le [Online]:
< http://w w w .azer.com /aiw eb /categories/m agazin e/63 folder/63 articles/63 socar alov.htm l>
[02 A ugust 2 0 0 4 ],
50 The main im plications o f the Caspian im passe w ere not ob viou s until the inform al CIS sum m it held in
the R ussian B lack Sea resort o f Sochi at the beginning o f A ugust. The sum m it w as attended by ten CIS
heads o f state, including three Caspian nations: R ussia, A zerbaijan and Kazakhstan. A t the m eeting
Azerbaijan w as giv en unconditional support. Heidar A lie v w as quoted as saying R ussian President
V ladim ir Putin had undertaken to “broker a sum m it o f four Caspian nations,” cutting Iran out. T he m essage
to Iran w as loud and clear: former S o v iet nations in the Caspian are form ing an alliance, and Iran isn't
invited. A rkady D ubnov, “Tehran Guns for Caspian O il,” In stitu te o f W ar a n d P e a c e R eportin g, CRS no.
95, 24 A ugust 2 0 0 1 .
51 M ustafa Y ilm az, “A n A ssesm en t o f T urkey’s A ctiv ities towards the Turkish W orld,” E u rasian S tudies
21 (Spring 20 0 2 ): 1 6 5 -9 2 .
52 “Irana G ozd agi,” H u rriyet, 23 A u gu st 20 0 1 ; “Tahran Tirm andiriyor,” M illiyet, 2 2 A u gu st 2 0 0 1 . S ee also
Erdal Guven, “Akrobatik D ip lo m a si,” R adikal, 26 A ugust 2 0 0 1 .
53 A ccord in g to Turkish new spapers, Iran w as trying to delay the d evelop m en t o f the Caspian resources as
Iran w ished the main export pipeline from Caspian states go through Iranian territory. S in ce under current
conditions, that is not lik ely to happen, Iran expected to ach ieve its aim s in the future. Turkish new spapers
also com m ented that the Iranian m edia provoked the issue and pushed the Iranian governm ent to stand up
on the issue. Foreign M inistry spokesm an H am id R iza A se fi stated that “Iran is determ ined to protect its
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hold by BP and Azerbaijan until a solution was found in these contested areas. Iran has
been negotiating for months over these oilfields and Iranian officials have said that one
solution would be the joint development o f the field.54
The focus on the legal status o f the Caspian Sea shifted along with the new
developments in the region. The Russian policy change, and the proceeding bilateral
agreements with Kazakhstan in July 1998 regarding the sectoral division o f the seabed on
the basis o f a modified median line and joint use o f the surface, left Iran as the only
country still adamantly opposing a regime o f delimitation.55 This affected the Russian/
Iranian alliance on the Caspian Sea over the legal dispute; with the latest developments,
Russia and Iran became opposing parties. The rift between Russia and Iran became more
apparent when the Iranian president Khatami walked out o f the Ashgabat conference 2 3 24 April 2002. Apparently, the walkout was a protest against the Russia-AzerbaijanKazakh block. Despite long and serious preparations, the conference ended without even
a joint statement.56 The following years, the littoral states of the Caspian Sea continued
to hold meetings on the same issues. Although the meeting of foreign ministers in Baku
produced some promising results, especially on the demilitarization o f the sea, free
merchant shipping, and the protection o f the ecosystem, the main issue o f contention

rights in the Caspian and w e hope that the A zeri governm ent and the oil com panies received the m essage.”
Z am an G a zetesi, 26 July 2001. A vailab le [Online]:
< http://w w w .zam an.com .tr/200 l/07/26/dishaberler/dishaberlerdevam .htm #9> [11 January 2 0 0 3 ].
54 H ow ever, in a report published by R adio Free E urope/R adio Liberty, “a U .S . o fficia l said there is little
chance that Iran w ill be able to settle its Caspian o il field dispute w ith A zerbaijan by proposing a join t
developm ent. A U .S . com pany is already part o f a consortium for the field, and Tehran has sh ow n no sign
that it w ill drop its claim to 20 percent o f the C aspian, clearing the w ay for an agreem ent am ong the five
shoreline states. M ich ael L elyveld , “U .S . O fficial D isp u tes Iranian S u ccess w ith Caspian Project,” RFE/RL,
18 October 2002 A vailab le [O nline]: < http://www.rferl.Org/features/2002/l0/18102002170429.asp>
[13 D ecem ber 2 0 0 5 ], There are reports about these areas that the A lo v -A lb o rz field m ay hold up to 9
billion value o f o il and gas.
55 A ccording to Iranians, it w as a violation o f the existin g regim e in the C aspian Sea. Quoted in Tehran
Times, 30 M ay 1998. Granm ayeh, “L egal H istory o f the Caspian S ea,” 37.
56 Ibid., 37.
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remained the same. Although Iran kept insisting on a solution based on joint
management and ownership o f the modified median line, the developments in the region
complicated the Iranian position. By 2003, Russia, Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan had
agreed on the demarcation o f the seabed on the basis o f a modified median line with the
sea surface being open to all. Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan agreed on the principle of
national sectors in 1997, and the Turkmen accord with Iran in 1997 on the common
borders left only the Turkmen Azeri disagreement on the Kypaz/Serdar oilfields.57
Although from the very beginning the littoral states said that the solution for the legal
dispute could be achieved with the participation of the five coastal states, the following
years proved that it was the bilateral agreements that could settle the region’s conflicting
issues. While a final solution was not reached, Iran would be in a difficult situation if
Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan reached an agreement on the conflict over the
Kypaz/Serdar field.58
Iran followed a policy of self interest in the Caspian region from the very
beginning, and remained the only littoral state pursuing a regime o f joint sovereignty.
Iran was blamed by other littoral states for slowing down the developments; some o f the
littoral states were in need o f a solution to start their projects in the Caspian Sea.59 Iran
may eventually yield to the pressure from the other littoral states and agree to the
delimitation of the Caspian Sea into national zones. As mentioned above, Iran does not
have only economic concerns in the Caspian but also other considerations, e.g., keeping
the ex-Soviet republics in check, especially Azerbaijan. For that reason Iran may not

57 S. C olakoglu, “Uluslararasi H ukukta H azar’in Statu Sorunu,” 47.
58 M ustafa A yd in , “K afkasya ve Orta A sy a ile Iliskiler,” in Turk D is P olitik a si, K u rtu lu s S a va sin dan
B ugune O lgu lar, B elgeler, Yorumlar, vol. 2, ed. B askin Oran (Istanbul: Iletisim Y ayinlari, 20 0 1 ).
59 K em al Karpat, “Orta A sy a D evletleri, Turkiye v e Iranin D is Politikalari,” Ye n't Turkiye 2 (July/A ugust
1997): 2 1 6 8 -7 0 .
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easily agree to sign a formal declaration for the division o f the seabed between Iran and
Azerbaijan, since that might cause Iran to lose important leverage with its neighbors, as
well as foreign companies, on other issues. However Iran, sooner or later, must accept
the existence o f a de facto regime in the Caspian Sea that based on delimitation.60

RUSSIA AND THE CASPIAN SEA: FROM CONFRONTATION TO COOPERATION
Russian policy on the legal status o f the Caspian Sea represents a classic example
of realist thinking o f states pursuing self interest in the international arena. Although
there are a number of inconsistencies in Russian policies toward the legal dispute, it
could also be interpreted as a change in the interests o f Russia, which affected the
eventual policy shifts. Like Iran, Russia has been a strong supporter o f joint management
of the Caspian Sea.61 During the early years after the breakup o f the Soviet Union,
Russia, in alliance with Iran, supported the idea o f condominium and favored joint
utilization o f the sea surface and the seabed. Along with Iran, Russia claimed the validity
of early treaties between the Soviet Union and Iran. By referring to the Caspian Sea as a
lake, Russia denied the applicability of 1982 UNCLOS articles on exclusive economic
zones and continental shelf. Having subscribed to these main policies, Russia also
acknowledged the fact that the Caspian Sea environment has changed and that there is a
need to redefine of the terms o f the management and joint use o f the sea, which should be
realized through a formal agreement among the coastal states. Therefore any unilateral

60 Sinker, “T he M anagem ent o f a Transboundary E nergy R esou rce,” 72.
61 Faruk U nal, “A zerbaycan R usya Iliskilerinde Hazar Sorunu,” J o u rn a l o f Q a fq a z U n iversity 2, no. 2
(1999): 19.
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action without the consent of the five littoral states or any activity related to the use o f the
sea resources would be illegal and unacceptable.

ftO

After the establishment of an international consortium in 1994 by Azerbaijan to
develop three Azeri oilfields in the Caspian Sea, the legal debate among the littoral states
intensified. The initial Russian response to the Azeri move was harsh and strong, and
Russia declared this unilateral initiative illegal, claiming that Caspian states were still
subject to USSR agreements and laws and the development of marine resources o f the
Caspian Sea must be resolved unanimously.
While Russia has economic motives for its opposition to the delimitation of the
Caspian Sea, the political and geopolitical considerations surpass the projections of
economic gain. Russia as the successor o f the Soviet Union does not want to see the
growing presence of Western oil companies and Western powers in its backyard. As the
number o f states involved in the Caspian Sea oil development projects increases, the
stakes get higher. Similarly, as Western investments grow in the Caspian Sea, Western
influence will spread. This might contradict Russian geopolitical considerations. On
many occasions, Russian officials stated their dislike for the growing American
involvement and influence in the Transcaucasus and the Caspian Sea region. Like Iran,
Russia also would not want to see prosperous and politically independent states in the
region, where Russia claims historical sphere o f influence.

62 For more inform ation on the initial R ussian approach to legal issu es in the Caspian Sea, see Horton and
M em ed ov “L egal Status o f the Caspian S ea.”
63 Certainly the R ussian and the Iranian m o v es have an econ om ic m otivation, but th ey have also a com m on
goal that w ou ld be “to restrict the sovereign ability o f A zerbaijan, Turkm enistan and Kazakhstan to freely
develop their offsh ore o il and gas resources w ith the active participation o f the W estern o il com panies and
governm ents.” C roissant and Croissant, “T he L egal Status o f the Caspian S ea,” 28. B esid e these, R ussia is
not w illin g to see the form er dom inions develop a genuine econ om ic independence from M o sco w . In fact,
it is part o f a general R ussian p o licy to keep the form er S o v iet republics under control and m aintain a
sphere o f influence.
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Another issue brought forward by the Russian-Iranian front is the necessity to
preserve the delicate ecological balance in the Caspian Sea. Their claim is that joint
management o f the sea would provide a better arrangement that would preserve the
nature and the environment. In fact, it is doubtful the natural balance could be preserved
better by a joint committee than by the initiatives of individual states. As Arthur Pizzi
points out, “multiple-ownership removes incentives for conservation o f the common
resources thus causing increased production costs, quicker depletion o f the resources and
decreased market price for the product due to oversupply. Exclusive ownership, on the
other hand, promotes more efficient oil and gas extraction due to lack of completion for
the common resource.”64
Despite strong Russian opposition, there has been dissension in the Russian policy
circles. The foreign ministry’s tough stance was not approved by the Ministry of Energy
and the Russian oil companies. Starting in 1995, Russian policy on the legal dispute
started to change. First, Russian oil company LUKOIL acquired a share in the Azeri
international consortium that Russia had previously condemned. Other reasons also
might explain this change in Russian attitude. One reason might be the fact that Russia
realized the difficulty o f holding onto the initial claims for so long, especially under the
pressure coming from the energy ministry and the Russian oil companies. It is also the
case that Russia may have realized that it might gain more in a regime o f delimitation,
especially through joint projects and later on pipelines and transit fees. In addition,
Russia might also have feared alienating the old dominions by pressuring on an issue that
these republics perceived vital. This could diminish Russian influence over these states
64 Arthur M . P izzi, “Caspian S ea O il, Turm oil and Caviar: Can T h ey P rovide a B asis for an E conom ic
U n ion o f the C aspian States?” C o lo ra d o J o u rn a l o f In tern a tio n a l E n viro n m en ta l L a w a n d P o lic y 7, no. 2
(Sum m er 1996): 4 9 5 -9 6 .

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.

and might push them more towards the West and the United States, which would be even
more of a problem for Russia. It might also be that Russia did not want to confront the
Western oil companies and the United States on this issue since these powers might resort
to use of other leverages at a time that Russia depended on Western assistance to relieve
economic hardships. It is hard to say what exactly affected the change in Russian
behavior, but it is possible that all o f the above reasons may have played a role in pushing
Russia toward cooperation. Besides, the new Russian proposal focuses on sharing the
seabed, whereas the surface still remains as a property for common use. This would
allow Russia to exercise its naval power and trade. Another aspect of this change is that
Russia wanted to control the transit routes of the oil export of the ex-Soviet republics by
using the delimitation issue as leverage. In August 1995, the Russian ambassador to
Turkey, Vadim Kuznetsev, stated that “Russia was ready to modify its position on the
legal status o f the Caspian Sea, if Azerbaijan agreed to export its oil through Russian
pipeline.”65
Starting in 1995, Russia slowly shifted its tough stance on the issue and made
progress through bilateral agreements with the neighboring countries, Kazakhstan and
Azerbaijan. Russia proposed a 35-40 mile exclusive economic zone in 1996, and
increased its proposal to 45 miles in the Ashgabat meeting in November 1996. A lowlevel conflict between Russia and Kazakhstan opened the way for bilateral agreements.
In 1997, Kazakhstan protested LUKOIL operation in the northern part o f the Caspian Sea
close to the Kazakh sector. After a period o f negotiations, Russia and Kazakhstan agreed
to develop these contested areas jointly and in February 1998, a joint drilling agreement
was signed between Kazakoil and LUKOIL. In July o f that year, the presidents o f each
65 Q uoted in G ranm ayeh, “L egal H istory o f the Caspian Sea, 21.
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state signed an accord on the sectoral division of the seabed. The agreement between
Russia and Kazakhstan constituted an example for the further developments in the Sea
and helped the emergence of a de facto regime in the Caspian Sea. Russia engaged in the
same type o f negotiations with Azerbaijan on the issue o f demarcation and by a protocol
signed in Baku in March 1997, both parties agreed on the division o f the sea on an
equidistance median line principle.66 Although there has not been an agreement signed
by all o f the coastal states, the Russia-Kazakh accord continued to affect future
developments and caused the relationship between Iran and Russia on the legal status
issue to deteriorate slowly over time.

KAZAKHSTAN AND THE CASPIAN SEA
Having elaborated on the tough Iranian and Azeri approach to the legal status of
the Caspian Sea, we could assert that the Kazakh approach would lie in the middle.
Kazakhstan, from the very beginning, supported the idea o f delimitation o f the Caspian
Sea, with an emphasis on the participation of all littoral states on an equal basis in
determining a regime suitable for today’s environment. Kazakhstan in fact has the largest
and most productive oil deposits in the Caspian Sea and the Kazakh government has
prioritized the use o f available oil and gas reserves for the development of the country.
Foreign Minister Gizzatov refers to the 1982 UNCLOS and claims that the UN articles
should apply to the Caspian Sea. Although Kazakhstan accepts the validity o f the 1921
and 1940 treaties between the Soviet Union and Iran, it draws attention to the fact that
those treaties were signed even before the introduction o f new concepts such as exclusive
zones, seabed, or continental shelf, and therefore those treaties are not suitable for today’s
66 Granm ayeh, “L egal H istory o f the Caspian Sea, 32.
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environment.

67

Kazakh officials also assert that those treaties between the Soviet Union

and Iran cannot be taken as a legal basis since those treaties do not have any provisions
regarding the exploitation of the mineral resources. Despite the fact that Kazakhstan
favored the sectoral division of the Caspian Sea, it has taken a fairly positive attitude
compared to the rigid and ambitious policies o f Azerbaijan. This is partially related to
the peculiar Kazakh-Russian relationship, where Russia had tremendous influence over
Kazakhstan, especially during the initial phases o f transition from the Soviet Union to an
independent Kazakh state. It could also be due to the interdependent relationship
between Kazakhstan and Russia where Kazakhstan needed Russia on many economic
and political issues. Considering the Russian minority in Kazakhstan and the need to
keep a friendly relationship with Russia, we can better understand the Kazakh position on
the legal status o f the Caspian Sea and the careful Kazakh approach not to antagonize
Russia. Another aspect of the issue is the Russian pipelines Kazakhstan has to use to
transport its oil to outside oil markets. These factors may explain the soft and
cooperative approach o f the Kazakh officials over time, despite the fact that Kazakhstan
had enormous reserves in the Caspian Sea.

68

Within this framework, Kazakhstan offers

“other Caspian states to participate in the development o f oil and gas deposits in
Kazakhstan sector o f the seabed o f the Caspian.”69
Although Kazakhstan tried to find a solution for the legal dispute within a
common ground by the participation o f all the littoral states, in 1993 it unilaterally took
some initiatives and “Kazak government signed an agreement with the Kazakhstan

67 G izzatov, “N eg o tia tion s on the L egal Status o f the Caspian S ea 1 9 9 2 -1 9 9 6 ,” 55.
68 Gun Kut, Yeni Turk C u m h u riyetleri ve U lu sla ra ra si O rtam : B a g im sizlig in Ilk Yillari, A zerb ayjan ,
K azakistan , O zbekistan, T urkm enistan (Ankara: T.C. Kultur B akanligi Y ayinlari, 1994).
69 Ibid., 5 5 -5 6 .
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Kazpishelf consortium o f western oil companies to explore for oil in the Kazakh sector o f
the sea. This followed the development o f Tengiz oil field by TengizChevroil, a joint
venture between Kazakhstan and Chevron.”70 Kazakhstan participated in all the meetings
related to the determination o f the legal status o f the Caspian Sea, and signed the 1995
Agreement on the Conservation and Utilization o f Biological Resources in the Caspian
Sea. Kazaks also hosted a session in May 1995 to settle differences between the littoral
states. However, the real development with respect to the settlement o f differences came
through bilateral negotiations. In 1997 and 1998, Kazakhstan and Russia signed an
agreement on the demarcation o f the seabed and the joint development o f the oil fields in
contested areas. This became a cornerstone of the creation of a de facto regime in the
Caspian Sea to which Iran sharply objected. On 27 February 1997, Kazakhstan and
Turkmenistan agreed on the demarcation o f their sectors in the Caspian Sea, which
continued to be in place up to then. In December 2001, Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan
reached an agreement on determining their sectors in the Caspian Sea. By the completion
of the above agreements with the Caspian littoral states, Kazakhstan basically secured its
own sectors in the Caspian Sea.

TURKMENISTAN AND THE CASPIAN SEA
Turkmenistan’s policy on the Caspian Sea has been inconsistent. Turkmenistan
supported the delimitation o f the Caspian Sea but sometime later announced that IT WAS
in full accord with Iran and Russia. The Turkmen position in some aspects resembles the
Kazakh approach. While Turkmenistan in 1993 enacted a Law on State Border that
clearly demarcated maritime and territorial borders, it also expressed its desire for a
70 Sinker, “The M anagem ent o f a Transboundary E nergy R esou rce,”66.
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common solution.

71

In contrast with the Common Border Law, Turkmenistan was among

the first states to support the 1992 Iranian proposal for cooperation in matters o f the
•

Caspian Sea.

72

•

This could be explained by the Turkmen government’s inexperience in

international relations and the absence o f a national policy formulation on the Turkmen
side. Another explanation for the inconsistency might be the changing nature of
relationships with the Caspian neighbors and the implicit pressure coming from Russia
and Iran. As with the changing nature o f interstate relationships, Turkmenistan’s need
for support from Russia and the huge natural gas deal with it might have shifted
Turkmenistan’s view on the legal status o f the Caspian Sea.

Turkmen Azeri Dispute and the Turkmen Borders
The absence o f a clear-cut regime in the Caspian Sea has caused some tension
among the littoral states, especially in areas where states border each other. One example
o f this kind of dispute is the incident between Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan over
Kypaz/Serdar oilfields, where each state claims ownership. In July 1997, Azerbaijan
signed an agreement with two Russian oil companies, LUKOIL and Rosneft, to develop
the Kypaz/Serdar area, which is located 145 km off the coast o f Azerbaijan. The Azeri
side claims that the area was discovered in 1959 by Azeri experts and the first oil well
71 In 1992, Turkm enistan passed its “L aw On State B orders,” one provision o f w hich claim ed for
Turkmenistan a 12-m ile coastal zon e (not 10 m iles) bordering the so-called A stara/H asanqoli Line on the
south. T his line crosses the Caspian Sea and connects the points o f exit o f the land border o f the Astara
village on the w estern shore and the H asanqoli villa g e on the eastern shore. Irina Paliashvili. “ Caspian
L egal D im ension: Investm ent R isk in South Caspian D elim itation; D iscu ssio n o f the L egal Status o f the
Caspian S ea ,” presentation for the International E nergy A g e n c y Roundtable on Caspian O il & Gas
Scenarios, 15 April 2 0 0 3 , 7. A vailab le [Online]:
< http ://w w w .iea.org/textb ase/w ork /2003/casp ian /P alias.p d f> [27 M ay 2 0 0 6 ].
72 In 1993 and 1995, Turkmenistan entered into agreem ents w ith W estern oil com panies to d evelop
offshore o ilfield s w ithin the Turkmen sector w ith the participation o f the Turkmen oil com pany
C helekeneft. Contrary to the Turkmen support for Iran and R ussia on m any occasion s, Turkm enistan
continued its unilateral initiatives in 1997 and 1998, w hen it issued licen ses for offshore drilling rights in its
new ly-declared 12-m ile coastal zone.
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was dug in 1986, with the first year of Azeri production totalling more than 300 million
-71

tons.

Turkmenistan protested the deal, claiming that the area belongs to Turkmenistan

since it is closer to Turkmenistan and therefore falls within the Turkmen sector. Russia
had to withdraw from the project on the grounds that Russia itself criticized unilateral
initiatives in the Caspian Sea and the fact that Turkmenistan on many occasions sided
with Russia over the legal dispute. Despite the efforts made by Azerbaijan to find a
common solution for the contested areas, the status o f the Kypaz/Serdar oilfields remains
unresolved.
Another dispute occurred between Iran and Turkmenistan when Turkmenistan
issued a tender for eleven blocks that were located on the Iranian border. Turkmenistan
later withdrew its tender for the Iranian claimed fields when Iran voiced its objection.
After these developments, Turkmenistan and Iran agreed on the joint utilization of the
non-clarified areas until a final resolution to the legal status of the Caspian Sea could be
found.

CONCLUSIONS
More than a decade after the first major contract in the Caspian Sea, the legal
status o f the Caspian Sea remains unsolved. There is no joint agreement by the coastal
states on the use o f the sea resources. Despite numerous initiatives, conferences,
meetings and talks among the riparian states, neither a regime nor an organizing body
emerged to manage the transboundary resources o f the Caspian Sea. One o f the most
striking factors that affected the legal status issue in the Caspian Sea is the fact that each
73 N atiq A liy e v , “Kapaz: S ocar’s O fficial Statem ent,’’A vailab le [Online]:
< http://w w w .azer.com /aiw eb /categories/m agazin e/53 folder/53 articles/53 statem ent.htm l>
[19 February 2 0 0 7 ].

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.

82
nation state followed self-interest policies that would be economically and politically
favorable for themselves. The tough stance o f Azerbaijan and Iran on opposite ends
proves the existence o f realist thinking in the making o f their policies. As we have
discussed above, existence o f other motives, such as geopolitical considerations caused a
great deal of controversy among the riparian states. In the end, the states o f the Caspian
Sea could not reach a common solution with respect to the settlement o f their differences
on the legal status o f the Caspian Sea.
However, the deadlock on the achievement o f a common solution has been
partially bypassed through bilateral negotiations. As the newly independent states
enthusiastically pursued a solution to start oil production in the Caspian Sea, eventually
some sort o f regime or understanding emerged especially in the northern part o f the
coasts. The Russian initiatives and efforts to find a solution to the legal issue in the
Caspian Sea greatly contributed to the emergence o f a de facto regime. By the signing of
the bilateral agreements among Russia, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan, the
Caspian states agreed to divide the seabed on the basis o f a modified median line. From
the very beginning, the littoral states continuously sought a common solution acceptable
to all the participants. However, the latter developments proved that in the context o f the
Caspian Sea, bilateral agreements were much more effective. The role o f Russia in the
emergence of some sort of cooperation should be acknowledged. The shift in Russian
policy from condominium to sectoral division o f the seabed is one o f the cornerstones of
the improvement of interstate relations in the Caspian Sea with regard to the legal issue.
Certain compromises have been made on both sides, but the littoral states that agreed to
divide the seabed were satisfied with what they achieved. Russia maintained its
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dominant status on the sea, as the sea surface remains an area for common use for
navigation, fishery and transportation. Newly independent states mainly focused on the
offshore oil drilling in the Caspian Sea, and with the signing o f the agreements they were
granted the right to develop the oil deposits in the Caspian Sea freely. Eventually, the
sectoral division o f the seabed worked well for Russia, Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan, and
in some ways for Turkmenistan but not for Iran. Iran currently is not a part o f the
emerging regime and still favors a solution based on joint management or equal sharing
where each individual state gets 20 percent o f the seabed and the surface.
As we have suggested from the beginning, the emergence o f cooperation among
the Caspian States has been quite slow despite the fact that littoral states o f the Caspian
Sea urgently needed a regional solution in order to start oil production. Geopolitical
considerations and pursuit o f self-interest policies in the region, and the existence of
divergent economic and political policies, impeded the settlement o f disputes over the
legal status o f the sea. Even after a temporary settlement o f the differences in the
Caspian Sea, we could assert that each individual state continued to follow policies that
favored themselves the most. The Russian policy shift from condominium to division of
the seabed could be construed as a compromise from Russian interests. However, the
long-lasting legal status dispute is only one aspect o f the trans-boundary interstate
relations in the Transcaucasus region. Issues are in many cases tied to each other, and
compromise in one area might mean a gain in another. In that respect, the Russian move
in the legal dispute should be viewed from a broader perspective, as it is directly related
to the issue o f pipelines, an issue that has dominated the agenda more than any other
issue in the Caspian Sea region.
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CHAPTER IV
THE PIPELINE DILEMMA IN THE CASPIAN SEA: DREAM OR REALITY?

Another aspect of the Caspian oil diplomacy or the so called new great game is
the complex set o f issues related to the transportation o f Caspian oil.1 The Caspian Sea is
a landlocked sea and the only connection to the outside world is the Don-Volga River
that passes through Russian territory to Baltic Sea.2 The oil producing countries of
Caspian Sea have to rely on the cooperation o f their neighbors to be able to transport the
oil produced in the region to the world oil markets. As each country had its own
preferences and desires as to which route and method to use as a means for
transportation, the pipeline dilemma in the Caspian Sea became an issue o f contention
among the countries involved in the affairs o f the Caspian Sea. Alongside the technical
and geological / geophysical difficulties that prevented the development o f petroleum
exploration and production, the competition over the control o f pipelines and the
expected economic benefits deeply affected the Caspian oil development.
1 Lutz K levem an com pares the to d a y ’s p olitico-m ilitary environm ent in the region to the 19th century
struggle b etw een British and R ussian Em pires. “N o w m ore than a hundred years later, great em pires once
again p osition th em selves to control the hearth o f the Eurasian landm ass left in a p o st-S o v iet pow er
vacuum . T oday there are different actors and the rules o f the n eocolon ial gam e are far more com p lex than
those o f a century ago: T he U nited States has taken over the leading role from the British. A lo n g w ith the
ever present R ussians, n ew regional pow ers such as China, Iran, Turkey and Pakistan have entered the
arena, and Transnational Corporations (w h o se budgets far ex ceed those o f m any Central A sian countries)
are also pursuing their ow n interests and strategies.” Lutz K levem an, The N ew G re a t G am e: B lo o d a n d O il
in C en tra l A sia (N e w York: G rove Press, 2 0 0 3 ), 3.
2 “Europe's lon gest river and the principal w aterw ay o f w estern R ussia, it rises in the V aldai H ills northw est
o f M o sco w and flo w s 2,193 m iles (3 ,5 3 0 km) southeastward to em pty into the Caspian Sea. It is used for
pow er production, irrigation, flood control, and transportation. T he river has played an important part in the
life o f the R ussian people, and in R ussian folklore it is characteristically nam ed M other V o lg a .” “V olga
R iver,’’A vailab le [Online]: < h ttp://w w w .answ ers.com /topic/volga-river> [4 A u gu st 2 0 0 6 ]. “T he D on is
one o f the major rivers o f R ussia. It rises near Tula, southeast o f M o sco w , and flo w s for a distance o f about
1,950 km (1 ,2 2 0 m iles) to the S ea o f A zo v . From its source, the river first flo w s southeast to V oronezh,
then southw est to its m outh. The main city on the river is R o stov on D on, its main tributary the D on ets. A t
its easternm ost point, the D on co m es near the V olga, and the V o lg a -D o n Canal (length ca. 105 km (65
m iles)), con n ectin g both rivers, is a major w aterw ay.” “D on River: R ussia,” A vailab le [Online]:
< http://en.w ikipedia.org/w iki/D on River. R ussia> [4 A u gu st 2 0 0 6 ],
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In this chapter, I would like to explore the complex interaction among state and
non-state actors on the issue o f pipelines and find out how the behavior o f each actor on
the Caspian pipeline issue affected the development o f cooperative or non-cooperative
outcome. I would also like to draw on some contending theories o f international relations
on the issue of cooperation and analyze the policies o f the diverse actors from a
theoretical perspective. As an actor in pipeline politics, Turkey’s involvement proved to
be a decisive factor. In this chapter I would also like to devote more space on Turkey and
its role in the whole Caspian pipeline negotiations.
The issue of control and profit attached to the control o f the oil has manifested
itself in the form of state confrontation, which has simultaneously slowed down the
implementation of oil extraction projects in the region. The Russian policy to maintain
influence in the Caspian region and the desire of the littoral states to break away from
Russia’s stranglehold and gain complete independence has emerged as an issue o f serious
political confrontation on the pipeline discussions. The complexity o f the whole pipeline
tangle doubled with the involvement o f the outside actors who had economic and
political interests in the Caspian region. The involvement of the United States as an
outside actor and as a strong supporter o f the regional states and their independence and
its special emphasis on Iran’s role added another dimension to the transportation o f oil
and pipeline discussions.
The very economic and political development of the former Soviet republics and
strengthening o f their independence depend on the revenues they receive from petroleum
exports. It is an issue o f utmost importance for the petroleum producing countries of the
Caspian Sea to be able to secure a stable export route and a dependable pipeline system.
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Share o f oil and gas in Azeri exports amounts to 90 percent, while it is 80 percent in
Turkmenistan and 65 percent in Kazakhstan. (See graph below.) The oil companies
which have already invested billions o f dollars in the Caspian oil are interested in the
most feasible and economical means o f transportation. On the other hand, the priorities
o f some external powers, i.e., Turkey, Iran and the United States, are a bit different than
those o f the regional states and oil companies. The complex web o f interests and the
multiplicity o f actors involved in the whole Caspian oil pipeline game created an
interesting interaction among states and non-state actors.4
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Kazakistan

Turkmenistan

Azerbaijan

Graph 6: Share o f Oil & Gas in Total Export
Source: World Bank Country Briefs and Azerbaijan Ministry o f Finance Fact Sheet

3 D ata gathered from W orld Bank Country B riefs and A zerbaijan M inistry o f F inance Fact Sheet.
4 Hans M orgenthau says that, “the idea o f interest is indeed o f the e ssen ce o f p o litics and unaffected by the
circum stances o f tim e and p lace.” M orgenthau, P o litic s a m o n g N a tio n s, 10.
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As Mustafa Aydin suggests, securing a major share in these pipelines will provide
enhanced influence throughout the region.5 Export of large scale oil to the world markets
from the Caspian Sea may provide great opportunities for economic development and
prosperity for the Caspian oil producers; especially Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and
Turkmenistan.6 However, the course o f the developments and the ability of the states to
manage their differences will be an important factor in the realization o f their goals for
economic development. In a world o f increasing oil prices, the competition over
resources and interstate rivalry maybe even more fierce than expected.7

Table 6:
Oil Prices by Year
1999
Dubai-Spot crude price
Brent-Spot crude price

17.25
17.97

2000

2001

26.2
28.5

22.81
24.44

2002
23.74

2003

2004

2005

26.78

25.02

28.83

33.64
38.27

49.35
54.52

Oil Prices: US dollars per barrel
Source: BP Statistical Review o f World Energy 2006

5 M ustafa A yd in , “O il, P ip elin es and Security: The G eop olitics o f the Caspian R eg io n ” in The C aspian
R eg io n , ed. M osh e Gam m er and Frank C ass, 1st ed. (N e w York: R outledge, 2 0 0 2 ), 6, 1 4 -1 6 .
6 In 2 0 0 3 , Turkish energy M inister H ilm i Guler told that B T C pipeline is one o f the b ig g est projects o f the
2 1 st century in the sen se that this p ipeline w ill provide energy to the European countries w here the demand
for oil is exp ected to increase in the com in g decades. Faruk Arslan, H a za rin K u rtla r V adisi: P e tro l
Im para to rlu g u n d a k i G uc S a v a sla ri (Istanbul: Karakutu Y ayinlari, 2 0 0 5 ), 300.
7 A ccording to the estim ates taken from International E nergy A g en cy , the glob al dem and for energy w ill
rise by 59 percent by 2 0 3 0 w ith 2/3 o f this demand com in g from d evelop in g countries particularly from
China and India. U .S . dem and for o il is also rising w h ile U .S . dom estic production is set to fall b y 12
percent over the next decade. “B o o m or B ust in the C aspian?” E u rom on ey (January 2 0 0 5 ). A lso A vailable
[O nline]: < w w w .eu rom on ev.com > 1 2 1 M arch 20 0 5 ].
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Graph 7: Oil Prices by Year (View in 3D Graph)
Source: BP Statistical Review o f World Energy 2006

EARLY OIL DEVELOPMENT AND PIPELINES
Despite the fact that Baku and the Caspian region provided half o f the world oil
production at the beginning of the twentieth century, the importance o f the region as an
oil producer declined after World War I and II. Soviet policymakers shifted their focus to
Siberia and the whole Russian oil pipeline network redesigned to serve the domestic need
o

and the export to Western countries.

The oil from the Caspian region was used to serve

domestic needs rather than export. Therefore, during the Soviet era, no major pipeline
has been built to carry oil from the Caspian region to the outside world. The Azeri and
Kazakh oil production were linked to the internal Russian pipeline network and carried to

8 Jennifer D elay, “T he Caspian Oil P ipeline Tangle: A Steel W eb o f C onfusion” in O il a n d G e o p o litic s in
the C a sp ia n S e a R eg io n , eds. M ichael P. C roissant and Bttlent Aras (W estport, CT: Praeger, 1999), 45.
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Russian refineries for domestic use. After 1991, Caspian oil producers found themselves
in a very difficult situation in terms o f oil export. On one hand, they were heavily
dependant on the revenues that might come from oil export; on the other hand they did
not have a stable and a secure outlet for the export of the oil produced in their countries.
Azerbaijan was only linked to a Russian pipeline (Baku-Grozny-Novorossiysk) passing
through war-torn Chechnya towards the Russian port at Black Sea. The Baku-Supsa
pipeline had not been used in years and needed a fundamental renovation to be
operational. The situation in Kazakhstan was no different than Azerbaijan. The only
export line for Kazakhstan was the Atyrau-Oask-Samara pipeline that needed a major
upgrade to be useful in exporting Kazakh oil. The small pipeline would not have been
sufficient to carry even a fraction o f Kazakh oil production.
Even then, the oil producers in the Caspian Sea region had to deal with the
Russian policies regarding the use o f the internal Russian pipeline system. “The old
Soviet system had served all the republics o f the Soviet Union on an integrated basis, but
now the natural preference o f the Russian companies would be to use the system for
Russian energy first, and secondarily to carry oil and gas produced by fellow Soviet
producers that could now be regarded as commercial rivals.”9 Caspian oil producers
found themselves in an urgent need to find an export route that could sustain Caspian oil
production. On the other hand, Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan started looking for
alternatives to reduce or eliminate their dependence on Russia and Russian pipeline
system in the long run, though it was much more difficult for Kazakhstan to bypass
Russia totally because o f its geographical location. As the investment by the oil

9 John R oberts, “P ip elin e P o litics,” in The C aspian : P o litics, E n ergy a n d S ecu rity, ed. Shirin A kiner
(London: R outledgeC urzon-T aylor Francis Group, 2 0 0 4 ), p. 77.
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companies grew, pipelines became an issue for both oil producing countries and oil
companies which already have invested huge amounts o f money in the Caspian oil
projects. Before starting with the complex and long-lasting negotiations among the
Caspian states, oil companies and external powers, I would like to cover some o f the
basic issues related to pipeline discussions.

MAIN PIPELINE PROJECTS AND PROPOSALS
As soon as the need for alternative routes for the export o f Caspian oil became
apparent, the Azeri and Kazakh government persistently worked to develop new export
routes either independent o f Russia or less susceptible to Russian control while still
having to remain on good terms with Moscow to ensure that their existing oil and gas
systems were not jeopardized.10 With the involvement o f oil companies and external
players there has been a plethora o f proposals and projects to transport Caspian oil.
One of the factors behind the multiplicity o f the proposals is the transit fees that host
states would collect for a long period o f time once the pipes have been laid. The
neighboring countries in the region offered their territories as a passage to pipelines for
the Caspian oil. This has created a great scale of competition among the major proposals
and has it also caused a great deal o f confusion over the course o f negotiations for the oil
producing countries with regard to the choice they had to make under prevalent
circumstances.11 Below is a summary o f existing pipelines and contending proposals for
the coming years. The discussions over the main export pipelines and the complex

10 Ibid.
11 Gaw dat Bahgat, “R egion al Report: T he Caspian Sea: Potentials and P rospects,” G overn an ce: A n
In tern a tio n a l J o u rn a l o f P o lic y a n d In stitu tion s 17, no. 1 (January 20 0 4 ): 119.
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negotiations among states and non-state actors will be covered in the coming sections of
this chapter.

EXISTING PIPELINES
Atyrau-Samara Pipeline
Atyrau-Samara Pipeline was the largest export pipeline for Kazakhstan before the
construction of CPC (Caspian Pipeline Consortium) and Kazakhstan exported almost all
of its early oil production through this northern route that connects Caspian port of
Atyrau to Russian Ural refinery at Samara and then connects with Russia’s main EastW est Druzhba system.

19

The pipeline capacity was increased from 240,000 bbl/d to

300,000 bbl/d with the addition o f another pumping station.

CPC: Caspian Pipeline Consortium
It is one o f the biggest projects to carry Kazakh oil from Tengiz oil reserves to
Russian Black Sea port of Novorossiysk. The CPC project was carried out by the
governments o f Russia, Kazakhstan and Oman in cooperation with a consortium o f oil
companies headed by Chevron. CPC consists o f the upgrade o f existing pipelines in
Kazakhstan which connects to Russia and reaches to Novorossiysk. After its completion,
the 1512 km long pipeline went into use and on October 13, 2001 first crude oil was
loaded onto a tanker at the port o f Novorossiysk on Black Sea.13 With the new additions

12 In June 2 0 0 2 , Kazakhstan and R ussia signed a 15-year oil transit agreem ent under w hich Kazakhstan w ill
export 3 4 0 ,0 0 0 bbl/d o f oil annually via the R ussian pip elin e system . Russia's trade m inistry also pledged to
increase the capacity o f the line to around 5 0 0 ,0 0 0 bbl/d. A s the CPC project grow s w ith Kazakh
production, absolute volu m es though A tyrau-Sam ara are exp ected to grow , but this p ipeline w ill b ecom e
relatively less sign ifican t.” “Kazakhstan: B ackground,” A vailab le [Online]:
< http://w w w .eia.d oe.gov/em eu /cab s/k azak .h tm l> [12 February 2 0 0 6 ],
13 For details see, “Caspian P ip elin e Consortium: General Inform ation,” A vailab le [O nline]:
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and upgrades and the additional pumping stations, CPC is expected to carry 67 million
tons of oil annually. (1.35 million bbl/d by 2009, 2.5 times the current capacity)

Baku-Supsa
An existing oil pipeline system from the twentieth century which Nobel brothers
used to transport oil from Baku to Georgian city o f Supsa on Black Sea provided an
opportunity for the transportation o f early Azeri oil and in 1998 the construction and
upgrade o f the old system completed with an initial capacity o f 115,000 bbl/d.

Baku-Novorossiysk
It runs from the oil terminals outside o f Baku to Novorossiysk, passing through
Chechnya. It had an 180,000 bbl/d initial capacity but the flow o f oil had never been
stable due to the war between Russia and Chechnya.14

Baku-Tblisi-Ceyhan
Supported by the governments o f Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Georgia, Turkey and
the United States, Baku-Ceyhan represents one o f the biggest projects in the Caspian oil
development. It runs from Baku to the Turkish marine terminal o f Ceyhan at the
< http://w w w .cp c.ru /p ortal/aliasip ress/lan gien -u s/tab ID i3357/D esk top D efau lt.asp x> [31 July 2 0 0 6 ],
14 “B ak u -N ovorossiysk pipeline ("northern route"), w hich sends approxim ately 5 0 ,0 0 0 bbl/d o f A zeri (and
ex clu siv ely SO C A R ) crude o il to the R ussian B lack Sea. The B ak u -N ovorossiysk pipeline clo sed briefly in
late June 2 0 0 4 after o il th ieves set o f f an ex p lo sio n w hen th ey attempted to steal oil from the pipeline. The
A zeri state com pany exp ects to begin reducing oil exports v ia the B ak u -N ovorossiysk pip elin e in A ugust
2 0 0 5 in order to divert crude to the B T C line, o n ce it b eco m es operational. Som e A zeri governm ent
officials have hinted that S O C A R w ill stop using the N o v o ro ssiy sk route on ce B T C b ecom es fu lly
operational because it w ill no longer m ake sen se to have higher quality A zeri crude o il m ixin g w ith
R ussian-based Urals blends. The crude oil m ixin g has decreased the price o f pure 'Azeri light' at the port o f
N ov o ro ssiy sk by as m uch as $ 4 -5 per barrel. A IO C w ill, h ow ever, continue to export oil via pip elin e and
rail from Baku to Supsa and B atum i on the G eorgian B lack Sea coast.” “Azerbaijan: B ackground,”
A vailab le [Online]:
< http ://w w w .eia.d oe.gov/em eu /cab s/azerb ian .h tm l> [17 June 2 0 0 6 ].
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Mediterranean Sea. 1,780 km (1,100 miles) long pipeline passes through the territories of
Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey, and is designed to carry a million bbl/d (50 million tons
o f oil). According to the initial estimates o f oil production by the AIOC (Azerbaijan
International oil Company), Baku-Ceyhan should be able to serve the Azeri needs even
when the production is expected to peak around 2010-2014.15 “The BTC pipeline project
cost an estimated $3.7 billion, with BP as operator. The pipeline was officially
inaugurated at the Sangachal terminal, near Baku, by President Ilham Aliyev o f the
Azerbaijan Republic, President Mikhail Saakashvilli o f Georgia and President Ahmet
Sezer of Turkey, joined by President Nursaltan Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan on 25 May
2005.”16 Almost a year after its start, on June 13, 2006 the first oil loaded onto tankers
and BTC pipeline officially became fully operational. In the opening ceremony o f the
BTC pipeline, the Turkish President o f republic called the project the “Rising Star o f the
Mediterranean.” 17

15 T he pipeline route p asses over 1,768km (1 ,1 0 0 m iles) through the countries o f A zerbaijan (445km ),
G eorgia (245k m ) and T urkey (1,070k m ). In d oing so it reaches an altitude o f 2 ,8 0 0 m as it p asses across the
Caucasus M ountains and East A natolia. T he pip elin e crosses the land o f 2 0 ,0 0 0 individuals and com panies
w h o have been com pensated w ith a share o f over $133 m illion for the acquisition o f rights to the sm all
portion o f their land w here the p ipeline runs. A lthough the pipeline is underground and the land reinstated
on top, all that rem ains v isib le are eight pum ping stations (tw o each in A zerbaijan and G eorgia and four in
Turkey). “B aku-T bilisi-C eyhan (B T C ) Caspian P ip elin e,” A vailab le [Online]:
< h ttp://w w w .hvdrocarbons-teehnology.com /proiects/bp/> [21 July 2 0 0 6 ].
16 B P holds a 3 0 percent stake in the consortium running the pipeline. Other consortium m em bers include
A zerbaijan's state o il com pany SO C A R (25% ), A m erada H ess (2.36% ), C on ocoP h illip s (2.5% ), Eni (5% ),
Inpex (2.5% ), Itochu (3.4% ), Statoil (8.71% ), T otal-FIN A -E L F (5% ), TP A O (6.53% ) and U nocal (8.9% ).
T he pipeline w as constructed by, and w ill be m anaged by, the consortium com pany B aku-T bilisi-C eyhan
P ipeline C om pany (B T C C o). Ibid. For more details on the technical inform ation about the B T C pipeline
see “B aku-T blisi-C eyhan P ip elin e Inaugurated on M ay 2 5 ,” P etro leu m E co n o m ist 72, no. 7 (July 2 0 0 5 ).
17 “T urkiye’y i Petrol U ssii Yapan Y tizyih n Projesi Buytik bir Torenle B a jla d i,” M illiy e t G azetesi, 13 July
2 0 0 6 , A vailab le [O nline] : < w w w .m illiv e t.c o m .tr/2 0 0 6 /0 7 /1 3 /so n /so n siv l6 .a sp > [21 July 2 0 0 6 ],
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PROPOSED PIPELINES
Kazakhstan-China
In 1997, the governments o f Kazakhstan and China signed an agreement to build
a pipeline from Atasu in northwest Kazakhstan to Alaskanhou in China’s northwestern
Xingjian region to carry Caspian oil to serve the growing energy demand o f China. The
project had an estimated cost o f 850 million dollars and originally expected to be
operational by 2006.

18

The first section of the pipeline was completed in 2003 and the

Kazakh-China pipeline will have an initial capacity o f 200,000 bbl/d, which maybe
expanded to 400,000 bbl/d in the following years. The 1860 km long pipeline faces
major challenges as it passes through seismically active territories. The Kazakh-China
pipeline will only carry a small percentage o f China’s demand for oil, at about 5 percent
as China has risen to the world’s second oil consumer.

TCP: Trans-Caspian Pipeline
This is originally intended to carry a 16 bcm/y o f Turkmen gas to Turkey through
a pipeline laid under the Caspian Sea. It was planned to cross the Caspian Sea to
Azerbaijan and Georgia to the Turkish city o f Erzurum.19 The project initially was
supported by the governments o f the United States, Turkey, Azerbaijan and

18 T he pipeline w ill extend 9 8 8 kilom eters from the K azakhstan o il term inal in A tasu to the C hinese railw ay
station in A lashankou. Its carrying capacity w ill be 10 m illion tons a year at the first stage, then w ill
increase up to 2 0 m illion tons at the secon d stage and could even reach up to 50 m illion tons in the long
term. C onstruction should be com pleted at the end o f this year, and Kazakhstan h op es to begin the first
deliveries o f o il in 2 0 0 8 . A lexander Sukhanov, “Caspian O il Exports H eading E ast,” C e n tra l A sia, 9 Feb
2 0 0 5 . A lso A vailab le [O nline]: < http://atim es.com /atim es/C entral A sia/G B 09A gQ 2.htm l> [28 A ugust
20 0 6 ],
19 See A vra sy a D o sy a si TIKA B ulteni, July 1999 and A v ra sy a D o sy a si T1KA B u lten i (O ctober 1999).
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Turkmenistan to establish another East-West corridor alongside with BTC.20 However
the Azeri government pulled its support from the project when the issue between
Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan turned into a competition for Turkish gas markets after the
discovery o f Azeri gas fields in Shah Deniz.21 Although the parties had optimistic views
about the project around 1998-99, the disagreement on the side of the Azeri and
Turkmen government virtually ended the possibility o f its implementation especially
when the Turkmen government cut a deal with Russia on the sale o f Turkmen Gas to
Russia and to other republics through the Russian internal pipeline network.22

INTERSTATE COOPERATION IN THE CASPIAN SEA: THE EARLY OIL DEBATE
As the investment in oil exploration and development in the Caspian Sea
continued, the oil producing countries and the oil companies had to work on the
transportation of current production and the huge volumes expected to be produced in the
following years. Therefore it is possible to analyze the transportation o f Caspian oil and
pipelines issue in two phases. The first part is about the transportation o f small amounts
o f oil to provide revenue for the producers. The second phase represents an important
stage in the Caspian oil development as it might affect the stability o f the long term oil
industry and transportation o f oil in the region
Despite the existence o f differences among the major players, policies o f the
involved actors proved to be conducive to cooperation during the early phases o f the

20 Hakki Buyukbas, “D unya Siyaseti: K uresellesm e, B o lg e sellesm e v e T urkiye,” A v ra sy a D o sy a si, no. 1
(2004).
21 Sem ih Idiz, “Trans Hazar: Boru Hatlari K onusu Arap Sacina D on d u ,” S ta r G a zetesi, 3 A pril 2000.
22 For more details see John Roberts, “E nergy R eserves, P ipeline R outes and the Legal R eg im e in the
Caspian S ea,” in The S ecu rity o f the C a sp ia n R egion , ed. G ennady Chufrin (O xford U n iversity Press,
2 0 0 1 ), 3 2 -6 8 .
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negotiation for early oil. Azerbaijan was mainly concerned about securing an outlet for
its already produced oil. Although Azerbaijan clearly tried to avoid dependence on
Russia, it also realized the importance o f staying on good terms with it for long term
stability in the region. The role o f Russia in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and the
Russian involvement in the internal conflicts in Georgia clearly affects the policies o f the
Caspian states. Therefore Azerbaijan was also willing to go for an option in which
Russia was also included to certain levels such that Russia would not resort to use of
other means to influence the developments. The main Russian policy was the control of
the transportation o f the Caspian oil for many reasons. First o f all, Russia wanted to
maintain a superior status in the region. Holding the pipelines for oil export in control
was seen as a way o f maintaining a good level o f influence over the countries o f the
Caspian states and also over the developments in the coming years. The economic
benefits that would come with the pipelines are undoubtedly an important factor in the
policies o f the involved parties. As the transportation o f oil and pipelines would yield
easy long term benefits, the push for favorable options intensified on all sides. As an
example to the benefits that host nations collect from these pipelines, “CPC has recently
presented its Shareholders with a comprehensive investment decision package to support
expansion o f the Project to its full capacity o f 67 million tons - 1.4 million barrels a day,
as was envisaged in the originally approved design o f the pipeline system.
Implementation o f this project, which will assure the long-term financial success o f CPC,
is expected to generate revenues to the Russian Federation between $16 and $18 billion.
Since operations began, CPC has contributed $650 million to the Russian budget in taxes,
fees and contributions. CPC employs directly or indirectly around 1,500 personnel in
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Russia and spends over 85 percent o f its annual budget locally.”

AIOC in many

occasions stated its interests and desires to move forward with the most feasible and
beneficial options. However, in the complex negotiations among the actors, geopolitical
considerations most o f the time dominated the thinking o f the states.
As for the early oil, despite prevalent policies and complexities, the negotiations
on the pipelines seem to be little bit o f a soft confrontation among actors rather than
being involved in a deadlock situation. For example, the U.S. government also wanted to
eliminate the dependence o f the Caspian states on Russia; however, it did not push for an
option that would completely exclude Russia from the oil business in the region. As for
the early oil, the main U.S. policy was the diversification o f the pipelines to eliminate a
complete dependence on a single route. As the Russian government pushed for BakuNovorossiysk as a main outlet for Azeri and Kazakh oil, the United States and the Azeri
government insisted on the availability o f a second route; Baku-Supsa. During the
negotiations, Baku-Supsa emerged as a second option for the export o f early Azeri oil.
Although an Iranian route as proposed by the government o f Iran on many occasions
could have economically and technically been more feasible and easier for the Caspian
oil to reach open seas for export, the Americans insisted on two exit routes for the early
oil and the exclusion o f Iran from any type o f oil transaction.24 “Zbigniew Brzezinski

23 “Caspian P ipeline C onsortium L oaded Its 800th Tanker,” Caspian P ipeline C onsortium , Press R elease,
A pril 7, 2 0 0 6 . A vailab le [O nline]:
< http://w w w .cp c.ru /p ortal/aliaslp ress/lan gien -U S /tab lD 13474/D esk top D efau lt.asp x> [19 June 2 0 0 6 ],
24 T he Iranian option includes o il sw aps w ith the Caspian countries. Iran proposes to buy o il from Caspian
nations for its d om estic use and agrees to pay for it in kind by m aking it available on Kharg Island for
export to w orld markets. T he Iranian governm ent awarded an Iranian oil com pany w ith 3 5 0 m illion dollars
for a p ipeline project that w ould connect Iranian port N ek a on the Caspian S ea to the refineries in the
country. T he 325 km lon g pip elin e how ever could not m aterialize because o f the financial problem s that
the Iranian governm ent could not finance it on its ow n and the foreign investm ent could not be secured.
H ere is the details o f the Iranian P roposals for the transportation o f Caspian o il b y w a y o f Iran:
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delivered a letter form president Clinton to Aliyev stating the American preference for
the second pipeline while offering assistance for Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Shortly
afterwards, president Bill Clinton placed a phone call to the Azeri President to assert the
significance to have two exit routes for the early oil. Clinton could also convince
Aliyev— counter the Baku’s initial interest—to exclude Iran from the early oil
business.”
After the agreement on the double route for the early Azeri oil, the BakuNovorossiysk pipeline became operational in late 1997 with a capacity o f 340.bbl/d on
the Russian side. However, the Baku-Novorossiysk line proved to be an unstable route
P hase I: Crude O il for Tehran & Tabriz R efineries: T he com bined p rocessin g capacity o f th ese tw o
refineries currently stands at 3 5 0 ,0 0 0 b/d w h ich are prim arily supplied b y Iran's northern oil field s and
further supplanted by a 4 0 ,0 0 0 b/d p ipeline directly linked to the Tehran R efinery from N ek a port in the
Caspian Sea. In this phase it is foreseen that a 390k m ., 32 inch diam eter pipeline w ith a capacity o f 3 7 0 ,0 0 0
b/d w ill be constructed from N ek a directly to Tehran and subsequently be connected to the Tabriz refinery.
T his plan also foresees the construction o f oil storage facilities and the reconfiguration o f the Tehran and
Tabriz refineries so as to be able to effec tiv e ly refine Caspian crude. It is foreseen that the project w ill take
tw o years to im plem ent. International Tender docum ents w ere released concurrently in Tehran and London
and evaluations are n o w under w ay.
P hase II: R efinery and P ip elin e M odifications: In this phase it is foreseen that the refineries o f the cities o f
Isfahan and Arak w ould also be geared towards the processing o f Caspian crude. T o ach ieve this objective,
the fo llo w in g steps are foreseen:
(I) R eversal o f the flo w o f the existin g p ipeline b etw een Tehran to Isfahan and Tehran to Arak.
(ii) Transfer o f oil from Northern Iran to Tehran via a n ew line from N eka, originating from Kazakhstan
and Turkm enistan and/or a n ew route from the Port o f A n zali or Baku, depending on the oil sw ap
applications.
It is thus foreseen that in Phase II, the capacity for crude oil transfers could rise by 4 5 0 ,0 0 0 b/d. Investm ent
is foreseen to take place concurrent w ith d evelop m en t w ithin the region.
P hase III: N e w P ipelines: In this phase it is foreseen that Caspian Oil w ou ld be fu lly capable o f being
transferred to Iran's southern o il term inals after full utilization o f Iran's northern refineries as w ell as
existin g lines from Isfahan and Arak having a capacity o f 8 0 0 ,0 0 0 b/d. T his can be ach ieved by:
(i) R eversal o f the flo w o f the existin g pip elin es o f Isfahan and Arak to Iran’s southern oil terminals.
(ii) The im plem entation o f n ew p ip elin es from Kazakhstan, Turkm enistan or A zerbaijan linked to Isfahan
and Arak.
It is o f particular note that this Third Phase requires m inim al investm ents in Iran's southern infrastructure as
there already exists a proven capacity to unload over 5m b/d o f oil. In sum, the im plem entation o f the above
three phases can enable the transfer o f over 1.6 m b/d o f Caspian o il w ith m inim um d elay and exp en se. Iran
Trade Point N etw ork w eb site, “G eo E con om ic Factors o f O il and G as,” A vailab le [O nline]:
< http://w w w .irtp.com /how to/partner/partner/chap3/chap3v.htm > [July 21 2 0 0 6 ].
25 Jofi Joseph, P ip e lin e D ip lo m a c y: The C lin ton A d m in istra tio n ’s F ig h t f o r B aku -C eyh an , W oodrow
W ilson S ch ool o f Public and International A ffairs, C ase Study in In tern a tio n a l D ip lo m a c y no. 1 (Princeton,
NJ: Princeton U niversity, 1999), 1 6 -1 7 . Cited in M arcus M en zel, D o o m e d to C o o p e ra te : A m erican
F oreig n P o lic y in the C a sp ia n R egion (Frankfurt am M ain, Berlin: Peter Lang P ublishing, D ecem ber
2 0 0 2 ), 78.
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for the Caspian oil as it had not been free o f long interruptions for varieties o f reasons.
One of the main reasons for the interruption o f the transportation o f Azeri oil through the
northern Russian route was the ongoing hostility between Russia and the Chechen
insurgents. The pipeline has been damaged many times during the bombings of
Chechnya and also the Chechen fighters used it to damage Russian interests in the region.
In addition to the war that was already destabilizing the region, some people in Chechnya
used to dig holes to steal oil from pipelines and sell it in the black market.26 The weak
Russian control over the Chechen territories raised serious concerns over the viability of
this route for Azeri oil. The concerns about the Russian route were coupled with the fact
that the Russian port o f Novorossiysk had to be closed for 3-4 months during the winter.
The Baku-Supsa pipeline, despite the difficulties and the ravaging costs, began
operations in April 1999 with a capacity o f 115,000 bbl/d. The cost estimates o f the
pipelines have been proven wrong. In the case o f Baku-Supsa, it cost about 600 million
dollars, twice the amount o f earlier estimates.

97

The first phase o f the oil transportation and pipeline negotiations was more or less
smooth and the cooperation among the actors has been achieved. One o f the reasons for
the emergence o f cooperation among actors on the issue was the absence o f relative gain
considerations.

The neo-realist theories argue that the states in international arena carry

26 A ccord in g to the State O il C om pany o f Azerbaijan (S O C A R ), a mere 4.3 m illion m etric tons o f oil has
been exported sin ce shipm ents began along the B ak u -N ovorossiysk route. O il from A zerbaijan accounted
for 1 m illion metric tons o f the total. Experts b eliev e that the p ipeline has been operating at 35 percent o f its
capacity. A total o f 1 2 0 ,0 0 0 m etric tons o f crude worth $ 5.5 m illion have been stolen from the BakuN ov o ro ssiy sk o il p ipeline in C hechnya sin ce the beginning o f 1999. N e v a sim a ya G a ze ta and G u d o k via
N e w s B ase, A vailab le [O nline]: < h ttp ://w w w .gasan d oil.com /goc/com p an v/cn c93206.h tm > [14 July 2 0 0 6 ].
“B ak u -N ovorossiysk O peration at 35% , O il S tolen ,” A le x a n d e r’s G a s a n d O il C on n ection 4 , no. 14 (June
1999).
27 D ekm ejian and Sim onian, T ro u b led W aters, 37.
28 R ealist assum ptions do not accept the existen ce o f ethic or m orality in international relations and state
behavior. A s M orgenthau puts it, “R ealism m aintains that U niversal moral principles can not be applied to
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relative gain considerations.

9Q

It is not only about what they gain from a transaction

between/among states, it is also the fact that what others gain and how much their gain
affects the existing power balance among states. As it goes from this assumption that if
the gain of others is considered to be higher, then the states may prefer to abstain from
-J A

cooperation.

Menzel argues that in the discussions for early oil it was the absolute gain

that prevailed. “Indeed a strict relative gains orientation would have impeded if not
o 1

killed cooperative endeavors at a rather early stage o f pipeline development.”

In the

case of early oil, the Russian government focused on the Baku-Novorossiysk pipeline and
did not oppose Baku-Supsa as the bulk o f the oil was planned to flow through the
northern route. The United States joined by Turkey, mainly focused on the
diversification of the pipelines and Baku-Supsa as an alternative to Baku-Novorossiysk.
Joseph Stanislaw and Daniel Yergin argue that “tight oil market is vulnerable to shocks in
IT

a way that an oversupplied market is not.”

Although Azerbaijan wanted to be less and

less dependent on the Russian pipeline system, under the prevailing circumstances and
the United States’ willingness to compromise, Azerbaijan agreed on the double route. It

the actions o f states in their abstract universal form ulation, but th ey must be filtered through the concrete
circum stances o f tim e and p lace.” M orgenthau, P o litic s A m o n g N a tio n s, 50.
29 M earsheim er, “The F alse Prom ise o f International Institutions.”
30 A ccord in g to realist paradigm , it is the nature o f the international system w h ich is anarchy that prevents
international cooperation. It stem s from the fact that “ states seek absolute gains and worry about
com pliance. H o w ever realists find that states are p ositional not atom istic, in character, and therefore realist
argue that, in addition to concerns about cheating, states in cooperative arrangements also worry that their
partners m ight gain more from cooperation than th ey do.” Joseph M . G rieco, “A narchy and the L im its o f
Cooperation: A R ealist Critique o f the N e w e st Liberal Institutionalism ,” in C o n tro v e rsies in In tern a tion al
Theories: R ealism a n d the N e o lib e r a l C h a llen g e, ed. Charles W . K egley, Jr. (N e w York: The M acm illan
Press Ltd., 1995), 152.
31 M en zel, D o o m e d to C o o p e ra te , 81.
32 A li Gungor and Ersel A yd in li, “T he D ual Pipeline: C ooperation V ersus C om petition,” C a spian
C ro ssro a d s M a g a zin e 2, no. 1 (Spring/Sum m er 1996).
33 Joseph Stanislaw and D an iel Y ergin, “Oil: R eop en in g the D oor,” F oreign A ffairs 7 2 , no. 4 (Septem ber/
October 1993), 91.
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was also the fact that, Azerbaijan was in an urgent need to find an outlet for the produced
oil to provide revenue for the future investments for the development o f the reserves.
Since each country focused on absolute gains, the outcome was a cooperative
behavior. Although Russia secured the biggest portion o f the oil transportation, the
United States and Azerbaijan did not focus on that part which indicates that they did not
carry relative gain considerations. The outcome could be interpreted as a win-win
strategy that could be better explained by the neo-liberal school of thought. Relative gain
considerations did not dominate the policies o f the negotiating parties which eventually
made it easy for them to achieve cooperation.
As for Iran and the United States, the situation was just the opposite. Relative
gain considerations and zero-sum thinking determined the nature o f the entire United
States-Iran relationship. The U.S. government used its resources to exclude Iran from
Caspian oil business and pipeline discussions despite the fact that the Iranian option
appealed to Azeri government and oil companies at the beginning. According to the
Iranian scholars, Iran is the most logical and feasible outlet for Caspian oil considering
the advantages it offers compared to the other options especially BTC. Nasri states that
“not only the Caspian oil and gas be exported cheaper in terms of transportation costs but
it can also reach both Europe and the huge Asian market.”34
The U.S.-Iran situation would be an example for state interaction from a neo
realist perspective as each state pursued a relative gain policy and tried to eliminate the
involvement/influence o f other in the affairs o f the region. A gain for Iran is seen as a

34 N arsi Ghorban, “B y W ay o f Iran: C aspian’s Oil and G as O utlet,” in The C a sp ia n R eg io n a t a C ro ssro a d :
C h allen g es o f a N ew F ro n tier o f E n erg y a n d D e v e lo p m e n t, ed. H ooshang Am irahm adi (Palgrave
M acm illan, 2 0 0 0 ), 154.
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loss for the United States and therefore the U.S. government used its power to persuade
Azeri government and oil companies to exclude Iran.
After all the negotiations for the transportation o f early oil, the actors were able to
achieve cooperation because each party accepted to modify their policies according to
others. While Russia accepted the inclusion o f a second route other than the BakuNovorossiysk, Azerbaijan accepted the U.S. proposal to exclude Iran. The United States
although did not want to give Russia a big share in the transportation o f Azeri oil, for the
stability o f the region and the apparent need for urgent settlement, agreed on the northern
route.35
From a stand point o f international relations theories, we might also conclude that
the number o f actors also affected the likelihood o f cooperation in the early oil debate. In
the case of early oil, the number o f actors in the negotiations could be considered small;
which facilitated the achievement o f cooperation.36
Another aspect o f the issue is the shadow o f future.37 In the case o f case o f early
oil discussions, the compromises made by the negotiating parties could be understood by
the existence o f an understanding by which actors expected to interact with each other in
the future. Since this was all about the transportation o f early oil, the actors wanted to
prepare a ground for the transportation o f main oil. Adjustment o f policies by each state
35 Three m illion tonnes o f A zeri crude through the B ak u -N ovorossiysk p ipeline 2 0 0 5 . Braemar S eascope
Saturday, July 08 2 0 0 6 . Braemar S eascop e reports that A zerbaijan hopes to export a m inim um o f 3 m illion
tonnes o f crude oil through the B ak u -N ovorossiysk p ipeline this year. U nder the agreem ent, signed w ith
R ussia in 1997, A zerbaijan can export up to 5 m illion ton es per year through the line. H ow ever, the
alternative B aku-Supsa pip elin e is cheaper to use, charging a transit tariff o f on ly $ 3 .2 0 per tonne,
com pared to $ 1 5 .6 7 per tonne to N o v o ro ssiy sk . A nother disadvantage for the A zerbaijanis using the
N o voro ssiy sk line is that their high quality A zeri crude is blended w ith low er grade R ussian crude to make
U rals B lend, w hich sells at a discount o f about $ 4 -5 pmt low er than pure A zeri crude. Braemar S eascop e,
“Three M illion T on es o f A zeri crude through the B ak u -N ovorossiysk P ipeline 2 0 0 5 ,” A vailab le [Online]:
< http ://w w w .in tertan k o.com /tem p lates/P age.asp x?id =331 3 1> [21 Septem ber 2 0 0 5 ],
36 K enneth A . O ye, “E xplaining C ooperation under Anarchy: H ypothesis and Strategies,” in C o o p e ra tio n
u n der A n arch y, ed. K enneth A . O ye (Princeton, NJ: Princeton U n iversity Press, 1985), 19.
37 Ib id , 1 3 -1 8 .
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and oil companies could be viewed from this perspective as well. Menzel asserts that “the
shadow of the future loomed large because the negotiations for the main export pipelines
MEP had yet to commence and the early oil deals could therefore serve as a test. This
implies that the United States could not, at this stage, exit from agreement without
suffering, in Crawford’s term, a reputational loss disadvantaging W ashington’s
negotiation position for the main oil in the future.
The stake in the early oil was not so high, compared to the economic benefits
expected from the transportation o f main oil.

39

The countries involved in the early oil

negotiations had high hopes about the main oil and main export pipelines (MEP). Russia
considered Baku-Novorossiysk as a success and expected the MEP pass through Russia.
However, the number o f actors in the second phase o f the pipeline negotiations for the
main oil increased as with the stakes at hand.

MAIN EXPORT PIPELINES (MEP) AND COOPERATION
Starting with the Production Sharing Agreements, the search for the main export
line(s) has gone through several stages of complex state interaction. The early stages of
the developments could be characterized as the complete absence o f coalition with the
existence of multiple proposals, and routes pushed by different governmental and non
governmental actors. Although the involving countries and oil companies started to
define their interests, there was not a strong center or a coalition nor a regime existed to
determine the rules o f negotiations for the main export pipelines. The friendly

38 M en zel, D o o m e d to C o o p e ra te, 83.
39 T he A zeri Production o f oil w as not to o high as it could bee seen from the numbers below .
1 9 9 2 .2 2 2 .2
1 9 9 3 ,2 0 6 .5
1 9 9 4 ,1 9 1 .2
1 9 9 5 ,1 8 0 .5
1996,180.3
1 9 9 7 ,1 7 9 .9
1 9 9 8 ,2 3 6 .7
1 9 9 9 ,2 8 3 .6
2 0 0 0 ,2 8 8 .6
2 0 0 1 ,3 0 8 .9
2 0 0 2 ,3 1 7 .8
2 0 0 3 ,3 2 7 .6
2 0 0 4 .3 1 9 .2
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environment emerged throughout the negotiations over the transportation o f early oil
started to fade as each actor in the Caspian Sea petroleum development realized the
nature o f the MEP issue. It was no longer a win-win scenario as it was the case with
early oil. The main pipeline would not possibly benefit all the involved parties. As there
would be winners o f the game, there was going to be some losers out o f all this MEP
negotiations. Having realized this fact, the actors in the game started competing over the
main export pipelines. Starting with 1997 and on, the countries o f Caspian Sea
(including Russia and Iran), the United States and Turkey fiercely fought over their
preferred route for the transportation o f Caspian oil. Despite the fact that there has been a
plethora o f proposals for the main route, the main export options seriously considered
were:
•

Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC)

•

Baku-Supsa

•

Baku-Novorossiysk

Other than these proposals, Bulgarian Black Sea route o f Burgaz and Greek port
o f Alexandropoulos on the Aegean Sea have been considered as an option by the AIOC.40
As the number o f proposals increased, the completion over the MEP intensified.41 This
has also pushed the Caspian oil producing countries in a difficult situation. They had to
choose a route for the main export pipeline and at the same time deal with the pressures
coming from powerful neighbors and external powers. Kazakhstan, for its part expressed
its support for a Western route as long as it was commercially feasible and at the same
40 See Hugh P op e, “A zerbaijani Leader Favors P ipeline B acked by U .S .,” cited in “R eb u ff to R u ssia,” The
W all S tre e t Journal, 9 M ay 1999.
41 “W ith so m any options and so m any com peting interests, it is hard to predict w here the pip elin es w ill
run.” Z enny M inton B ed o es, “A Survey o f Central A sia: P ipeline Poker,” The E conom ist, 7 February 1998,
11.
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time Kazakh government displayed interest in the Iranian route.42 These were interpreted
as a way o f throwing off of the Iranian pressure or maintain a level o f friendship with the
neighbor countries. Azerbaijan acted similarly and expressed its desire on a route that
would commercially be viable.43
Although it has been stated that the decision for the MEP would be based on
commercial viability and technical feasibility, the involvement o f external players and the
nature of the issue at stake, geopolitical considerations took precedence.44 This was
especially visible in the policies o f the Turkish government who rejected any option other
than Baku-Ceyhan. With the United States backing up Turkish government, the Baku
Ceyhan route became one o f the main issues o f discussion among the states and the oil
companies. Although the United States had been trying to play a role o f an impartial
arbiter, its support for Baku-Ceyhan and Turkish government changed the dynamics of
relationships in the Caspian MEP discussions. American policy on the MEP is also
geopolitically oriented contrary to the oil companies whose policies are based on
commercial viability and cost-benefit analysis. Opponents of BTC criticized the
American government for its support for BTC, a project that is not economically feasible
and not the most efficient.45

42 “Iran O ffers Transport R outes for Caspian O il,” C a sp ia n B u sin ess R e p o rt 2 , no. 15 (A ugust 1998).
43 “The d evelop m en t toward a com petitive, com m ercial environm ent and em ergence o f multiparty,
m ultilevel n egotiations b etw een states-as- and o il com panies-as-actors w ith d ivergin g interests, i.e.
com m ercial interests m ainly o f the oil com panies opposed to geop olitical interests o f nation states,
enorm ously com plicated and slow ed dow n prospects for an early or readily predictable outcom e on main
export p ip elin es.” M en zel, D o o m e d to C o o p era te, 90.
44 A ndrew I. K ilgore, “Id eo lo g y Triumphs E con om ic E fficien cy , as the B aku-T bilisi-C eyhan P ipeline
O pens,” S pecial Report, The W ashington R e p o rt on M id d le E a st A ffairs, A u gu st 2 0 0 5 .
45 H oom an Peim ani, The C a sp ia n P ip e lin e D ilem m a: P o litic a l G a m es a n d E con om ic L o sses (W estport,
CT: Praeger, 2 0 0 1 ), 77.
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TURKEY AND THE BAKU-CEYHAN PIPELINE
The involvement of Turkey as a regional actor in the MEP negotiations proved to
be a decisive factor in the future o f the interstate relations/negotiations in the Caspian
region over the pipeline issues. Turkey, as a regional power, has close ties to the
countries of the Caspian region. The historical friendship and kinship with Azerbaijan,
Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan is one o f the driving forces behind Turkey’s enthusiasm to
reestablish close ties with these countries.46 Starting with the break up o f the Soviet
Union, Turkey supported the countries o f Central Asia and the Caucasus by being one of
the first to recognize their independence. Ever since, Turkish governments made
continuous attempts to increase political and economic relationships.47 The newly
independent states o f Central Asia and the Caucasus were seen as brother countries by the
Turkish people, and the Turkish governments tried to provide every possible help to these
countries with their transition to being an independent state and to democracy. Turkey
also assumed a role model for these countries after their independence.48 In fact, this was
also welcomed by the littoral states o f the Caspian Sea as they needed every possible help
to consolidate their place as an independent country.49 Although both sides here had high
hopes about the possibilities o f close relationships and Turkey being a primary caretaker
for these countries, the availability o f political and economic resources limited the extend
o f interstate relationships between Turkey and the Turkic states in the Caspian Sea and

46 Pinar E geli, “B izim Icin A sy a N ed ir?” A v ra sy a E tu d leri, no. 2 6 , 2004.
47 Orhan M orgil, “Y en i Turk C um huroyetleri ve T urkiye E konom ik Iliskileri,” in B alkanlar, K a fk a sya ve
O r ta d o g u ’d a G elism e ler ve Turkiye, ed. Erol M anisali, Uluslararasi Girne K onferanslari, Kibris
Arastirmalari V akfi, no. 10, 1994.
48 Busra Ersanli, “C ok B oyutlulugun Y en id en K esfi: T urkiye’nin Turk C um huriyetleriyle Isbirligi A rayisi,”
in Turk C u m h u riyetleri ve P e tr o l B oru H a tla ri, ed. A laeddin Y alcinkaya (Istanbul: B aglam Y ayinlari,
1998).
49 Kamer K asim , “N agorno-K arabakh C onflict, Caspian O il and R egional P ow ers,” in The P o litic s o f
C aspia n O il, ed. BUlent G okay (N e w York: Palgrave, 2 0 0 1 ), 1 8 9 -9 0 .
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the Central Asia. Soon they realized the need for a broader framework for transition to
being an independent state after years o f Russian rule. Despite the fact that, Turkey
could not provide the resources needed by the former Soviet republics,50 it presented
itself as a door to the Western World as a NATO country and a long time ally of
Washington.51 Nevertheless, Turkey continued to support these countries as best as it
could and established strong relationships in economic and political arenas.52
When it comes to the negotiations for pipelines, Turkey moves from the very
same stand point where it sees itself as a natural outlet for these countries.53 For Turkish
people and Turkish government, a pipeline that will carry Azeri petroleum, Turkey must
be the first choice among others, considering the level o f closeness between Turkey and
Azerbaijan.54 Therefore Turkey, starting with 1992, has strongly been supporting the
Baku-Ceyhan as a main export pipeline for the Caspian oil. Any alternative to this option
fiercely opposed by the Turkish governments on several grounds.

50 Som e Turkish scholars also claim that the inability o f Turkey to provide a broad range o f help in m any
areas is not actually related to the absence o f su fficien t am ount o f resources in Turkey. T hey tend to put
the blam e on the Turkish governm ent asserting that Turkey had no v ision over the course o f developm ents
in the region. T he lack o f a grand strategy com plicated our initiatives in the C aspian and C aucasus area and
caused Turkey to be u n su ccessfu l com pared to w hat w e could have done considering that fact that turkey
has certain advantages over the region com pared to other external countries. S ee D e n iz Kutluk, H a za r
K afkas P etro lleri, Turk B o gazlari, C e v re se l T eh d it 16 (Istanbul: Turk D en iz Arastirmalari V akfi, 2 0 0 3 ),
5 0 -5 1 .
51 Fuad H u seyin ov, “A vrupa B irligi Turk C um huriyeleri Iliskileri v e T urkiye,” A v ra sy a E tu d le ri 21 (2 002).
52 Turkish m inister A had A ndican also confirm ed the fact that Turkey has m ade certain m istakes w ith
respect to the p o licies over the region and the relationship w ith th ese countries, em anating from the fact
that the internal problem s inside the country prevented Turkey from taking an active role in the regional
affairs. H e also m entioned the lack o f experience on the side o f Turkey to in v o lv e in the affairs o f other
countries and region s com pared to the other great pow ers in the w orld w h o have had vast experience for
centuries.
“Kafkaslar, Orta D o g u A vrasya Perspektifinde Turkiyenin O nem i Sem pozyum u: Sorular
C evaplar” (Istanbul: Harp A kadem ileri Y ayin i, 1998), 2 3 4 -3 5 .
53 For more details on the Turkish approach to the region see A laeddin Y alcinkaya, ed., Turk
C u m h u riyetleri ve P e tro l B o ru H a tla ri (Istanbul: B aglam Y ayinlari, 1998).
54 B oth countries speak Turkish language w hich, A zeri is the c lo se s to the language spoken in Turkey.
K asim , “N agorno-K arabakh C onflict, C aspian Oil and R egion al P ow ers,” 185. A lthough m ost o f the A zeri
p eop le are S h i’as, it never constitutes a problem in term s o f establishing clo se ties in different realm s.
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First, from the very beginning o f the pipeline negotiations, Turkey has been
complaining about the intense tanker traffic on the Bosporus where more than 12 million
people lives. The status of the Istanbul straits had been determined by the Montreux
Treaty in 1936. The treaty proposes free passage to commercial ships and only gives the
right to Turkey to close it during wartimes against enemy warships.55 Therefore Turkey
has no right to intervene in the passage of oil tankers through the Turkish straits
(Dardanelles).56 After 1990, the traffic on the Bosporus intensified and this has caused
several serious accidents that threatened the city life in Istanbul.57 Turkish government
stepped up and introduced certain regulations to control the passage o f heavy loaded
ships, however these regulations could not help to solve the existing problems as the
traffic through the straits increased each year.

CO

Potential threats posed by accidents still

affecting city life in Istanbul and also around Marmara Sea and Dardanelle.59 The Turkish
argument on the basis o f high traffic on the Turkish straits indicates the very fact that,
transportation of Caspian oil through Turkish straits will increase already tight traffic
which would eventually increase possibility o f accidents and oil spill into the sea.60

55 A s it is proposed by the first article o f the M ontreaux Treaty “T he H igh Contracting Parties recognize
and affirm the principle o f freedom o f transit and navigation by sea in the Straits.”
56 Full text o f the Treaty can be located at: Turkish M aritim e Pilots A sso cia tio n W ebsite, A vailab le
[O nline]: < http://w w w .turkishpilots.org/D O C U M E N T S/m ontro.htm l>
[21 A ugust 2 0 0 5 ],
57 For more details on the accidents and incidents w here serious threat w as p osed to human life, see Kutluk,
H a za r K a fk a s P etro lleri, Turk B o g a zla ri, C e v re se l T eh dit 16, 8 -1 2 . Z am an G a ze te si reports a recent
incident that a big disaster w a s barely prevented in Istanbul. Z am an G a zetesi, 2 2 February 2 0 0 6 . Turkish
M edia has num erous reports on the incidents that p osed serious threat to human life in Istanbul from the
passage o f the giant oil tankers through B osporus. S ee for exam ple Z am an G azetesi, 13 February 2 0 0 4 .
58 For details o f these regulations see Kutluk, H azar K afkas Petrolleri, Turk Bogazlari, C evresel T ehdit 16,
1 7 6 -2 3 2 .
59 Ors and Y ilm az argue that “O il sp ills from tankers, sm all or large, have resulted in considerable dam age
to the environm ent. I f no major dam age to human population took place, there is no guarantee that w e are
spared forever.” Haluk Ors and Server L event Y ilm az, “O il Transport in the Turkish Straits System , Part
II: A Sim ulation o f C ontam ination in the D ardanelles Strait,” E n erg y S o u rce 2 6 (2004): 175.
60 A hm et Ozturk, “From O il P ip elin es to O il Straits: the Caspian P ipeline P olitics and Environm ental
Protection o f the Istanbul and the Canakkale Straits,” J o u rn a l o f Southern a n d the B alkan s 4 , no. 1 (2002):
59.
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Throughout the negotiations, Turkey used this card continuously to extract some support
for the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline that would carry a million barrel per day. Some people
however challenge the Turkish argument on the ground that the bulk o f the Caspian oil
will still be carried by oil tankers through Turkish straits since the Kazakh oil is already
flowing through Novorossiysk. The construction of CPC and the completion o f RussianKazakh oil network through Novorossiysk take up most o f the oil production in the
Caspian Sea region.61 Therefore the argument is that, still most o f the Caspian oil has to
go through Turkish straits despite the fact Baku-Ceyhan will carry a million barrel to
Mediterranean. According to the proposed levels o f production, the Caspian oil
production is expected to be around 200 million tons per year which 50 million tons of
the oil will be carried by the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline. This amounts to only 22 percent o f
/r-\

the total Caspian oil production.

As we see from the numbers, the Caspian oil is still

expected to put a lot of pressure to tanker traffic on the Turkish straits.63 Nevertheless,
Baku-Ceyhan pipeline might still be able to reduce certain amount o f traffic and relieve
the pressure over the Turkish straits. As it looks from the Turkish perspective, this issue
will continue to be on agenda when it comes to negotiations over pipelines for the
Caspian oil.64 Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan stated in the grand opening
ceremony o f the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline on July 13 2006, that Turkey will pursue other

61 Z eynep G ogu s, “C eyhanin Rakibi N o v o ro ssisk ,” S a b a h G a zetesi, 29 E ylul 1997.
62 T he numbers m ight change sligh tly as the n ew d iscoveries are made and the production capacity
increased around Caspian Sea.
63 T he Russian side did not agree w ith the Turkish arguments. D esp ite the Turkish insistence on the issue
o f Traffic on the B osporus, the R ussian side did not quite agree w ith the Turkish com plains and blam ed
Turkish governm ent for introducing tight m easures to regulate the passage from Istanbul strait. For more
details on the op p osition to Turkish argum ents, see F e lix N . K ovalev, “Transportation o f C aspian O il
Through R u ssia,” in The C a sp ia n R eg io n a t a C ro ssro a d : C h a llen g es o f a N ew F ro n tier o f E n erg y a n d
D evelopm en t, ed. H ooshang Am irahm adi (Palgrave M acm illan, 2 0 0 0 ), 159.
64 For more statistical inform ation on the high traffic that has been increasing in the Turkish Straits and
p ossib ility o f oil sp ills and accidents; see Ors and Y ilm a z “O il Transport in the Turkish Straits System , Part
II,” 1 6 7 -7 5 .
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options for carrying Kazakh and Russian oil through another pipeline project from
Samsun ( a Turkish city on the Black Sea) to Ceyhan.65 If Turkish government can bring
other parties together on the project, it is quite possible that the tanker traffic might be
reduced to safer levels. However, these would require the cooperation o f the Russian and
Kazakh government, although Kazakhstan would accept such proposal, Russia may not
pursue this option because o f other political considerations.66
Another reason that Turkey has been so enthusiastic about Baku-Ceyhan as a
main export pipeline for the Azeri petroleum is the fact that, the direction o f the pipelines
has become an issue o f geopolitical importance. The country that the pipeline goes
through will have a political influence over the region and the regional affairs. Turkey,
Russia and Iran have long competed for establishing influence over the region. Svante E.
Cornell argues that “the building o f the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline constitutes a
strategic milestone in post-Soviet Eurasia. In the first place, the pipeline’s construction
will have major implications for the South Caucasus, especially as regards its role in
European and World Politics.

For everyone involved, within as well as in every

direction from the South Caucasus, the building o f the BTC pipeline reconfigures the
mental map with which political observers and decision-makers look at the world.
Azerbaijan and Georgia will see their futures in more direct relation to Europe through
the umbilical cord that BTC constitutes.”68 Russia as the successor o f the former Soviet

65 M illiye t G azetesi, 13 July 2006.
66 R u ssia’s resentm ent over B aku-C eyhan w as v isib le from the opening cerem on y o f the B aku-C eyhan
pipeline.
A lthough the other countries w ere represented at high diplom atic lev els, R ussia did not
participate at m inistry level; on ly the R ussian am bassador to Turkey w as present. “ 15 Y illik R uya Gercek
O ldu,” Z am an G azetesi, 14 July 2 0 06 .
67 D PT , Turkiyenin U yeligin in A B ’y e M u h tem el E tk ileri (Ankara: D PT Y ayinlari, 2 0 0 4 ).
68 Svante E. C ornell, M am uka T sereteli and V ladim ir Socor, “G eostrategic Im plications o f the B akuT b ilisi-C eyh an ,” in The B aku -T b ilisi-C eyh a n P ip elin e: O il W indow to the W est, eds. S , Frederick Starr and
Svante E. C ornell (John H opkins U n iversity Press, 2 0 0 5 ), 17.
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Union sees the region as a natural sphere o f influence. Any attempt by outside powers is
seen as a setback for Russian control in the region. Among the other political and
military games that have been played in the region over the course o f developments, the
MEP issue has become an issue o f influence and reputation. The country that controlled
the direction o f MEP would be in a better position to exert influence over the regional
affairs. Turkey has long been striving to be an important actor in the region through the
establishment of economic and political links. Baku-Ceyhan pipeline presented itself as a
big opportunity for Turkey to gain an important status in the region. As the early oil was
agreed to go through Russian territories and neither Turkey nor the United States wanted
to see Russia establishing full control over the future of Azeri oil.69 It was also a priority
for Azerbaijan to break away from Russian stranglehold, and during the negotiation for
MEP, Azerbaijan sided with Turkey and the United States.70 Turkish struggle for
geopolitical influence is also related to domestic politics in Turkey.71 Turkish
governments have long tried to establish an eminent position in the Caucasus and the
Caspian region. The issue o f pipelines, Baku-Ceyhan, became an issue o f reputation for
Turkey. From 1990s to 2007, Turkish government changed hands many times. Each
political party made it a high priority for itself to complete the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline

69 R ussian scholars argue that the R ussia phobia in the C aucasus-C aspian region is unwarranted. K ovalev,
“Transportation o f Caspian O il Through R u ssia,” 159.
70 Turkish prim e m inister referred to a corridor that B T C establishes that “B T C w ill not be on ly a p ipeline
that carries petroleum but also a gold en line that links the countries o f the region to each other. It w ill help
to im prove our relations at p olitical and eco n o m ic areas. “ 15 Y illik R uya G ercek O ldu.” S ee also M illiyet
G azetesi, 13 June 2 0 0 6 .
71 T he p o licies fo llo w ed by Turkey set an exam ple to R ealist explanation for struggle for power. The
realist paradigm assu m es the ex isten ce o f a struggle for pow er and influence in international arena. States
also try to prevent others from gaining pow er w hich in such settings ach ievem en t o f cooperation b ecom es
very difficult. A s M orghantau puts it, “A ll P olitics, d om estic and international reveals three b asic patterns;
that is all political phenom ena can be reduced to one o f the three basic types. A p olitical p o lic y seek s to
either to keep pow er, to increase pow er and to dem onstrate p ow er.” M orgenthau, P o litic s a m o n g N ation s,
50. H e also asserts that “struggle for pow er is universal in tim e and space and is an undeniable fact o f
exp erience.” Ibid., 36.
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project. The governments thought that it could also increase their popularity as a political
party that was able to achieve such a big and beneficial project for the country.72
In fact, the rising Turkish enthusiasm for the project, for some people, has harmed
Turkish interests in the negotiations as the oil companies (AIOC) used it as a leverage to
extract more benefits by asking for reduced tariffs and land right prices. Turkish
governments have been criticized by giving big concessions during the negotiations to the
oil companies and also providing subsidies for the project when the cost estimates passed
the initial projections.73 Although the United States also supported the Baku-Ceyhan
project, it never accepted providing financial support. Turkish scholars also criticized the
American policy o f providing infinite political support during the negotiations for MEP
but abstaining from giving out subsidies for the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline.74 Some argued
that Turkish government knowingly accepted the lower tariffs and provided additional
support on the ground that this project is an important step for the Caspian states to
export oil and build up wealth and break away from the Russian and the Iranian
influence.75 This is also in the Turkish interest to see the exclusion o f Russia and Iran
from the MEP and therefore the Turkish attitude and compromises should be considered
from this perspective. Dr. Kutluk content this view by asserting that the aforementioned
points were also in the American interests but the U.S. government never promised any
financial contribution to the project.

72 N ejd et A . Pamir, “B aku-C eyhan Boru Hatti,” A vrasya Stratejik Arastirmalar M erkezi (A S A M ) Y ayinlari
(Ankara: Kirali M atbaasi, 1999), 11.
73 N ejd et A . Pamir, Baku C eya h a n B oru H a tti ve O rta A sy a ve K a fk a sy a d a B itm eyen O yun, A vrasya
Stratejik Arastirmalar M erkezi (A S A M ) Y ayinlari (Ankara: Kirali M atbaasi, 1999).
74 M en zel, D o o m e d to C o o p e ra te , 63
75 See Suha B olukbasi, “A nkara’s Baku-C entered P olicy: H as it F ailed?” The M id d le E a st J o u rn a l 51, no. 1
(W inter 1997).
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Regardless o f the discussion about the material and financial benefits that will
come from BTC to Turkey, the project in fact will deliver certain financial benefits to
Turkish people in the long run. As Mr. Erdogan explained in his speech, Turkey will
receive a 250-300 million a year from the BTC pipeline, other than the employment and
the profits to be made for the maintenance o f the long pipeline.76
Dr. Kutluk is also critical o f the oil companies which, despite the increase in oil
prices, heavily bargained on the tariffs that the host nations will receive. 77 On the day
that the BTC first started loading on the Ceyhan port, Turkish newspapers praised the
capacity of the Ceyhan port (160 million ton) as the biggest in Europe even passing
Rotterdam.

78

It is also expected that Ceyhan could be a center for the oil industry that

would greatly benefit Turkey.
As it could be seen from the explanations above, Turkey followed a strict selfinterest policy during the negotiations for MEP.79 As we have mentioned before, any
other option has been strongly rejected by the Turkish government and especially after
1997 and onwards, Turkey used every possible policy to achieve its aim, including
pressuring the U.S. government to use its power and influence over BTC option. There
has been no sign o f a possibility for a compromise for MEP as far as Turkey is
concerned.

76 “T iirkiye’y i Petrol U ssii Y apan Y u zy ih n Projesi Buyuk Bir T orenle B a jla d i,” M illiy e t G azetesi, 13 July
2 0 0 6 . Dr. Kutluk states that, despite the fact than B T C pipeline is longer than K erkuk-Ceyhan, the material
benefits that Turkey gets from B TC is low er, referring to the lo w tariffs rates Turkey accepted. Kutluk,
H a za r K a fk a s P etro lleri, Turk B o g a zla ri, C e v re se l T ehdit 16, 1 0 8 -1 1 2 .
77 Ibid., 1 0 5 -1 0 7 .
78 “T urkiye’yi Petrol UssU Y apan Y iizy ilm Projesi Bttyttk Bir Torenle B a jla d i,” M illiy e t G azetesi, 13 July
2006.
79 “R ealism v ie w s the m odern state as a rational actor en gagin g in strategic action w ith other states. A ll
states are taken to be structurally m otivated to advance their respective national interests on the b asis o f
their pow er in an anarchical international sy stem .” B ald ev R ay N ayer, “R eg im es, P ow er and Institutions,”
In tern a tio n a l O rg a n iza tio n 4 9 , no. 1 (W inter 1995): 141.
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Since the number o f actors in the whole MEP negotiations was big, the possibility
for a common solution was considered very thin. Despite the fact that Turkey did not
play a big role during the early years o f oil development and transportation o f early oil,
Turkey emerged as one o f the main centers o f the negotiations for the MEP discussions.
One o f the results o f strong Turkish approach to the issue was the slowing down o f the
developments. Considering the fact that the negotiations for the main export pipeline
started as early as 1994-95 and ended around 2001 and completed in 2005, the attitude
and policies o f the involved actors particularly slowed down the advancements o f the
negotiations over MEP. The same kind o f attitude was also visible on the policies o f
other actors in the MEP negotiations.

THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE PIPELINE DILEMMA
The United States as an external power took a more or less impartial role during
the negotiations for early oil but changed the course o f its policies fundamentally and
provided full support for the BTC and Turkey. American foreign policy in the Caspian
region is formulated around the exclusion o f Iran from any oil business, therefore
preventing Iran from extracting any lucrative benefits, controlling and limiting Russian
influence in the region, protecting the interests o f American oil companies and ensuring
the smooth transition of newly independent states to democracy and market economy
•

•

while helping them to consolidate their independence.

80

♦

Some o f the interest listed

above overlaps with the interests of Turkey. Turkey has been a dependable ally for

80 For more details on the A m erican foreign p o licy in the Transcaucaus region, see Gawdat Bahgat,
A m erican O il D ip lo m a c y in th e P ersia n G u lf a n d th e C a sp ia n S ea (G ainesville: U n iversity Press o f Florida,
2 0 0 3 ), 167. S ee also U nited States Senate, H earing before the Subcom m ittee on International E con om ic
P olicy , Export and Trade Prom otion o f the C om m ittee on Foreign R elations, “U .S . E nergy Security: R ussia
and the C aspian,” 30 April 2 0 0 3 , 4.
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Washington since the end o f the World War II. When it conies to the MEP negotiations,
Turkey and the United States supported the same agenda and tried to counter the Russian
and the Iranian alternatives and their influence in the region. Energy security is an
important issue for the United States and the diversification of the energy supplies and
reduction o f dependence on Middle Eastern oil is an important aspect o f achieving this
aim. The American approach to Caspian is interpreted within this venue that extraction
o f the Caspian oil in a smooth and steady way may provide additional resources for
consumption. Although this view is challenged by some people on the ground that the
Caspian oil is no way close to be an important source for diversification o f oil supplies,
the U.S. government continuously supported a smooth and a healthy oil development in
the Caspian Sea region and openly supported Baku-Ceyhan route as a main export
pipeline.81
American involvement in the MEP issue is also related to the control o f Russian
hegemony over oil outlets as Russia possesses certain advantages coming for the
historical establishments and its geographical location vis-a-vis to Caspian and Central
Asian states.

In addition to these, Russia was already controlling the early oil pipelines

from Caspian Sea and the Kazakhstan’s oil export line, including CPC. Under the
circumstances, the U.S. government alongside with Turkey and Azerbaijan favored a
different route that would not fall under the Russian control. Although the Iranian route
seemed to be the shortest and the cheapest according to the analyses made by European
companies, the U.S. policy to isolate Iran left no ground for any Iranian option for MEP.

81 A t its peak level, Caspian o il production is estim ated to be around 3 - 5 percent o f the total w orld oil
production.
2 Z bign iew B rzezin sk i, The G ra n d C h essboard, A m erica n P rim a ry a n d its G e o stra te g ic Im p era tives (N ew
York: Harper C ollins, 1997), 129.
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Considering the directions o f the developments and the heightening tensions between the
United States and Iran over nuclear plants and Iran’s support for Hezbollah in Lebanon,
any policy change on the U.S. side towards Iran in the coming years is not expected.83
American licensed oil companies are forbidden to get into any type o f business
transaction with Iran, exceeding 20 million dollars. ILSA (Iran Libya Sanction Act 1996)
serves this purpose and designed to control Iranian involvement in lucrative projects.
This represents an important aspect o f non-cooperation in the region as it simply ignores
the Iranian side and their policies. Overall, we could assert that the nature o f the
relationship between United States and Iran has long been an important impediment to
the achievement o f a general cooperation in the region in terms o f developing the energy
resources o f the Caspian Sea. The deepening o f the tensions between Iran and United
States has negatively affected the prospects for a larger scheme o f cooperation in the
region.
Despite the fact that the BTC option is longer and more expensive,84 under the
circumstances the U.S. government accepted the BTC option as the most reliable and safe
exit for the Azeri oil and possibly for Kazakh oil from Kasghan reserves.

oc

The

American policy on MEP and its push for support from oil companies has been criticized
83 S ee Gawdat B ahgat, “T he U nited States and Iran: Prospects for R approchem ent,” in A m erica n O il
D ip lo m a c y in th e P ersia n G u lf a n d the C a sp ia n S ea (G ainesville: U n iversity Press o f Florida, 2 0 0 3 ), 103—
140.
84 For an extended cost-b en efit analysis o f the pip elin e proposals, se e R onald S o lig o and A m y M yers Jaffe,
“T he E con om ics o f P ip elin e Routes: The Conundrum o f Oil Exports from the Caspian B asin ,” in The
C aspia n R egion : P re se n t a n d F u tu re, ed. Y elen a K alyuzhnova et al (Palgrave M acm illan, 2 0 0 2 ).
85 There have been concerns over the security o f the B TC p ipeline esp ecia lly it p asses through som e areas
w here there has been som e internal con flicts b etw een insurgents and host nations. T he internal problem s in
G eorgia long lasting quarrels b etw een the A bkhazian and G eorgian created som e concerns over the security
o f BTC. In addition to this, the PK K issue in Turkey raised som e fears about the stability o f the flo w over
B TC line. H ow ever, the governm ents o f th ese countries took important steps in clearing som e o f the
existin g issu es for the security o f the pip elin e. T he P K K issu e is no longer a serious thereat to B T C
security sin ce the arrest o f the leader o f the organization. Under the circum stances, the p ossib ility o f
interruption o f the flo w o f o il through B T C p ipeline is very lo w considering the security precautions taken
by the host governm ents.
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by the company executives. One o f the main criticisms directed at the U.S. government
was that the United States supported the BTC pipeline but was not willing to provide any
financial support. As some Turkish scholars did, oil companies in the region also blamed
American government for not providing any subsidy for the costly project. Nevertheless,
the discovery of Kasghan reserves and the increasing oil prices after 1995 worked as an
incentive for oil companies to drop their opposition to the BTC after long years of
dragging their feet.

RUSSIAN RESISTANCE TO BTC AND NEGOTIATIONS OVER MEP
However, the Russian opposition to BTC never stopped and Russia kept pushing
for the northern option that goes through Novorossiysk. Russian opposition to East-West
corridor is related to many factors. One o f them is the Russian fear o f loosing influence
over the course o f developments in the Caucasus and Caspian region. The fight for the
MEP turned into a great competition between Russia and the U.S.-Turkish alliance. It
was considered to be a game where winner takes all. Historically, Russia dominated the
region especially after the arrival o f Putin into Kremlin, Russia intensified its pressure
over the Caspian affairs. Policy of Near Abroad proposes the continuation o f the Russian
sphere o f influence in Central Asia, Caucasus and the Caspian region. A move by
Western states or regional powers, i.e. Turkey, is considered as a direct threat to Russian
interests in the region. The activities o f the Western oil companies are considered to be a
deliberate act o f placing a wedge between Russia and ex-dominions. Because o f these
considerations, Russia strictly opposed to other options for the MEP that would not pass
through Russian territory. The Russian activities in the Caucasus and the Caspian region
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were directed to force the regional states to comply with the Russian requests in favor of
the northern route. Russian support and transfer o f a billion dollar value o f weapon to
Armenia during the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and the Russian activities in Georgia
have been seen as an indirect way o f Russian pressure over the issues related to the main
export pipeline.86 According to Aydin, Russia “decided to keep Azerbaijan weak and on
the defensive”87 to achieve its aims in the region.88
The second reason that Russia insisted on the northern route is related to the
financial benefits associated with the pipelines. Once the pipelines have been laid, it
provides continuous and easy revenue for the host country. Despite the fact that Russia
has one o f the largest oil and gas reserves in the world, Russian economy is still in need
o f support.
Nonetheless, the Russian arguments in favor o f the northern route have been
challenged on several grounds. The first and the foremost concern over the BakuNovorossiysk pipeline option is the issue o f security. During the fight between Chechnya
and Russia, the pipeline has been damaged and sabotaged by the Chechen insurgents.
They have also used the pipeline to threaten the Russian military operations in the region.
Additionally, the local people developed a habit o f breaking into the pipeline to steal oil.

86 It is assum ed that M o sco w w as behind the operations that resulted in the overthrow o f E lcib ey
G overnm ent (E lcib ey has been know n for his strong pro-Turkish p o licies) in A zerbaijan in 1993 after he
has com pleted som e o il deals w ith w estern com panies. T he su ccessor A liy e v barely escaped a coup attempt
after the sign in g o f the D eal o f the Century in 1994 w ith a consortium o f W estern o il com panies.
A ccord in g to B olukbasi, M o sc o w has also been blam ed for tw o coup attempts against E lchibey's su ccessor
A liev , w h o se opp osition to the reintroduction o f R ussian m ilitary forces in A zerbaijan m ay have prompted
M o sco w to act. T he first coup attempt took place in late Septem ber 1994, w hen the A zerbaijani deputy
interior m inister R oushan Javadov, in co llu sio n w ith Prim e M inister H u sein ov ch allen ged the A liev
administration. A lie v quelled the revolt, and H u sein o v escap ed to M o sco w .6 2 Javadov, w h o w as pardoned
by A liev , challenged him again in M arch 1995, but the coup failed and Javadov w as killed during the
clashes. (B olukbasi “A nkara’s Baku Centered T ranscaucasia P o licy .”
87 A ydin, “O il, P ip elin es and Security,” 17.
88 For m ore details on the R ussian activities to m aintain its influence in the region see A rslan, H azarin
K u rtla r V adisi, 1 2 5 -2 5 3 .
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Despite the fact that Russia insisted on the Baku-Novorossiysk as MEP for Azeri oil, it
could not provide a safe and a secure passage for the transportation o f Azeri oil. Another
hurdle for the Russian side was the Novorossiysk port itself. Due to the climate
conditions, the port had to be closed at least 3-4 months a year. Considering the
conditions and concerns stated above, the Azeri government and oil companies did not
want to commit themselves to a highly problematic route, although the northern route
was cheaper than the B T C .89 Azerbaijan and AIOC opted for BTC which seemed to be
much more stable and yet costlier.
The American support for Azeri government and also its insistence on BTC
helped Azeri government to move forward with the western route.90 We could also
mention the fact that the Caspian countries particularly avoided Russian alternatives due
to the fact that they indeed wanted to loosen Russian control over their countries.
However, the situation for Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan is different. Their dependence
on Russia is way greater than the Azeri people. Among these states, Kazakhstan depends
89 D esp ite the fact that B ak u -N ovorossiysk pipeline has a capacity o f 180.00 on A zeri side and 3 4 0 .0 0 0 b/d
on the R ussian side, A zerbaijan Oil C om pany have not b een able to utilize it to its full capacity due to the
interruptions because o f the C hechen con flict. D uring 2 0 0 4 -0 5 , AIOC transported 5 0 .0 0 0 b/d o f oil
through this pipeline. On the other hand, B aku-Supsa has a capacity o f 1 1 5 .0 0 b/d and later expanded to
2 5 0 .0 0 0 b/d. A ccord in g to a report by A le x a n d e r’s G a s a n d O il C on n ection (1 9 9 9 ), “A sp ok esw om an for
the A zerbaijan International Operating C om pany (A IO C ) said that the n ew B aku-Supsa p ipeline w as
pum ping o il at its full capacity o f 1 1 5 ,0 0 0 barrels per day. T he A IO C had originally planned to bring the
early oil pip elin e up to full capacity in June o f this year, Tam am B ayatly said. A ll construction work on the
pipeline itse lf has been com p leted , and the sixth and final pum ping station along the B aku-Supsa route w as
finished earlier in M ay, she added. A IO C o fficia ls have said they are eager to m ake go o d use o f the new
pipeline, particularly sin ce the R ussian state pip elin e operator Transneft appears to be having trouble
keeping the B ak u -N ovorossiysk pipeline— the consortium 's on ly other export outlet— open. The northern
pipeline has been shut dow n repeatedly sin ce the b egin n in g o f the year. Frequent interruption o f service is
not the on ly drawback o f the northern pipeline; Transneft charges the A IO C and S O C A R $ 15.67 for every
ton o f oil transported from the Azerbaijani border to N o v o ro ssiy sk . B y contrast, the co st o f shipping one
ton o f crude from Baku to Supsa through the n ew pip elin e has b een figured at on ly $ 2 - 3 per ton. The
w estw ard-leading pipeline m ay b ecom e even m ore econ om ic i f the A IO C builds n ew infrastructure
facilities; w ith extra pum ping stations and storage facilities at the Baku and Supsa term inals, industry
experts say, the p ipeline could handle 2 5 0 ,0 0 0 bpd.” “B aku-Supsa P ipeline R each es Full C apacity A head
o f Sched u le.”
90 W ithout the support from the U .S . and Turkish governm ent, it could have been remarkably d ifficu lt for
A zerbaijan to resist R ussian pressure for the B ak u -N ovorossiysk option.
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on Russia the most. Kazakhstan has also the largest reserves among the Caspian
countries excluding Russia and Iran. For the Kazakh oil, Russia is the only natural outlet
under the current conditions. For this very basic reason, Kazakhstan’s attitude towards
Russia has been a lot more conciliatory compared to other countries o f the region.
Kazakhstan has to use the existing Russian pipelines to be able to export its production.91
Q9

Although it has been quite difficult for Kazakhstan to deal with Russia , they have come
a long way with regard to the use o f internal Russian pipeline network, compared to the
early years of independence. With the competition o f CPC (Caspian Pipeline
Consortium) Kazakhstan now is able to transfer large volumes o f oil to the Russian port
of Novorossiysk.
Russia for long dragged its feet over the construction o f CPC pipeline that was
planned to carry oil from Kazakh Tengiz fields to the port of Novorossiysk at Black
Sea.

QT

When things really started moving in favor o f BTC, Russia found itself in a

position where it has to make certain moves to keep up in the competition. That is when
Russia cleared up some o f the issues with CPC; which Kazakhstan, Russia, and Chevron
(one o f the biggest American oil company) came to an agreement on the details of

91 A nother important reason that forces Kazakhstan to be m indful o f its p o licies tow ards R ussia is its
sizable R ussian m inority in the country. A ccord in g to C IA W orld B o o k o f 2 0 0 6 , the R ussian m inority
takes up 30 percent o f the Kazakh population. A vailab le [O nline]:
< http s://w w w .cia.gov/cia/p u b lication s/factb ook /geos/k z.h tm l> [2 April 20 0 6 ],
92 A s early as 1993, Kazakh o fficia ls w ere op en ly com plaining that the n ew post S o v iet regim e in R ussia
w as taking advantage o f its pip elin e m on o p o ly to m ake Kazakhstan to pay a h eavy price for its reliance on
Russian gas line system . ...n o t on ly R ussia dud R ussia use its m onopsony purchaser to force K azakhstan to
accept on ly a fraction o f the w orld price for gas entering R ussia from w estern K azakhstan, it also used its
p osition as m on op oly shipper to force the K azakhs to pay m uch higher price for gas exported from R ussia
to eastern Kazakhstan. R oberts, “E nergy R eserves, P ip elin e R outes and the L egal R egim e in the Caspian
S ea,” 79.
93 One o f the reasons for R ussian p o licy is the idea that any o il that go es through R ussia from Kazakhstan
to world oil markets w orks against R ussian share in the oil market. H aving seen the K azaks as their
com petitors, the R ussians used their advantages to create problem s to K azakhstan and therefore extract
more benefits. It w as also the desire o f Chevron and the Kazakh governm ent to d evelop a pip elin e that
g o es through R ussia as the on ly natural outlet but less and less R ussian control is giv en to R ussians.
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proposed pipeline.94 On October 13, 2001 the Kazakh oil reached to Black Sea and
started loading onto tankers. The CPC pipeline has been completed by 2003 and started
its regular operation.95 As the activities o f the Western companies increased in the
Caspian Sea area, Russia kept making new moves to counter the Western influence and
also to be able to participate in the oil business in the region. Another step taken by
Russia was the re-establishment o f natural gas transaction with Turkmenistan. At a time
when TCP (Trans Caspian Pipeline) had no promise for Turkmenistan, Russian proposal
was welcomed by the Turkmen government. The negotiation of the deal and the
agreement between the two countries officially ended the prospects for TCP. This was
considered as a victory for Russia while it was seen as a setback for American and
Turkish interests. Turkmenistan, although wanted to stretch towards western direction,
was frustrated by several developments in the Caspian Sea. First o f all, Turkey promised
to buy large amounts o f Turkmen gas from Turkmenistan to be transported by a pipeline
built under the Caspian Sea.96 This project was also supported by the American
administration mainly because the TCP project would further reduce Russian influence

94 It w as probably after the integration o f the R ussian o il com pany LUK O IL into the CPC project as a
shareholder that the R ussians started m ovin g tow ards cooperation. Roberts, “E nergy R eserves, P ipeline
R outes and the L egal R egim e in the Caspian Sea,” 82.
95 CPC has a co m p lex organizational structure. Three G overnm ents and ten com panies representing seven
countries participate in the project. T w o jo in t stock com panies— C PC -R (R u ssia) and C PC -K
(K azakhstan)— have been created to im plem ent the project. CPC M anagers and sp ecialists are from
shareholder com panies. T he initial construction o f the pip elin e w as funded b y o il producing shareholder
com panies, com bined w ith the assets provided by the host governm ents. Future p ipeline capacity
expansions w ill be financed from the C PC ’s revenues. “Caspian P ip elin e Consortium: General
Inform ation,” A vailab le [O nline]:
< http://w w w .cpc.ru/D ortal/aliaslpress/langlen-us/tabID i3357/D esktopD efault.aspx> [17 Septem ber 2 0 0 6 ].
The Structure o f CPC Shareholder Capital is the follow in g: R u ssia-24% ; K a za k h sta n -1 9%; O m an-7% ;
C hevron Caspian P ip elin e C onsortium C o.-15% ; L U K A R C O B .V .-1 2 ,5 % ; M ob il Caspian P ip elin e C o 7,5% ; R osn eft-S h ell Caspian V entures L td .-7,5% ; A g ip International (N .A .) N .V .-2 % ; Oryx Caspian
P ipeline L L C -1,75% ; B G O verseas H old in gs Ltd.—2%; K azakhstan P ip elin e V entures L L C -1,75% .
“Caspian P ip elin e Consortium: CPC Structure,” A vailab le [O nline]:
< http://w w w .cpc.ru/portal/aliaslpress/langlen-U S/tabID 13360/D esktopD efault.aspx> [17 Septem ber 2 0 0 6 ],
96 A ccord in g to the original proposals, Turkey prom ised to buy 16 bcm /y natural gas from Turkmenistan.
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over the region and also prevent any Iranian involvement in the Turkmenistan, Russia
and Iran fiercely opposed to such a project on the ground that it might cause serious
ecological damage to the Caspian Sea as the base o f the sea was known to be seismically
active and not very steady. The further discovery o f Azeri natural gas in the Shah Deniz
area in the Caspian Sea and Azerbaijan’s desire to sell this gas to Turkey complicated the
project when Azerbaijan pulled its support from TCP in favor o f its own benefits.
Frustrated by these, Turkmen President Saparmurat Turkmenbashi blamed the U.S.
government for favoring Azerbaijan over Turkmenistan and approached to the Russian
offer in 2000, despite the fact that the deal with Russia had certain downsides.97 The
Turkmen gas is delivered to domestic market in Russia and to other former Soviet
Republics, which are not able to pay their debt in hard currency.

QQ

Another successful move by Russia during the negotiations for main export
pipeline is the completion o f Blue Stream Project with Turkey. Turkey and Russia
agreed on the construction o f a pipeline that would carry large amounts o f Russian
natural gas to Turkey.99 Despite the technical and financial difficulties that was expected
to slow down the project, the consortium was able provide finance in a short period of
time. To everyone’s surprise, the project started as soon as the parties agreed on the

97 Here one o f the reasons that no serious project has been d evelop ed for Turkmen gas and o il production is
that, it is the inability o f the Turkmen governm ent to attract foreign investors through m aking certain
political and regulatory adjustm ents at d om estic level.
98 The stand o f f b etw een R ussia and Ukraine is a clear exam ple o f the situation m entioned above. R ussia
stopped transferring natural gas to Ukraine due to the disagreem ent on the price o f the natural gas. R ussia
has been sellin g gas to U kraine for and charging quite less than the world market average. (5 0 $ per 1000
cm where R ussian sale to other countries w ere around 2 4 0 $ for the sam e amount. M illiy e t G azetesi, 4
January 2 0 0 6 . W hen the d om estic p olitics in Ukraine fo llo w ed a different track than w hat R ussia expected,
R ussia decided to treat Ukraine the sam e w a y and increased to prices to 2 3 0 $ . W hile R ussia w as charging
2 3 0 $ per 1000cm for R ussian natural Gas, the custom ers for Kazakh and Turkmen natural gas paid 95$.
Z am an G azetesi, 5 January 2 0 0 6 .
99 Ironically, R ussia initiated a project that in v o lv es laying pipes under B lack S ea w h ile it w as op p osing to
the TCP project on the ground that undersea p ip elin es m ay bring e c o lo g ica l dam age to the C aspian S ea and
the marine life.
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terms and conditions.100 These moves by Russia are said to compensate what Russia had
lost on the other side o f the Caspian oil business namely the direction o f the main export
pipeline. The new deals and intense Russian involvement in the Caspian oil strengthened
the Russian position in the whole picture. However, the U.S.-Turkish alliance won the
second round when the presidents of Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey signed an
agreement on the construction o f BTC in 1999 in Istanbul.101

OIL COMPANIES AND IRAN
In fact Russian policies were not the only factor that stalled the negotiations for
the main export pipeline. The oil companies that invested in the Caspian Sea also created
serious problems for the development o f the negotiations over BTC. One o f the main
differences between the oil companies (Despite they are mostly American based oil
companies) and the governments (both regional and external) is the fact that the oil
companies are profit minded. They would like to move into the direction where they
could extract more revenue from investments.

109

Unlike the oil companies, the

governments of the regional and external countries had secondary or tertiary agendas.
Geopolitical considerations most o f the time took precedence over economic gains. As
the fundamental way of thinking differed, the oil companies and the governments had
100 The Turkish governm ent has been criticized by the Turkish scholars and journalists for their inability to
bargain a go o d deal out o f the B lu e Stream Project. W hile R ussia sold its natural gas to European
Countries for about 150$ per a 1000cm , Turkey paid 2 6 0 $ for the sam e am ount w h ile the R ussian sale to
other countries averaged around 2 4 0 $ . M illiy e t G azetesi, 4 January 2006.
101 The President o f the U n ited States B ill C linton w as also present in the cerem on y to sh ow the support o f
the U nited States and its com m itm ent to the project. Signed in 1999, alm ost 3 years o f h eavy negotiations
and preparations, “On 18 S ep t.2 0 0 2 , the construction o f B aku-C eyhan starts in a cerem on y hosted b y the
A zerbaijan president. T he p ipeline is 9 9 6 m illim eters in diam eter, it w ill be 1760 km, and it w ill be ready
som etim e in 2 0 0 5 .” A gh ai-D ib a, “B aku-C eyhan P ip elin e.”
102 See Svetlana T salik and R obert E. Ebel, C asp ian O il W indfalls: Who W ill B en efit, C a sp ia n R even u e
Watch, Open S o ciety Institute Central Eurasia Project (M ay 2 0 0 3 ).
A lso see D avid I. H offm an,
“Azerbaijan: T he P o liticization o f O il,” in E n erg y a n d C o n flict in C en tra l A sia a n d th e C a u ca su s, ed.
Robert M enon and Rajan E bel R ow m an (L ittlefield Publishers, Inc., 20 0 0 ).
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certain issues to deal with, which eventually slowed down the developments o f oil
business in the region. First o f all, when it comes to the MEP issue, the oil companies
opted for the easiest and the cheapest option. As it was commonly accepted, Iran is the
closest and the cheapest route for the export o f Caspian oil. A pipeline from Baku could
be linked to the internal Iranian network which would then find its way to Arabian Sea.
During the negotiations for the MEP, Iran proposed many alternatives for the
transportation o f Caspian oil and tried to use every possible option to work its way for a
better outcome for Iran. Although the Iranian proposals have been dismissed by the
governments o f the United States and Turkey, without even being given serious
consideration, it created some confusion on the side o f the oil companies and the regional
governments.103 The U.S. government had to provide incentives for the Azeri
government to disregard any Iranian proposal with respect to the export o f Caspian oil.104
The American government also had to apply pressure to oil companies not to consider
Iran105 as an outlet for the Caspian oil export.106 The reason for the U.S. attitude towards

103 Rob S. Sobhani, “President C lin ton ’s Iran O ption,” C a sp ia n C ro ssro a d s M a g a zin e 1, no. 1 (W inter
1995). On the issue o f oil com panies vs. the U .S ., see Nadr Entessar, “Iran: G eop olitical C hallenges and the
Caspian R eg io n ,” in O il a n d G e o p o litics in the C a sp ia n S e a R eg io n , ed. M ichael P. C roissant and B illent
Aras (W estport, CT: Praeger, 1999), 174.
104 T he U nited States w as able to persuade A zeri governm ent on double route and ex clu sio n o f Iran form
Caspian oil d evelop m en t through establishing linkages b etw een issues. B y prom ising to provide help on
the con flict b etw een A rm enia and Azerbaijan, the U nited States w as able to secure A zeri support. Robert
A xelrod and Robert K eohane argue that “linkage can be b en eficial to both sid es in n egotiations and
facilitate the agreem ents that m ight not otherw ise be p o ssib le.” Robert A xelrod and R obert O. K eohane
“A ch iev in g C ooperation U nder Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions,” in C o o p e ra tio n U n der A n a rch y, ed.
K enneth A . O ye (Princeton, NJ: Princeton U n iversity Press, 1985), 2 3 9 .
105 H ow ever, “Form er U .S . W hite H ouse national security adviser Z b ign ew B rzezin sk i says A m erican
efforts to isolate Iran and keep Caspian o il pip elin es out o f that country could push Tehran into
collaboration w ith R ussia to exclu d e w estern presence from the region. B rzezin sk i, w h o headed the
national Security C ouncil under President Jim m y Carter, told a Senate Foreign R elations subcom m ittee
W ednesday that i f the U .S . w ants a stable Persian g u lf and central A sian region, “ som e gradual
accom m odation is in the mutual interest o f both countries.” RFE/RL, W ashington, 9 July 1998.
106 T he relationship b etw een states and non-state actors started to change as the im portance o f the non-state
actors in w orld p olitics started to rise. In the case o f B TC and oil com panies, the o il com panies had to
change their p o licies despite the fact that for long they p erceived it against their interests. It all com es
dow n to the fact that in areas o f high p olitics, states w ill alw ays force the non-state actors to co m p ly w ith
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Iran is obvious but some say that an Iranian option would direct the Caspian and Middle
Eastern oil through the same outlet (Hormuz Strait) which would not make any sense if
the Caspian oil is expected to provide diversification for imports. It is also the fact that
Hormuz strait is already crowded with the transportation o f huge Middle Eastern oil, and
additional burden would not be a wise choice considering the issue from a perspective of
Global Energy security. Iran, for its part kept maneuvering during the negotiations for
MEP. Iran tactically sided with Russia from time to time and proposed easy access to
Iranian oil network. Even then, the Iranian proposal for swapping the Caspian oil for its
domestic use in the northern and central parts of Iran and making it available in the south
for export to world markets, has been seen as a favorable option especially by the oil
companies and Turkmenistan as well.
Iran and Russia created an alliance against American and Turkish side; however
they were also indeed rivals considering the MEP as a single outlet. Therefore this
alliance did not continue throughout whole discussions as their interests conflicted with
each other. Russia and Iran share the same interests when it comes to slowing down the
developments. It could also be said that, Iran from the very beginning knew that the
American government would not allow any Iranian option to materialize but kept
working on different options as a way o f stalling the developments through creation of
♦

confusion on the other sides.

107

•

The idea behind stalling the developments was that they

could maybe get a better deal in the future rather than accepting BTC as a main outlet. In
their p olicies. For m ore details on the d iscu ssion s about the rise o f transnational actors and pow er o f states;
see Thom as R isse-K appen, “Structures o f G overnance and Transnational R elations: W hat W e H ave
Learned?” in B rin g in g T ran sn ation al R ela tio n s B a ck In: N o n -S ta te A ctors, D o m e stic S tru ctu res a n d
In tern a tio n a l Institutions, ed. T hom as R isse-K appen (N e w York: C am bridge U n iversity Press, 1995), and
Robert O. K eohane and Joseph S. N y e , Jr. “Transnational R elations and W orld P o litics,” in T ran sn ation al
R elatio n s a n d W o rld P o litic s, ed. R obert O. K eohane and Joseph S. N y e , Jr. (C am bridge, M A: Harvard
U niversity Press, 1972).
107 For m ore on Iranian Approach, see Peim ani, The C a sp ia n P ip e lin e D ilem m a, 1 -1 2 1 .
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fact oil companies also hoped for a change in the future and expected a more favorable
solution rather than going for BTC, the western route. This mentality and expectations
stalled the developments o f MEP discussions until it became clear that the U.S.
government and persistent Turkey will not go for a different alternative. With the rise in
the oil prices after 1995-96, the oil companies dropped their opposition to costly BTC
project.

108

With the accumulation o f enough support and finance, the parties agreed on

the construction o f BTC as a main export pipeline for the transportation o f Azeri oil and
possible Kazakh oil from Kasghan reserves.

BTC: A DREAM COMING TRUE
Early years o f negotiations for BTC have been marked with so many questions
and confusions. People has pessimistic views about BTC coming into reality, even there
have been number o f people talking about BTC pipeline in terms o f pipe dreams.109 One
o f the points that need to be taken into consideration is the continuous U.S. support and
Turkish insistence on the project. With the changing environment and increasing oil
prices, BTC pipeline was chosen to be the main export pipeline in 1999. Even then it
took six years to materialize because of the unexpected problems (most o f them are
related to political, economic and technical challenges) on the way. The issue o f finance
has been one of the main problems that the actors in the process had to deal with for a
long period o f time. The Turkish flexibility on the issue has helped the project to move
108 Roberts, “E nergy R eserves, P ipeline R outes and the L egal R egim e in the C aspian S ea,” 84.
109 Martha B rill O lcott, “P ip elin es and Pipe Dreams: E nergy D ev elo p m en t and Caspian S o ciety ” J o u rn a l o f
In tern a tio n a l A ffairs 53, no. 1 (Fall 1999): 305; M anana K ochaladze, “P ipeline Dreams: T he W orld Bank
O il D ev elo p m en t and Environm ental Protection in G eorgia,” M u ltin a tio n a l M o n ito r 23 (5 M ay 2 0 0 2 ). See
also N an cy Lubin “P ipe Dreams: Potential Im pacts o f E nergy E xploitation,” H a rv a rd In tern a tio n a l R eview ,
Harvard International R elations C ouncil (22 M arch 2 0 0 0 ). A fter years o f debate it seem s the 3 -b illion dollar B aku-T bilisi-C eyhan oil pipeline project w ill go ahead, or w ill it? S om e industry experts remain
unconvinced. Jon Gorvett. “P ip elin e dream s?” The M id d le E a st 38, no. 2 (N ovem b er 2 0 0 2 ).
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on. Out o f schedule but steady, the BTC pipeline has been completed in May 2005 and
AIOC started loading the pipeline with oil. It took a year to fill the BTC pipeline to its
full and first tanker was loaded on 13 June 2006, at the Turkish port o f Ceyhan on
Mediterranean.
The grand opening ceremony o f BTC itself showed the importance o f project for
Turkey and for Azerbaijan and the other parties who took part in the process.110 The
leaders of the three countries depicted the BTC pipeline as a golden link that brings these
countries together. Although not planned at the beginning, the establishment o f the BTC
pipeline may have helped to strengthen the economic and political relationship among
these countries as w ell.111

CONCLUSIONS
Blessed with large amount o f oil and gas reserves, Caspian states found
themselves in a dilemma right after they gained their independence. Apart from the
technical and technological difficulties that they had to deal with to extract the natural
resources, the transportation o f oil to world markets presented to be one o f the most
difficult problems for the newly independent states. Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan and
Turkmenistan do not have direct access to outside world and therefore are dependent on
110 The im portance given to this project by the participating countries and the U nited States as an outside
supporter o f the project w as quite v isib le from the am ount o f effort spent for the cerem on y and the security
m easures taken for the diplom atic representatives o f gu est countries. In the cerem ony, Turkey w as
represented at the h igh est diplom atic lev el w ith the participation o f the President o f the Turkish R epublic,
Prime M inister and several other m inistries. A zerbaijan and G eorgia w ere also represented by their
Presidents. T he cerem on y w as v iew ed by 4 0 0 journalists and reporters and Turkey and B P alm ost spent
3.6 m illion dollars for the w h o le cerem on y including the concert given by Mariah Carey. Z am an G a zetesi
reported this even t w ith a title o f 15 year D ream C am e True (“ 15 Y illik R uya G ercek O ldu.”)
111 Turkish President A hm et N ecd et Sezer in his speech during the opening cerem on y o f the B TC p ipeline
indicated that the pip elin e w ill play an important role in the very strategic geographical location where
m ost o f the w orld ’s o il is produced (referring to M id d le East and Caspian) and that B T C w ill be one o f the
cornerstone o f the develop m en ts that provides stability in the region by con n ectin g the regional countries
together. Z am an G a zetesi, 14 July 2 0 0 6 .
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the cooperation o f neighbor countries. As soon as the western oil companies started
investing, they also started looking for ways to export Caspian oil. Although at the
beginning limited amount of production was somehow exported either trough swaps or
railroads, further discovery o f new recourses and expected increase in the oil production
necessitated the construction of oil pipelines that would link the Caspian states to the
open seas. (See tables below for the Caspian oil and Gas Production across recent years.)
However, the issue o f pipeline proved to be one o f the most difficult and troublesome
issues that they had to deal with. As the construction o f pipelines involves neighboring
states, the number o f actors increased naturally which at the end caused complications.

Table 7:
Oil Production: Caspian States
1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

Russian F.

304.8

323.3

348.1

379.6

421.4

458.8

470.0

Azerbaijan

13.8

14.0

14.9

15.4

15.5

15.7

22.4

Kazakhstan

30.1

35.3

40.1

48.2

52.4

60.6

63.0

7.1

7.2

8.0

9.0

10.0

9.6

9.5

Turkmenistan

Source: BP Statistical Review o f World Energy 2006, Unit: In Million Tones

Table 8:
Gas Production: Caspian States
1999
Russian Fed.
Turkmenistan
Kazakhstan
Azerbaijan

551.0
21.3
9.3
5.6

2000
545.0
43.8
10.8
5.3

2001
542.4
47.9
10.8
5.2

2002
555.4
49.9
10.6
4.8

2003
578.6
55.1
12.9
4.8

2004
591.0
54.6
20.6
4.7

2005
598.0
58.8
23.5
5.3

Source: BP Statistical Review o f World Energy 2006, Unit: In Billion Cubic Meters
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In the Caspian context, the transportation of Azeri and Kazakh oil went through
two distinct stages. The first stages o f pipeline construction involved a limited amount of
early oil from the offshore Azeri fields. The stake was not so high considering the daily
pumping capacity o f the pipeline projects. The limited number o f the actors at the first
stage, helped to the achievement o f cooperation in a fairly short period o f time. As we
have discussed earlier, the willingness o f the United States, Russia and Azerbaijan to
come to a middle ground by making certain compromises further ameliorated the
achievement o f an acceptable solution. States did not have relative gain considerations as
the stake at hand was not so high and the shadow o f the future loomed large. Each party
focused on what they wanted most, not on what others might get.
On the other, hand the second phase o f the pipeline development turned out to be
totally different.112 As states and oil companies prepared for a main export pipeline, each
party in the game favored an option that served their interest best.113 It was either
northern or western or the southern route that the Caspian oil would be carried. The
benefits associated with the realization o f their objectives is considered to be big and the
loss is believed to be huge. The zero-sum thinking dominated the MEP negotiations
throughout most o f the decade.114 With regard to cooperation on the MEP issue, we

112 Faruk A rslan depicts the Caspian region as a “V alle o f the W o lv es” for the rivalry and intense
com petitions over the C aspian. Arslan, H a za rin K u rtla r Vadisi: P e tr o l Im p a ra to rlu g u n d a k i G uc S a va slari.
113 H ooshang Am irahm adi considers the rivalry in the Caspian region as a n egative force that creates
further hazard for the future security o f the region. H e argues that “the current position s held b y major
players in volved often ignore this com p lexity in favor o f narrow ly defined strategic and econ om ic interests
largely inform ed b y the shortsighted an im osity, rivalry or a llian ces.” A m irahm adi, “P ipeline P olitics in the
Caspian R eg io n ,” 163. H e also claim s that the on e sided ch o ice m ade by U .S.-T urkish alliance w ill further
the split b etw een regional countries b y exclu d in g R ussia and Iran, w hich w ou ld even tu ally endanger the
security in the region. (Ibid., 1 6 7 -6 9 )
114 A s R obert A xelrod and Robert O. K eohane su ggest, “ach ievin g cooperation is d ifficu lt in w orld politics.
There is no com m on governm ent to en force rules, and b y the standards o f d om estic so ciety , international
institutions are w eak. C heating and deception are e n d e m ic .... W orld p olitics is not a h om ogen eou s state o f
war: cooperation varies am ong issu es and over tim e.” A xelrod and K eohane “A ch iev in g C ooperation under
Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions,” 2 2 6 .
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consider that the cooperation has not totally been achieved considering the fact that
Russia and Iran never accepted BTC route as a main outlet for the Caspian oil. One of
the purposes of this chapter was to find out the reasons for the lack o f interstate
cooperation over energy development in the Caspian Sea region. In that context, we may
assert that one o f the most essential reasons for the absence of interstate cooperation (this
also involves state and non-state actors) is the relative gain considerations which drew
actors away from each other as each actor tried to exclude an option that might advantage
others. The U.S. policy to exclude Iran and to limit Russian control o f the future o f oil
developments in the region and in the same line, Russian policy to maintain a sphere of
influence in the region by limiting the presence o f Western powers clearly indicates a
relative gain policy by each state. In a setting where actors are obsessed with relative
gain thinking, cooperation among actors is not expected to occur. In the case o f MEP
negotiations, cooperation among all the involved parties has not been achieved.
However, the United States was able to deliver its promise to Turkey on the realization of
BTC by applying pressure on the oil companies to bring them to the table.115 Within this
context, we might argue that the United States had to use its hegemonic power to
convince oil companies and regional countries (Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan) to accept

114 See A m irahm adi, “P ip elin e P olitics in the Caspian R eg io n ,” 1 3 -1 8 .
115 The project also has been supported by Israel and Jew ish lobby. A ndrew K illgore argues that Israel
w anted to prove that Turkish alliance w ith Israel pays o f f in different areas. K ilgore, “Id eo lo g y Triumphs
E con om ic E fficien cy , as the B aku-T bilisi-C eyhan P ip elin e O pens,” 32. S ee also Suat Taspinar, “TurkiyeIsrail Ittifaki,” S a b ah G a zetesi, 1 Septem ber 1997. For more inform ation on the lobbying activities o f
Caspian states and oil com panies in the U nited States to get A m erican support in favor o f their ow n
interests, see Stone H. Peter “Caspian W ells C om e in for K Street,” N a tio n a l J o u rn a l 31, no. 11 (M arch
1999): 6 8 0 . (Info Trac One F ile. T hom son G ale. Old D om in ion U niversity Library. 8 A ug. 2 0 0 6 ),
http://find.galegrouo.com .proxv.lib.odu.edu/itx/infom ark.do?& contentSet=IA C D ocum ents& type=retrieve& tablD = T 002& prodld T rO F & d o cld -A 5 4 3 Q 9 5 2 1& source:=gale&srcprod==ITOF
& userG roupN am e=viva odu& version^ 1.0
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BTC as a main outlet; and also Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan not to consider
oil transaction with Iran.
In addition to this is the self interest considerations of the actors involved in the
negotiations. While Russia pushed for the northern route, the U.S, Turkey and Azerbaijan
insisted on the western route. On the other hand Iran proposed its own territory as a
passage for the Caspian oil produced by Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan and some o f the oil
companies have inclined towards Iranian side as the Iranian proposals seemed to be
shorter and cheaper. This has created an environment in which multiple actors interacted
with fundamentally different and conflicting interests. Considering the existence of
varieties o f alternatives each state leaning towards one direction, the expected
cooperation among the actors has been at its best slow to emerge.
Another reason that might explain the slow emergence o f cooperation on the MEP
issue is the number of actors participated in the negotiations. The number o f actors in the
MEP discussions increased and the likelihood o f cooperation diminished. A large group
o f state and non-state actors with different agenda and concerns did not produce an
environment that is readily conducive to cooperation. Therefore; we may argue that the
number o f actors in the MEP negotiations also prevented the emergence o f cooperation
among the involved actors in a short period of time.
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Figure 2: Existing and Projected Pipelines
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CHAPTER V
CONFLICTS IN THE CAUCASUS AND CASPIAN OIL DEVELOPMENT

Throughout the history, the Caucasian region has been dominated by outside
powers. The transcaucasian region has been ruled by the Turkic Empires, Persians, and
the British and finally fell in to the hands of the Soviets.1 With the arrival o f Communist
Russia, the region has been included under the Soviet Union; theoretically abolishing the
nation states. The issue o f internal borders and the existing conflicts among the
neighboring states has been suppressed during the Soviet era. The Soviet rhetoric of
brotherhood under communist umbrella did not quite help to the elimination of the
existing disputes related to land and border. But the strict and heavy handed Soviet
policies helped these issues to be frozen for a long period of time. Through the end o f the
Soviet Union and after its break up, the existing issues in the Transcaucasian region
began to emerge. As the Soviet Russia lost its power and control o f the former republics,
these states had to deal with internal and external issues. Caught in the phase o f transition
to independence, the issues of minorities and autonomous regions have caused a great
deal of problems for the Transcaucasian states. Although some o f the issues purely
remained as an internal issue o f nation states, the extent o f the violence and the potential
for spread to regional states internationalized the conflicts.2

1 “T he Caucasus's co m p lex and shifting m ix o f cultures, religion s and nationalities, has long been a source
o f potential instability. A s a rule, its com m unities have lived in harm ony on ly, w hen peace has been
im posed by an outside pow er. For the past on e hundred and fifty years, that pow er w as the R ussian em pire
and its successor, the S o v iet U n io n .” Q uoted in A lish o v D adash Rahim, “T he R ole o f Caspian O il in
M aintaining Stability in the C aucasus R egion: In the C ase o f M ountainous Karabakh C on flict.” (Ph.D .
diss., K eele U niversity, U K , 1999). See also “Transcaucasia: H ell is Other P eo p le,” S tra teg ic S u rvey
(1 9 9 3 -1 9 9 4 ): 89.
2 S ok olsk y and C harlick-Paley, N A T O a n d C a sp ia n S ecu rity, 13.
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In this chapter, I will mainly focus on the conflicts and subsequent wars between
different ethnic groups and states in the Caucasian region, especially the conflict between
Azerbaijan and Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians which had the greatest impact on the
course of the developments in the region. By looking at the consequences o f these wars
and violence, I would like to assess the impact of these conflicts on the achievement of
interstate cooperation in the Caspian region over the issues related to the development of
Caspian oil. The long-lasting conflicts in the region prevented the early development of
the oil industry and the flow o f foreign direct investment. The countries o f the Caspian
Sea were in serious need o f foreign investment for oil extraction in the offshore oil fields,
but the wars in the transcaspian region and instability accompanied with it slowed down
the arrival o f western oil companies.
There are number of examples o f such conflicts after the end o f the Cold War;
however within the context of Caucasian region there has been three major o f conflicts
that has caused a great deal of concern for the region. Especially within the context o f a
globalized world and the rise of international institutions dealing with such issues, the
conflicts in the Caucasian region became a global issue. As the world community paid
more and more attention to the issues of human rights and gross human rights violations,
protection o f the rights o f individuals, minorities and refugees, the extend o f the regional
conflicts reached to the other parts o f the world.
Another factor that put the regional conflicts in the Transcaucasian region to
International scene is the oil reserves in the Caspian region. As the major oil companies
planned to get a share o f the Caspian oil, the western states including the United States
had to pay more attention to the issues o f the Caspian region. The conflict between
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Azerbaijan and the Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians, the Chechen-Russian conflict and the
internal conflicts in Georgia constituted the main sources o f instability in the region.
Despite the fact that some o f these conflicts were domestic in nature, the possibility o f the
spread of these conflicts and the geopolitical importance o f the region internationalized
the problem. Another aspect o f the ethnic strife in the transcaucasia is that the violence
between different parties carried a potential for vast migration to neighbor countries
which eventually necessitated the involvement o f the other states.
Conflict and cooperation is an important area o f study for international relations
theories. In my examination of the impact of these conflicts on the cooperative/non
cooperative behavior o f the regional states, I will be referring to the approaches from
international relations theory. What causes cooperation or defection is an important
question and under what conditions do states choose to cooperate? Within the context of
the Caspian region, the choices o f the states in terms o f resorting to military options will
be examined.
The main issue that all these come down to is the achievement o f cooperation
among the major actors over the issues related to the development o f Caspian oil and its
transportation to world oil markets. Among the conflicts that had the greatest potential to
spread to the region is the conflict between Azerbaijan and Nagorno-Karabakh
Autonomous region (N K ).3 It has also been the main source o f instability that affected
the oil business in the Caspian region. When it comes to the development o f economy,
industry and foreign investment, existence o f stability becomes a very important issue.

3 A utonom y in a political and legal context refers to the pow er o f social institutions to “regulate their ow n
affairs by enacting legal rules.” In international law , autonom y is taken to m ean that “parts o f the state’s
territory are authorized to govern th em selves in certain matters by enacting law s and statutes, but w ithout
constituting a state o f their o w n .” Svante E. C ornell, “A u ton om y as a Source o f C onflict: C aucasian
C onflicts in T heoretical P ersp ective,” W o rld P o litic s 5 4 , no. 2 (January 2002): 2 4 5 .
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Business follows secure and stable areas. In the Caspian context the question we ask is
how has the business o f oil development been affected by the conflicts between different
groups. After examining the military conflicts and wars in the Caucasus region, I will
move onto the investigation o f the impact o f these wars on the interstate relationship and
cooperation on the issue o f oil development in the Caspian region.

OIL DEVELOPMENT AND CONFLICT IN THE CASPIAN REGION: AZERBAIJAN,
ARMENIA & NAGORNO-KARABAKH
The roots o f the conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia and the NagornoKarabakh Autonomous region goes back to the eighteenth century where Armenians had
the idea of establishing a great Armenian Empire comprising o f the areas o f Armenian
population in the Caucasian region. Throughout the history, the area that is populated by
many ethnic groups including Armenians has been controlled by Muslim Turks and
Persians.4 Russians took control of the region, including Nagorno-Karabakh, after
defeating Persians in 1828 which resulted in the treaty of Turkmenchai that marked the
beginning o f Russian rule in the region. Despite the Ottoman and the British presence in
the region for some time, the end o f World War I and the subsequent Bolshevik
revolution and the rise of the Soviet Empire, the region has been put back under Soviet
control.5 During the Persian, Ottoman and British times, the status o f the NagornoKarabakh changed hands but mostly remained under Azeri control. Nagorno-Karabakh
has been inhabited by the Armenians in majority and Azeri population remained as a

4 For details o f early history see G eorge A . B ournoutian, Two C h ron icles on th e H isto ry o f K a ra b a g h :
M irza J a m a l J a va n sh ir's T arikh-e K a ra b a g h a n d M irza A d ig d za l B eg's K a ra b a g h -N a m e (C osta M esa, CA:
M azda Publishers, 2 0 0 4 ).
5 Edgar O 'B allance, W ars in the C aucasus, 1 9 9 0 -1 9 9 5 (N e w York: N e w Y ork U n iversity Press, 1997), 3 -

22.
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minority in the region throughout the history with varying degree o f proportion
depending on the mass movements and the policies o f controlling states in terms o f the
settlement of their subjects.6
The Azeri and Armenian historians tend to view the history o f Nagorno-Karabakh
from their own perspectives and lay claims on the region.7 The differences between the
two nations have been one o f the causes for conflict throughout all history. Azeris and
Armenians fought over Nagorno-Karabakh region for long time. As long as the area was
controlled by outside powers, the issue remained dormant. As soon as the external control
loosened, violence erupted between two nations.8
The issue o f borders on the southern Soviet flank was determined by the Treaty of
Moscow between Turkey and the Soviet Empire in 1921. Soviet Russia had to favor
Turkish opinions in the Caucasus region because o f the fact that, SSSR needed good
relations with Turkey at a time when the communist Russia needed allies and saw Turkey
as a potential ally against the western block. With this treaty, Nakchivan was given a
status o f Autonomous Soviet Republic where as Nagorno-Karabakh was given to Azeri
control and became an oblast,9 Although Azeris were happy about the Soviet’s decision,
the Armenians objected to this division but returned no result. Despite the fact that
Soviets favored a Turkish approach over the division o f the Caucasus states and

6 “N agorno-K arabakh is a de facto independent republic in the South C aucasus, o fficia lly part o f the
R epublic o f Azerbaijan, about 2 7 0 kilom eters (1 7 0 m iles) w est o f the A zerbaijani capital o f Baku, and very
clo se to the border w ith A rm enia.” “N agorno-K arabakh,” A vailab le [Online]:
< http://en.w ikipedia.org/w iki/N agorno-K arabakh> [27 A u gu st 2 0 0 6 ].
7 For A rm enian v ie w s see L evon Chorbajian, ed., The M a k in g o f N a g o rn o -K a ra b a k h : F rom S ecessio n to
R epublic, (Palgrave M acm illan, 2 0 0 1 ) and Richard G. H ovannisian, “H istorical M em ory and Foreign
R elations: T he A rm enian P ersp ective,” in The L e g a c y o f H isto ry in R u ssia a n d the N ew S ta te s o f E u rasia,
ed. S. Frederick Starr (N e w York: M .E . Sharpe, 1994), 2 4 9 -5 0 .
8 T adeusz S w ieto ch o w sk i, “T he Problem o f N agorno-Karabakh: G eography versus D em ography under
C olonization and D eco lo n iza tio n ,” in C e n tra l A sia: Its S tra teg ic Im p o rta n ce a n d F uture P ro sp e c ts, ed,
H afeez M alik (B asingstoke: M acm illan, 1994), 1 4 3 -5 8 .
9 Pustilnik Marina, “C aucasus S tresses,” T ransition 15 (M arch 1995): 1 6 -1 8 .
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autonomous regions, the old Soviet divide and conquer rule remained in place. By
favoring Turkish approach, Soviets achieved both a Turkish sympathy at that time and at
the same time they had a good system o f control over the region. Alexei Zverev suggests
that the Soviet decision to accommodate Turkey “reflects wider Bolshevik concerns to
appease Kemal Ataturk and placate the restive Moslem population which was being
subdued by Soviet Russia.” 10 Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous region became a trouble
spot for both Azeris and Armenians that Soviets could use whenever the occasion
called.11 This increased the dependence of Azeris on the Soviet army to maintain control
over the region. Regardless o f the past and the present, the Karabakh Armenians tried to
gain their independence and/or unification with Armenia throughout the Soviet era. With
glasnost and perestroika, a window o f opportunity was open to Armenians. Karabakh
Armenians demanded unification with Armenia in 1988 and this was quickly rejected by
the Azerbaijani government. During the same year, the Supreme Soviet o f USSR
discussed the issue and decided to keep Nagorno-Karabakh under Azerbaijani control.
This was met by heavy protest by the Armenians and marked the start o f violence
between the two communities.
The following days, months and years, the violence escalated between the
Armenians and the Azeris. It started out as an internal problem o f Azerbaijan but quickly
involved Armenia as well. As soon as the social unrest erupted, mass migrations followed
suit. The following years witnessed a huge number o f people being forced out o f their
10 A lex ei Z verev “Ethnic C on flicts in the C aucasus 1 9 8 8 -1 9 9 4 ,” in C o n te ste d B o rd e rs in th e C aucasus, ed.
Bruno C oppieters (Pleinlaan Brussels: V U B U n iversity Press, 1996).
11 Svante C ornell argues that “the provision o f institutionalized, territorial autonom y for an ethnic m inority
m ay cause the opposite o f its intended e ffect - it m ay augm ent rather than reduce the potential for con flict
betw een a m inority and central g o v ern m en t.... A utonom y is neither a su fficien t nor a necessary cause o f
conflict. Y et, it has a strong causal relationship w ith both a m inority’s w illin g n ess and esp ecia lly its
capacity to revolt. It is reasonably clear that w ithin the C aucasian context, autonom y has been a source o f
con flict and not a solution to it.” C ornell, “A u ton om y as a Source o f C on flict,” 2 7 5 .
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homes and moved towards safe territories. Because of the ethnic structure o f the region
and the historical mixture o f different populations, the transcaucasia represents a land of
multiple nationalities; Armenians living in Azerbaijan, Georgia and elsewhere in the
region while Azeris inhabited parts o f Armenia and Georgia as well. Under volatile
conditions, ethnic minorities suffered the most. In the case o f Nagorno-Karabakh
conflict; as soon as the violence started, ethnic minorities became the victim o f heavy
harassment by the local people as a response to the ongoing political rivalries. Hundreds
of thousands o f Azeris had to move out o f Armenia and the Azeri villages in NagornoKarabakh with en estimated figure around 200,000-250,000 people. An approximate
number o f (200,000) Armenians fled Azerbaijan towards Armenia for the same reason as
the harassment and threat increased.12
In 1988, the events that started in Sumghait marked another cornerstone o f the
inter-ethnic conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan. The killing o f two Azeris by
Armenians caused a public fervor in Azerbaijan and led to the killing and throwing out of
Armenians in Azerbaijan. A total o f 32-36 people have been killed in the events while
i 'i

the local authorities did little to stop the riot.

In response to the Azeri outrage in

Sumghait, Azeris in some villages have been pushed out and their homes were burnt in
Armenia. As a matter o f fact, each event led to another which in the end worsened the
conditions. Angry crowds in the streets of Azerbaijan and Armenia demanded revenge
for those who has fallen victim to ethnic violence. Governments had hard time trying to
control their own people. As the social unrest grew, the dissent with governments caused

12 Edmund H erzig, The N ew C au casu s: A rm enia, A zerb a ija n a n d G e o rg ia (London: R oyal Institute o f
International A ffairs, 1999), 66.
13 A rm enian sources reported th ese numbers by ten tim es higher com pared to other sources w h ich indicates
the ten d en cy o f each sid e to use the incidents in their ow n p olicies. Svante E. C ornell, S m a ll N a tio n s a n d
G re a t P o w ers: A S tu d y o f E th n o p o litic a l C o n flict in the C au casu s (Richm ond: Curzon Press, 2 0 0 1 ), 82.

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.

140

the rise of popular fronts. In Azerbaijan, APF (Azerbaijan Popular Front) and in Armenia,
ANM (Armenian National Movement) gained popular support. With their nationalist
rhetoric and severe criticism of current socialist governments, the political situation in the
two republics became more fragile. The rise of APF was viewed in suspicion by Moscow
which culminated in the events o f Black January. The invasion o f Baku in 1990 by the
Soviet troops to root out the APF leaders and supporters increased anti-Moscow
sentiments in Azerbaijan, contrary to the Soviet policies.14 The nationalistic fervor did
not stop but gained momentum in both Azerbaijan and Armenia. The Soviet troops
stationed in Baku, protecting the Soviet regime in Azerbaijan was also seen as a threat to
Armenia in the sense that Soviet military did not do much about the ethnic conflicts that
had been going on.15
Another turning point in the history of communal violence is the start of
Operation Ring by the Soviet forces in Azerbaijan and Azeri Police in 1991. The main
purpose o f the operation was to search for illegal weapons in the Armenian provinces to
prevent the formation of guerilla warfare by the Armenians. At the same time, the
Soviets planned to teach a lesson to Armenian state for their demand for independence
from the Soviet Union. However, the whole operation alienated the Armenians from
Soviets and increased the solidarity to defend themselves against the Russians and the

14 “W hat cam e to be know n as B lack January in A zerbaijan— the b lood y takeover and occupation o f Baku
by S o v iet troops on 20th January 1990— w as the culm ination o f heightening nationalist fervor in A rm enia
and Azerbaijan, and grow in g inter-com m unal v io len ce in the A zerbaijan capital itself. M oreover, B lack
January had brought inter-ethnic ten sion s and an ti-M oscow feelin g s to a n ew lev el in both republics,
propelling A rm enia and A zerbaijan further dow n the road toward open warfare. B lack January had a
m om entous im pact on the parties in volved in the conflict. T he brutal use o f S o v iet troops in Baku and the
repression o f the A PF (A zerbaijan Popular Front), did not root out the A zerbaijani nationalist m ovem en t, or
prevent re-establishing strong links w ith the centre.” “T he R ole o f Caspian O il in M aintaining Stability in
the C aucasus R egion: In the C ase o f M ountainous Karabakh C on flict,” Chapter 1, A vailab le [Online]:
< http://w w w .zerbaiian.com /azeri/dadash2.htm > [23 A ugust 2 0 0 6 ],
15 For more on the details o f the human rights violation s by both sides, see R achel D enber, B lo o d sh e d in the
C aucasu s: E sca la tio n o f the A rm e d C o n flict in N a g o rn o -K a ra b a k h (N ew York: H elsinki W atch, 1992).
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Azeris.16 Operation Ring carried a different character from the previous violence
between Azerbaijan and Armenians o f Nagorno-Karabakh. For the first time, the Soviet
troops actively supported Azeri side against Armenians. The Azeri government in Baku
(Ayaz Muttalibov, pro-Soviet) depended on Moscow in their battle against Armenians.
On the other hand the Armenians had to rely on their own resources in their struggle for
independence and started forming armed units. It is around this time that the nature of
the conflict changed to direct military confrontation between the Azeri military and the
Armenian militias. The end o f the Soviet Empire weakened the Azeri position as the
Azeri resistance to Armenian drive for independence and unification with Armenia
depended highly on Soviet military units. The nature o f the conflict has also changed to
interstate conflict soon after the Armenian and the Azeri government declared
independence from Soviet Empire. Followed by the Azeri declaration o f independence,
NK Republic in September 1991 declared itself as an independent unit with the borders
o f NK Autonomous Oblast. Azerbaijan Republic reacted harshly to this and abolished
the status o f NKAO and reduced it to a region. Elowever, this did not mean much to the
either side since the NK territory was well controlled by the Armenians where Azeri
military had little control and was quickly loosing the region.
The years following 1992-94 have shown a different character as the nature of the
conflict turned into a direct military confrontation. After three years o f struggle and
ethnic violence and irregular clashes, starting with 1992, the issue o f NK turned out to be
a full scale war between NK Armenians and Azeris. NK Armenians has been supported
by Armenia financially and militarily. The Armenian Diaspora has provided a great deal
of financial support for the Armenian cause in NK. On the other hand, Azerbaijan for
16 C ornell, S m a ll N a tio n s a n d G re a t P o w ers, 90.
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long depended on Soviet military to suppress demands for independence. Turkey as an
ally for Azerbaijan also provided help for Azerbaijan. Because o f the fragile balance in
•
17*
the region, Turkey’s options have been limited during the times o f full scale war. Still
there are numerous sources that acknowledge that Turkey provided arms and other
1o

contribution to Azerbaijan underhand.

t

'

Armenia as an ally o f NK refrained from

recognizing the independence o f NK as it may have caused complications for Armenia at
international level. Despite the fact that Armenia does not recognize N K ’s independence,
it is generally accepted as a political move. Armenia has involved in every step o f the
way as a guarantor for the NK Armenians.
Starting with 1992, Armenian offensive began to move towards the Azeri
populated villages in NK region. Having prepared itself for military confrontation,
Armenians successfully defeated Azeri military and advanced towards Azerbaijan. In
addition to the forced migration o f the inhabitants o f the Azeri villages, the Armenian
army committed gross human rights violations. Khojaly19 represents the peak of
Armenian atrocities towards Azeris where the town has been burnt and the remaining
people fled to A zerbaijan.20 According to some independent resources, the Armenians
have killed and mutilated 600-1000 people.21 The Khojali massacre created a fear in the
remaining villages that the Azeri people fled their homes before the arrival o f Armenian

17 This is partly due to the fear o f R ussian in volvem en t on the Arm enian side and also the existin g
com m ercial links betw een R ussia and Turkey. Kam er K asim , “N agorno-K arabakh C onflict, Caspian Oil
and R egional P ow ers,” 191.
18 A y in Tarihi, 12 February 1992. A lso A vailab le [Online]:
.h ttp ://w w w .b vegm .gov.tr/Y A Y lN L A R lM lZ /A vin T arih i/A vin tarih i.h tm > [29 O ctober 20 0 6 ]
19 For a narrated coverage o f K hojaly m assacre and N K con flict, see Thom as G oltz, A ze rb a ija n D ia ry: A
R ogu e R ep o rter's A d ven tu res in an O il-R ich, W ar-Torn, P o st-S o v ie t R ep u b lic (A rm onk, N Y : M .E. Sharpe,
1998), 1 7 -1 3 1 .
20 Araz A slan li, “Tarihten G unum uze Karabag Sorunu,” A v ra sy a D o sy a si 7, no. 1 (Spring 2 0 01): 404.
21 Flugh P op e says that “6 0 0 A zerbaijanis Slain at K hojali,” L o s A n g e les Tim es, 12 June 1992, A 6.
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army. The capture o f the Lachin corridor that connects NK to Armenia provided a direct
link to Armenia which eventually made the Armenian contribution to war easier.
The Azeri offensive at different times produced no tangible results and eventually
was pushed back. The initial loss o f war caused an internal political instability in
Azerbaijan. The last pro-Soviet government had to resign (Ayaz Muttalibov) and
Elchibey Government (APF) assumed control.

99

Elchibey promised victory in two

months. In 1992 Azeris carried out successful operations and pushed back Armenian
military in many o f the areas, however, the Lachin corridor remained under Armenian
control. Although the balance shifted towards Azeris in 1992, the Armenians regrouped
and took control o f strategic areas including Kelbajar in 1993. Starting with the fall of
Kelbajar, Armenian government gained upper hand and further advanced into Azeri
territories. The fall o f Kelbajar sparked a new wave o f political discussion in Turkey.
The President o f Turkish Republic argued that the advance of the Armenian army into
Azeri territories should be viewed from the perspective o f the establishment o f Great
Armenia which may involve Turkish territories in the future therefore Turkey needs to be
involved in the conflict to put a stop to Armenian advances. On the other hand Turkish
Prime Minister Suleyman Demirel insisted on the necessity to maintain a neutral status or
at least avoid a direct military confrontation, referring to the fragility o f the situation as it
may have repercussions for Turkey if Russia reacts to Turkish m oves.23 The losses on
battleground diminished Elchibey’s popularity and created splits in Azeri army. Elchibey

22 Faruk A rslan states that pro-Turkish, anti-R ussian E lch ib ey ’s rise to pow er m ade the R ussian
administration very anxious.
E sp ecia lly E lch ib ey ’s plans to go into o il business w ith Turkey and
construction o f p ip elin es resulted in the overthrow o f A PF w ith R ussian support. A rslan, H a za rin K u rtla r
V adisi, 128.
23 A y in Tarihi, 7, 3 April 1993.
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had to leave Baku against the popular dissent and the pressure from Army.24 Heidar
Aliyev replaced Elchibey and stabilized the internal politics in the coming years.25
However, the following offensives under Aliyev’s government’s directives did not
produce expected results and Azerbaijan lost around 20-25 percent o f its territory to NK
Armenians.
One of the reasons for the failure o f Azeri army against NK Armenians was the
continuing internal political clashes that paralyzed a systematic warfare by Azeri military.
Another factor that contributed to Azeri failure in the battlefield was the Russian support
for Armenia. According to several sources, Russians provided military equipment
around a value o f 1 billion dollar.

One o f the reasons that shifted Russian focus

towards Armenian side was the rising anti-Russia, pro-Turkish Elchibey government and
its respective policies. In addition to this was the Azeri intransigence in participating in
the CIS

97

•

and station o f Russian troops on Azeri soil.

98

As Azeris rejected the Russian

demands, Russia sided with Armenia to pressure Azerbaijan.

24 “In June 1993, Surat H u ssein ov, a renegade co lo n el w ho had com m anded a m ilitia brigade that w as
lo o sely incorporated into the new ly-created A zerbaijani army, overthrew the A zerbaijani Popular Front
(A P F ) governm ent led by President A b u lfaz E lchibey. T he A PF had com e to pow er in M ay 1992, and by
the tim e o f H u ssein ov's revolt w as b esieged over lo sses in Nagorno-K arabakh. H ussein ov's revolt paved the
w ay for the rise to pow er o f Azerbaijan's current president, Heydar A liy ev , w h o first had h im se lf installed
as chair o f the parliament. On O ctober 3, 1993, A liy e v w as elected to the presidency in an im probable
S oviet-style election in w hich he received 9 8 .8 percent o f the vote. A n in exp licab ly high 96 percent o f
eligib le voters w ere reported to have participated. President A liy e v nam ed Surat H u ssein o v prime
m inister.” Hum an R ights W atch on A zerbaijan, “P olitical Turmoil: B ackground,"A vailable [Online]:
< http://hrw .org/reports/1999/azerbaiian/A zer0799-02.htm > [10 Sep 2006],
25 Heydar A liy e v (M ay 10, 1 9 2 3 -D ecem b er 12, 2 0 0 3 ) served as president o f A zerbaijan for the N e w
A zerbaijan Party from June 1993 to O ctober 2 0 0 3 .
26 T his has not been ack n ow led ged by R ussians. R ussians denied their assistance to A rm enia and the
transfer o f large m ilitary equipm ent. In d oing so, R ussians tried to force A zeri tow ards R ussian dem ands
on CIS and also remain as a neutral actor in the d evelop m en t o f p eace process. For R ussian p o licies in the
conflict, see T hom as D e W all, B la ck G arden, A rm en ia a n d A zerb a ija n through P e a c e a n d W ar (N ew
York: N e w York U n iversity Press, 2 0 0 3 ), 170.
27 A liy e v in 1993 jo in ed CIS and estim ated that by jo in in g the CIS and sign in g a bilateral security
agreem ent w ith M o sco w , he w ould secure Russia's neutrality in the Karabakh con flict. A liy e v on N ational
televisio n in June 2 0 0 0 said that “the k ey to settling regional con flicts such as the Karabakh co n flict is, in
M o sco w .” D ina M alysh eva, “T he C on flict in N agorno-Karabakh: Its Im pact on Security in the C aspian
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Under the circumstances, the NK Armenians captured a massive Azeri territory
without much resistance.29 Since Azerbaijan had no hope at that time for another
successful military operation and the Armenians captured Lachin corridor and established
a buffer zone between Azerbaijan and Armenian settlements, a Russian brokered
ceasefire agreement has been signed by both sides on May 16 1994. This ceasefire has
been in place since then despite the occasional shootouts on both sides.
The war between Armenia and Azerbaijan ended with the victory o f Armenians
and a humiliating defeat for Azerbaijan against smaller number o f former subject. The
total death toll is estimated to be around 20,000-30,000 people whereas a 1.5 million
people have been moved out o f their homes. Azerbaijan is burdened with a huge number
of refugees (around 1 million) compared to a 6.5 million population.

NAGORNO-KARABAKH CONFLICT AND PEACE PROCESS: A DIFFICULT
ROAD AHEAD
The conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh started as an internal problem. During the
Soviet period international community had little chance o f involving in the settlement of

R egion ,” in The S ecu rity o f th e C a sp ia n R eg io n , ed. G ennady C huff in (N e w York: O xford U n iversity
Press, 2 0 0 1 ), 260.
28 “Geidar A liy e v talks about the co n flict b etw een A rm enia and the role R ussia can play in resolvin g the
conflict. A rm enian armed forces continue to attack, and several districts o f A zerbaijan such as Zangelan,
Kubatly and F izuli have been occu p ied by them . M easures are being taken to im prove the relations betw een
R ussia and A zerbaijan as the former has the potential to help end the co n flict.” Source Citation: Bangersky,
Aleksandr. Geidar A liy e v is counting on R ussia. “CIS Summit: Som e G ains, N e w Snag on Karabakh,”
Interview w ith Geidar A liy ev , leader o f Azerbaijan. The C u rren t D ig e s t o f the P o st-S o v ie t P re ss 4 5 , no. 52
(January 1994): 17. InfoTrac O neFile. T hom son G ale. Old D om in ion U n iversity Library. 2 0 Sep. 2006.
A vailab le [O nline]:
< http://fm d.galegroup.com /itx/infom ark.do?& contentSet=lA C D ocum ents& tvpe=retrieve& tabID =T 002& prodId=lT O F & docId=A 15223468& source=gale& srcprod=IT O F
& userG roupN am e=viva od u & version = l ,0> [3 M ay 20 0 6 ]
29 W hen A rm enians m o v e along line tow ards 10 kilom eters to N akhchivan, Turkish m inisters had a
m eeting w ith a d ecisio n to inform A rm enia on the determ ination o f Turkish governm ent on the territorial
integrity o f N akhchivan w hich have been guaranteed by treaties betw een M o sc o w and Turkey in 1921
(Treaty o f Kars in 1921). A yin Tarihi, 18 M arch 1992.
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disputes. It was up to the Soviet Union to mediate the differences among the conflicting
parties. The continuation of the war between Azerbaijan and NK Armenians severely
hampered the prospects for oil development. Under those conditions, Azerbaijan had no
way of focusing its attention to oil industry and oil extraction.
The eruption o f the conflict into a full scale war coincided with the break-up of
the Soviet Union and the declaration o f independence o f the two states. As the intensity
o f violence increased the international community started to pay more attention.
Especially the Khojali massacre by Armenians sparked a new wave o f international
involvement in the conflict.

Russia has been one o f the main actors in the peace

process; however the Russian policies in the region have been met with great suspicion
and distrust. The Russian involvement on the Armenian side discredited Russia as an
impartial arbiter in the eyes o f the Azeris; while the same could be said for Turkey as
well.

Turkish support for Azeri cause and the blockade of Armenia

hampered Turkish mediation efforts for the conflict.

-1o

has also

While Russia and Turkey initially

have not been effective in brokering a solution to the conflict, the mediation efforts have

30 “On the night o f February 2 5 - 2 6 , 1992, the gruesom e statistics indicate that 613 peop le had been killed,
o f w hich 106 w ere w om en and 83 w ere children; 1275 taken hostage, 150 w ent m issing; 4 8 7 people
becam e disabled and invalid, 76 o f w hom are teen age boys and girls; 8 fam ilies had been com p letely
destroyed; 25 children had lost both o f their parents, 130 children had lost one o f their parents; and 56
p eop le had been killed w ith extrem e cruelty and torture. Sharing the fate o f its population, the tow n o f
K hojaly had been co m p letely destroyed as w e ll.” K hojaly M assacre C om m em oration Site, A vailab le
[O nline] : < h ttp ://w w w .com e.to/k h oialv>
[11 Septem ber 2 0 0 6 ],
31 A lthough R ussia tried to avoid a direct in volvem en t in the con flicts in the C aucasus region, the R ussian
support for A rm enia in the N agorno-K arabakh co n flict has b een quite visib le. T hom as D e W all says that
R ussian soldiers a ctiv ely participated in the war on the A rm enian side. D e W all, B la c k G arden , A rm en ia
a n d A zerb a ija n through P e a c e a n d War, 170.
32 T he idea w as put forth b y the President o f Turkish R epublic Turgut O zal in an interview g iv en to British
Financial T im es. A yin Tarihi, 7 M arch 1992.
33 Turkey tried to bring the U nited States into the scen e and Turkish Prim e m inister Suleym an D em irel
called President B ush to get the U nited States in volved in the resolution o f the con flict. C ornell, S m a ll
N a tio n s a n d G re a t P o w ers, 109.
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been taken up by the CSCE (Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe).34
United Nations for its part could not actively involve in the peace process other than
passing several resolutions for the cessation o f hostilities.35 In fact the UN was already
burdened with other peace keeping activities in other parts of the world; therefore
delegated the issue to the CSCE.36 In March 1991, the CSCE established a group to
handle the peace efforts for NK conflict.37 The eleven member community planned an
eventual peace conference to be held in Minsk and therefore named after this conference
and became known as Minsk Group. Minsk Group assumed the role o f establishing
peace in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. CSCE as an organization was in a phase of
transition at that time just after the dissolution o f the Soviet Empire. In the wake o f a
unipolar world, CSCE was also looking for a new role as a security organization in the
new world. Conflict resolution, however, was new to CSCE and the structure o f the
organization was weak. Each member had equal vote in the decision making process.
34 Later changed to OSCE.
35 1993 U N Security C ouncil R esolu tion s on N agorno-K arabakh R E SO L U T IO N 822 (1 9 9 3 )
A dopted by the Security C ouncil at its 3205th m eeting, on 30 April 1993
C oncerning the N agorno-K arabakh con flict, E xpressing its serious concern at the deterioration o f the
relations b etw een the R epublic o f A rm enia and the R epublic o f A zerbaijan, N o tin g w ith alarm the
escalation in armed hostilities and, in particular, the latest invasion o f the K elbadjar district o f the R epublic
o f A zerbaijan by local A rm enian forces, C oncerned that this situation endangers peace and security in the
region, E xpressing grave concern at the displacem ent o f a large number o f civ ilia n s and the humanitarian
em ergency in the region, in particular in the Kelbadjar district, R eaffirm ing the respect for sovereign ty and
territorial integrity o f all States in the r e g io n ... E xpressing its support for the peace process b ein g pursued
w ithin the fram ework o f the C onference on Security and C ooperation in Europe and d eep ly concerned at
the disruptive effe c t that th e escalation in armed h ostilities can have on that process, D em an ds the
im m ediate cessation o f all h ostilities and hostile acts w ith a v ie w to establishing a durable cease-fire, as
w ell as im m ediate w ithdraw al o f all o ccu p yin g forces from the Kelbadjar district and other recently
occup ied areas o f A zerb aijan ... Extracted from the w eb site o f U .S . D epartm ent o f State, “ 1993 U N
Security C ouncil R esolu tion s on N agorno-K arabakh,” A vailab le [Online]:
< http://w w w .state.gov/p/eur/rls/or/l 3 5Q8.htm> [16 April 2 0 0 6 ]. U N also issued the fo llo w in g resolution in
the sam e line asking for the cessation o f hostilities: R esolution 853 (29 July 1993), 874 (14 O ctober 1993)
and 884 (12 N ovem b er 1993).
36 For detailed analysis o f O S C E ’s and U N ’s activities and p eace efforts in C aucasus, see O liver Paye and
Eric R e m a d e , “U N and CSCE P o licies in Transcaucasia,” in C o n te ste d B o rd e rs in the C au casu s, ed. Bruno
C oppieters (Pleinlaan B russels: V U B U n iversity Press, 1996), 1 0 3 -1 3 7 .
37 T he M insk Group is headed by a C o-Chairm anship o f France, the R ussian Federation and the U nited
States. T he M insk Group includes the fo llo w in g participating states: Belarus, G erm any, Italy, Portugal,
N etherlands, S w eden, Finland, Turkey, A rm enia and A zerbaijan.
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Apart from the structural weaknesses, the CSCE did not have an enforcing mechanism.
The function o f the Minsk Group therefore was reduced to mediation and bringing the
•

•

3

8

parties to conflict to table.

•

CSCE has spent tremendous effort in bringing a ceasefire in

the region, despite the fact that it suffered from organizational restraints and from the
policies o f the members. Especially the Russian proposal under CSCE undermined the
efforts o f Minsk Group. Russia in 1993 demanded to deploy only Russian peacekeeping
forces in the region under CSCE mandate; however this was not accepted by the member
states. The United States and Turkey particularly objected to the Russian proposal.
Under all these demands, Russia still wanted to maintain a special sphere o f influence in
the region. On the other hand, despite the efforts o f CSCE members and Minsk Group,
the warring parties did not feel the need to listen to what CSCE members asked for.39
Despite numerous temporary ceasefires, the Armenians engaged in new attacks on Azeri
territory. Beyond all these was the fact that none of the parties to the conflict really
wanted a ceasefire. They have moved forward with aggression whenever they saw a
window o f opportunity. The ceasefires and negotiations have been utilized as a time for
regrouping and consolidating their bases. One thing that explains this type o f behavior is

38 T he Personal R epresentative's mandate from the C hairm an-in-O ffice is to:
Represent the O SC E C hairm an-in-O ffice in issu es related to the N agorno-K arabakh con flict, assist
the CiO in ach ievin g an agreem ent on the cessation o f the armed co n flict and in creating
conditions for the deploym ent o f an O SC E p eace-k eep in g operation, in order to facilitate a lasting
com prehensive p olitical settlem ent o f the con flict in all its a sp ects...
A ssist the parties in im plem enting and d evelop in g confid en ce-b u ild in g, humanitarian and other
m easures facilitating the peace process, in particular by encouraging direct contacts; co-operate, as
appropriate, w ith representatives o f the U nited N ations and other international organizations
operating in the area o f conflict.
(Extracted from officia l O SC E W ebsite, T he Organization for Security and C o-operation in Europe
(O SC E ), “CiO R epresentative on M insk C on ference,” A vailab le [Online]:
< h ttp ://w w w .osce.org/item /13668.h tm l>
[21 A ugust 2 0 0 6 ].
39 R ecallin g the previous disregard for O SCE and U N dem and for the cessation o f h ostilities and respecting
human rights and other issu es pertinent to warfare, The N K A rm enians and A zeris have seen no com p ellin g
reason for co m p ly in g w ith International Institutions.
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the lack of an enforcing mechanism. Beside these shortcomings, Russian initiatives in
the region further undermined CSCE’s role as a mediator.
First o f all, Russia did not want the Minsk Group to be successful in mediation
efforts which would decrease Russia’s role in the region. Therefore, in many occasions
Russia tried to bring the Armenians and Azeris together for a final ceasefire agreement.
As it became clear that parallel efforts did not quite produce positive outcomes, in 1994
the OSCE had to accommodate Russia in its peace efforts and Russia was made the
permanent co-chairman o f the Minsk Group.40 With the signing o f the ceasefire
agreement brokered by Russia in May 1994, the conflict between Armenia and
Azerbaijan has been put in a frozen state. This agreement in fact did not provide a final
solution to the disagreements between warring parties but only provided a temporary
ceasefire. The attempts at finding a permanent solution acceptable to both parties
continued under OSCE’s umbrella in the following years after 1994.
However the ceasefire gave the NK Armenians a good chance for consolidating
its position as an entity closely imbedded in Armenia as an independent unit. Each year
passing without a final agreement on the status o f Nagorno-Karabakh, the current status
quo is being further consolidated.41 The following years after 1994, the OSCE tried the
resolve the main issues o f disagreement between the conflicting parties. However the
efforts produced no promising results. First o f all, the Armenians are insisting on their
right for self-determination and Azerbaijan is considering the territorial integrity as a

40 K enneth W eisbrode, C e n tra l E u rasia: P rize o r Q u icksan d?: C on ten d in g Views o f In sta b ility in
K arabakh , F erg h a n a a n d A fgh an istan (O xford, N e w York: O xford U n iversity Press for the International
Institute for Strategic Studies, 2 0 0 1 ), 31.
41 H erzig, The N ew C au casu s, 68.
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precondition for settlement. The return o f the occupied territories and the repatriation of
the forced refugees remain as difficult issues for future negotiations.
The main dilemma lies in the bringing o f the concept o f self-determination and
territorial integrity together. None o f the states want to make a sacrifice on their
priorities. On the other hand, the leaders o f the two nations are under great pressure from
their people on any kind o f compromise. Any compromise in these issues is equated with
being defeatist or being treacherous.42 Despite the fact that under OSCE’s umbrella the
parties had engaged in diplomatic negotiations43during 1996-98, the irreconcilable
policies of Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians and insistence o f Azerbaijan on the
preservation o f Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity precluded the achievement o f a final
resolution 44
Under current conditions NK Armenians insist on the resolution o f the status of
the Nagorno-Karabakh as a precondition for the return o f the occupied territories. Beside
these, the NK Armenians insists on maintaining a territorial link to Armenia as a corridor
that complicates the Azeri demand for the return o f the occupied territories and Lachin
corridor.45 As long as the Azeris prioritizes the territorial integrity and the Armenians
insist on their right to self-determination a final resolution that could bring a permanent

42 A rm enian president T er-Petrosyan inclined towards som e o f the proposals m ade by M insk group and
appeared to be a soft-liner. H is p o licies regarding N agorno-K arabakh created internal p olitical crises w hich
he eventually had to resign. T his has giv en a strong m essage to the leaders o f both countries that the A zeri
and Arm enian p eop le are not ready to make com prom ises.
43 M any proposals have been laid by M insk group including the one that proposed phased n egotiations
w hich offers the negotiation o f the issu es separately. T his w as rejected by N K A rm enians on the ground
that they do not w ant to settle any issue as lon g as the issu e o f status o f the R epublic is not resolved.
44 A li M assoud Ansari, “T he M ilitary B alan ce in the Caspian R egion ,” in The C a sp ia n R egion a t a
C ro ssro a d : C h a llen g es o f a N ew F ro n tier o f E n erg y a n d D evelopm en t, ed. H ooshang Am irahm adi
(Palgrave M acm illan, 2 0 0 0 ), 214.
45 A Karabakh o fficia l said that “w e w ill never be an en clave again.” C ornell, S m a ll N a tio n s a n d G re a t
P ow ers, 123.
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peace does not seem to be likely.46 The status quo is likely to continue as long as the
current balance o f power is preserved. Although no one is satisfied with the status quo,
each side fears that a compromise might put the adversary in an advantageous position
which may lead to shift in the balance of power against them. Fear o f survival is a major
issue that impedes cooperation.47 This is apparent in the case o f Azerbaijan and Armenia.
The immensity o f mistrust among the two rivals is one o f the main causes o f the failure
of the mediation attempts. Armenians maintain the idea that Armenians historically have
been persecuted by Ottoman Turks and Azeris as well during the events in Sumgait and
Baku in 1988.

This line o f thinking has motivated the Armenians o f Nagorno-Karabakh

to establish a buffer zone in their military campaign against Azerbaijan. In return,
Armenian drive toward Azeri territories has caused great anger and distrust among Azeris
and strengthened the negative image o f Armenians as a savage people.49 Azeris very
much rely on the revenues that they expect to get from oil development in the Caspian
region in the coming years. Many people indicate that this might reverse the current
balance between Azeris and Armenians in favor o f Azerbaijan economically and
militarily.50

46 T he bilateral m eetin gs under the auspices o f O SC E continued up to our day. Z am an G a ze te s i reports that
the parties to co n flict m et in Paris and discu ssed the issu es face to face. A lthough this sum m it have not
produced a tangible progress, French Prim e M inister Chirac, said that th ey w ere hopeful about the future o f
A zeri-A rm enian talks. Z am an G azetesi, 11 February 2 0 0 6 .
47 Joseph M . G rieco, “A narchy and the L im its o f C ooperation: A R ealist Critique o f the N e w e st Liberal
Institutionalism ,” in C o n tro v ersie s in In tern a tio n a l Theories: R ea lism a n d th e N e o lib e ra l C h allen ge, ed.
Charles W . K egley, Jr. (N e w York: The M acm illan Press Ltd,. 1995), 152.
48 The Turkish A zeri alliance rejects the A rm enian claim s on the ground that A rm enian claim s lack
acceptable ev id en ce but m erely remains as a propaganda.
49 Christian Tolstrup, “T he C ollap se o f D ia lo g u e,” in C o n tra sts a n d S olu tion s in th e C aucasus,, ed. O le
H oiris and S efa Martin Y urukel (Aarhus, O akville, CT: A arhus U niv. Press, 1998), 2 3 6 -4 5 .
50 Ansari, “T he M ilitary B alan ce in the Caspian R eg io n ,” 2 1 9 -2 1 ; M evlut Katik, “M ilitarisation o f the
Caspian S ea,” in The C aspian : P o litics, E n erg y a n d S ecu rity, ed. Shirin A kiner (London:
R outledgeC urzon-T aylor Francis Group, 2 0 0 4 ), 3 0 2 -3 0 3 ; M alysheva, “T he C on flict in N agornoKarabakh,” 2 7 5 -7 7 . S ee also “President A liyev: A zerbaijan N ever to A gree to N agorno-K arabakh
Separation,” Interfax T 1 4 :4 9 :1 6 Z , 31 July 2 0 0 6 .
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THE CHECHEN CONFLICT
Another conflict in the region that had an impact on the stability o f the region for
investment and economic activities and on the development of oil industry in the Caspian
region is the Russian-Chechen conflict that has caused a great level o f devastation in
Chechnya and proved to be the most destructive war in the territory o f the former Soviet
Union. Although the conflict took place within the borders o f the Russian Federation, the
Chechen conflict had a great potential to spread to neighbor states. The intensity o f the
violence and the rate o f human suffering turned the world’s attention to the Chechen
conflict.
Although the roots o f the conflict between Russia and Chechnya goes back to
early times in history, we will be looking at the most recent developments that has started
just after the end o f the Soviet Empire. As in the other former soviet Republics, the end
of the Soviet Union sparked a wave o f independence movements in Chechen Republic as
well. The events that led to the faithful confrontation between Russia and Chechnya
started when the National Guard o f Chechnya captured the Supreme Soviet headquarters
in Groznyy in September 1991. The following events in the capital culminated in the
election o f Johar Dudayev as the President of Chechen Republic.51 Dudayev came to
power On 27 October of the same year with an overwhelming majority (90 percent).
Under Dudayev’s leadership Chechnya declared its independence from the Soviet Union
on November 22, 1991. The Soviet administration responded with a declaration o f state
of emergency in Chechnya and also threatened the parliament with use o f military to
bring the Chechen state under Soviet control.

c'y

Unsuccessful military move towards

51 T he first president o f the C hechen R epublic o f Ichkeria (C hechnya), in the N orth C aucasus.
52 Later the deceleration o f state o f em ergen cy w as annulled by Suprem e S o v iet o f R ussian Federation.
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Chechnya was pushed back by Dudayev’s National Guard and this has strengthened
Dudayev’s government in Chechnya.53 Although Dudayev was an experienced army
leader, he did not have any background in economy and in other social matters. With the
stoppage o f economic aid from Soviet Union and the leaving o f the Russian elite form
Chechnya, the internal situation in the country degenerated into a chaotic situation.54 The
coming years did not bring a desired level o f stability in the region. Internal power
struggle continued as the economy and social life worsened in Chechnya. During the
years of 1992-94, Russia tried to bring Dudayev’s regime down through different tactics
which none o f them had actually produced any positive results for Russia. Other than the
thereat to use o f force, Russian administration supported other opposition groups in
Chechnya. “As the initial attempts failed, Russia increased its role in the secret
operations and began to deploy Russian servicemen and mercenaries and supply heavy
equipment to the opposition force in an effort to shift the balance in Republic. Altogether
five covert operations against Dudayev’s regime were orchestrated by the Federal
Counter Intelligence Service. The battle for Groznyy was the unintended consequence o f
one such operation.55
One o f the things that prevented productive talks and negotiation between Russia
and Chechnya was the personal animosity between Russian president Boris Yeltsin and
Johar Dudayev.56 The use of insulting language in many occasions prevented the start of

53 T he N ational Guard w as com prised o f irregular personnel and the prisoners.
54 “A deteriorating econ om y, a standard o f living; collap sin g state services, m a ssiv e corruption and
crippling ‘m afiaisation ’ o f large political, eco n o m ic and social sectors, an in flu x o f C hechens from other
parts o f the F S U and em igration o f Russians; p olitical pow er struggle to shape the n ew regim e; the clim ax
o f w hich w as the confrontation b etw een the parliam ent and president.” M osh e Gam m er, The L on e W o lf a n d
the B ear: Three C en tu ries o f C hechen D efia n ce o f R ussian R u le (Pittsburg: U n iversity o f Pittsburg Press,
2 0 0 6 ), 205.
55 Q uoted in Gam mer, The L on e W o lf a n d th e B ear, 2 0 0 6 .
56 S ee Richard Sakw a, ed., C h echnya: F rom P a s t to F uture (London: Anthem Press, 2 0 0 5 ).
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peace talks between two leaders. This may have forced Russian administration to resort
to extreme violence in Chechen issue. Dudayev’s posture as a strict leader and lack of
experience in diplomacy and politics alienated Russia and damaged the countries’ hope
for a peaceful transition.
The state of unrest in Russia just after the break up of the Union and the confusion
that accompanied the dissolution prevented a firm and clear cut Russian approach to the
Chechen issue. During the years o f 1992-94, Russia itself was in a phase o f transition
from communist regime and looking for a new definition o f Russia in the post-Soviet
world. The state o f confusion and internal crises prevented Russia from approaching to
Chechen issue in a steady way. Three years after Chechen declaration o f independence,
Russia decided to take control. Traditionally Russia assigned a strategic importance to
Chechnya as a buffer zone and also because o f the fact that Chechnya is located on the
way to Caucasia. Losing control o f Chechnya might very well have been resulted in the
worsening of the conditions for Russia over the control o f transcaucasia. It has also been
said that Chechnya’s independence may set an example to other republics under Russian
control which eventually may further shrink Russian Federation. Having already lost a
number of former dominions, Russia could not let any other go out o f its hand. As Peter
Shearman and Matthew Sussex suggest, “Chechen rebels have prompted fears o f conflict
spillover to the neighboring republic o f Dagestan, and possibility o f new independence
claims from republics in the economically vital South Caucasus. The loss o f Chechnya
would also seriously dent Russian prestige at a time when policy makers have come to
en

regard maintaining the trappings o f great power status as a vital Russian interest.”

57 Peter Shearman and M atthew Su ssex, “G lobalization, N e w Wars and the War in C hechnya,” in Richard
Sakwa, ed., C h echnya: F rom P a s t to F uture (London: A nthem Press, 2 0 0 5 ), 203.
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Other than the factors stated above, Chechnya is located on a very strategic
geographic location for the transportation o f Caspian oil to the Black Sea port of
Novorossiysk. For Russia to remain as an influential actor in the Caspian Sea oil
development, the northern route that goes through Chechnya had to be under Russian
control. It is interesting here to note that, the major Russian offensive on Chechnya came
after there years o f Chechen declaration o f independence which also coincides with the
signing o f the contract o f the century by Azerbaijan in 1994.58 Svante E. Cornell argues
that “a direct reason for the war to erupt suddenly in the end of 1994 might have been the
signing in autumn o f 1994 o f the Baku oil consortium, heavily contested by Russia,
whereby the Azerbaijani state signed an agreement with Western oil companies on
extracting large quantities of oil from the Caspian Sea shelf.”59 If Russia were to impose
the northern route for the transportation of Caspian oil towards the Russian port of
Novorossiysk at Black Sea, it was imperative for Russia to be in full control o f the
pipelines including Chechnya. Chechen conflict stood in the way o f Russian control of
its neighborhood as a big trouble spot that needed to be removed for further Russian
control o f the region.
For whatever the reasons, the Russian invasion of Chechnya started on 11
December 1994. Despite the optimistic expectations, the war turned out to be disastrous
for both Russia and Chechnya. First, the Russian army has been stopped by Chechen
militias on many occasions. Only after the use o f heavy artillery and the destruction of
capital Groznyy could the Russians enter the city. Russians have been harassed by small

58 For more on the C aspian o il as an important m otive for R ussian o ffen siv e on C hechnya, se e A ndrew
Tow ner, “T he R ussians, C hechens and the B lack Gold: A G eo-E con om ic Explanation for the C hechen
W ar,” in The P o litic s o f C a sp ia n O il, ed. Bttlent G okay (B asingstoke: Palgrave, 2 0 0 1 ), 1 9 9 -2 1 5 .
59 C ornell, S m a ll N a tio n s a n d G re a t P o w ers, 2 2 3 .
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groups o f Chechen fighters and gave heavy casualties. Still, Chechen people suffered the
most out o f this war as it has caused the death o f 45,000-60,000 people in three years.
The level of atrocities committed by Russian army and the killing o f civilians to root out
Chechen resistance alarmed international community. After the killing o f the Chechen
leader Johar Dudayev in 1996 by an attempted strike at his life, Russians gradually took
control o f the Capital through establishing friendly government. Despite the continuation
o f fighting ands skirmishes, both parties signed the Khasav Yurt Agreement on 31
August 1996 and Moscow Peace Accord on 12 May 1997.60 Both sides has agreed to a
ceasefire and the status o f the Chechen Republic left to future negotiations; expected to
be concluded within five years by 2001.
The years between 1997 and 1999 left Chechnya in a complete chaotic
environment. The rise o f crime and terrorism crippled a functional social life. Apart from
the apparent consequences of the war, the Russian offensive increased the Islamization of
the Chechen people.61 While people fought for their country during the 1994-96 war,
now most o f the Chechens turned towards religion and started fighting for their religion.
Nevertheless, the lawlessness in Chechnya and the attack on Dagestan spurred a new
wave of Russian offensive coupled with Russian anger towards terrorist activities
directed against Russian civilians.62 Despite the official rhetoric to suppress terrorist

60 A ceasefire agreem ent that marked the end o f the First C hechen War w as sign ed in K hasav-Y urt on
A ugust 3 1 , 1996 betw een A lexander L ebed and A slan M askhadov. The agreem ent w as broken after the
Raid on D agestan and R ussian Apartm ent B om b in gs fo llo w ed b y the Second C hechen War. M o sco w
A ccord w as signed b y R ussian President B oris Y eltsin and M askhadov and m ainly focu sed on p eace and
the principles o f bilateral relations.
61 A nna Z elkina, “T he W ahhabi’s o f the Northern C aucasus vis-a -v is State and Society: T he C ase o f
D aghestan,” in The C a sp ia n R eg io n Vol II: The C au casu s, ed. M osh e Gam mer (London: R outledge, 2 0 0 4 ).
62 T he R ussian peop le did not fu lly support the war in C hechnya before the start o f terrorist activities in
R ussia but after the attacks on civilian targets the support for R ussian m ilitary operations increased. S ee
M ike B ow ker, “W estern V ie w s o f the C hechen C on flict” in Richard Sakwa, ed., C h echnya: F rom P a s t to
F u ture (London: A nthem Press, 2 0 0 5 ), 2 2 3 -3 8 .
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activities and eliminate their establishments in Chechnya, a vast majority o f Western
media reported the Russian offensive as a political move by Vilademir Putin to
consolidate his place as a candidate for Russian presidency after Yeltsin. The brutality of
Russian military again surfaced in this attacks and gross human right violations and war
crimes criticized by Western states.
The war left Chechnya in ruins resembling villages after World War II. The new
governments after Russian invasion had no real hope about the reconstruction o f the
cities destroyed by Russian attacks. Out o f a million people in the whole republic a 300400 thousand people became refugees.64 The impact o f the war was also felt on the
Russian side as their losses totaled up to 25,000 deaths o f varieties o f servicemen. The
stability in the region was very much shaken by the Chechen conflict in the region. It has
also caused Russia a reputation as the Russian army had to fall back against Chechen
pressure in capturing the capital. This might explains the brutality of Russian forces to
conquer the Chechen territory to save face at both home and at the international level.

Normalization
Under heavy pressure from Western world and the United States, the Russian
administration has made certain efforts to normalize the internal political situation in
Chechnya. In a referendum in 2003 a new constitution was accepted by Chechen
people.65 The constitution gives Chechnya a wide autonomy but the Republic remains an
integral part o f the Russian Federation.

63 Ibid., 2 3 2 .
64 For more inform ation on the casualties o f C hechen War, see Shearman and S u ssex, “G lobalization, N e w
Wars and the War in C hechnya,” 2 0 3 , 2 0 1 -2 0 6 and C ornell, S m a ll N a tio n s a n d G re a t P ow ers, 2 2 0 -3 8 .
65 96 percent o f the C hechen p eop le approved o f the n ew constitution.
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ETHNIC CONFLICTS IN GEORGIA AND THE STABILITY IN CAUCASUS
Another trouble spot in the post-Soviet World was Georgia which has been hit
worst by internal conflicts. Georgia is located on the transit routes o f Caspian oil. Major
oil pipelines proposed to be built passes through the territories o f Georgia. Therefore,
instability in the region directly affects the oil development projects and the
transportation o f Caspian oil. Georgia has experienced three major struggles starting
with 1988 to 1993. Georgia has fought two bloody ethnic wars and tom with internal
power struggle after the end o f the Soviet Union. One o f the main reasons for the rise of
ethnic strife in Georgia is related to the old Russian divide and rule system. As we have
indicated in the previous sections, the Caucasus region has a highly complex ethnic
structure with numerous ethnic groups spread across the territories o f many nationalities.
The Soviet system allowed the allocation of ethnicities under the rule o f Caucasian states.
In Georgia, the Abkhaz and the Ossets are the largest group o f ethnic minorities. The
Soviets established Abkhazia as an autonomous republic under Georgia while South
Ossetia was made a region under Georgian rule. As it stands from this hierarchical
structure, the Soviets stands at the top o f the political pyramid, where Georgia follows the
ladder of hierarchy after Soviets and then the autonomous republics and regions take
their place.
The general impact o f Gorbachev’s perestroika was also felt hard in Georgia
where the autonomous republic o f Abkhazia and autonomous region o f South Ossetia
moved for either independence or unification with North Ossetia under Soviet Union,
breaking away from Georgian rule. The early stages o f the Abkhaz and Osset movement
was met by rejection by the Georgian authorities and mainly remained at the level of
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verbal confrontation through decreeing political statements and laws. However, as the
Georgian nationality started to rise in Georgia, the other ethnicities followed suit. The
heavy rhetoric o f the Georgian National Movement alerted the ethnicities in Abkhazia
and South Ossetia forcing them to introduce countermeasures against rising Georgian
nationalism.66

Abkhazia
On the border o f Russia Abkhazia is located on a strategic gateway to Russia.67 A
total of half a million population, Abkhazia enjoyed a high level o f standards compared
to the rest o f the country. The rich mineral resources and tourist sites and their
relationship with Russia advantaged Abkhazians over the other nationalities in Georgia.
Despite the fact that the Abkhazia constituted an average 18 percent o f the Abkhazian
territory68 they dominated the economic and political life mainly because o f their close
relationship with the Soviet Union and constant demand for cessation from Georgia.69
Soviet leadership increased their share each time they demanded unification with Soviet
Union as an autonomous republic.70
This has actually caused grievances on the other side where Georgians constituted
the majority o f the population (45 percent) but were treated like a small minority. And
66 M on ica D u ffy T oft, “T w o -W a y Mirror N ationalism : T he C ase o f Ajaria,” in The C a sp ia n R egio n Vol II:
The C au casu s, ed. M osh e Gam m er (London: R outledge, 2 0 0 4 ).
67 T he R epublic o f A bkhazia covers 3 ,3 0 0 square m iles b etw een the eastern shores o f the B lack Sea and the
crest line o f the main C aucasus range; from the rivers P sou (in the North) and Ingur (In the south). T o the
north, A bkhazia is bordered b y R ussia and to the south by the G eorgian p rovin ces o f Svanetia and
M ingrelia. Around 74 percent o f the territory is m ountains or m ountain approaches.
68 Total population o f A bkhazia w as around h a lf a m illion during 1 9 90s o f w hich on ly 9 3 ,0 0 0 o f them w ere
Abkhaz. G eorgians constituted 45 percent o f the population w h ile A rm enians and A zeris accounted for the
30 percent o f the R epublic. H erzig, The N ew C au casu s, 76.
69 Bruno C oppieters and Robert L egvold , ed s., S ta te h o o d a n d Secu rity: G e o rg ia a fter th e R o se R evo lu tion
(C am bridge, M A: A m erican A cad em y o f Arts and S ciences: M IT Press, 2 0 0 5 ), 88.
70 M o sco w allocated tw o third o f party and governm ent p osition s w ithin the R epublic to them , though they
accounted for on ly about one sixth o f its population. H erzig, The N ew C a u casu s, 77.
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yet, the Abkhazian administration constantly complained about the movement of
Georgian nationalities to Abkhazia to reduce the proportion of Abkhazian population. In
March 1990, the Georgian state declared independence from Soviet Union that initiated a
serious of political and military confrontation within the country.
Following the Georgian declaration o f independence, the Abkhaz Supreme Soviet
unilaterally declared itself as a sovereign republic and asked for Moscow to be integrated
into the Soviet Union as a Union Republic. Although the Georgian authorities declared
this step invalid at that time, due to the internal situation, Georgian response to Abkhazia
remained at political level.71 After two years o f internal political struggle, Georgian
authorities managed to bring the ends together. Only after that the Georgian government
took the issue at hand seriously to find a solution. With Shevardnadze strengthening his
position in the capital, the nature o f the conflict between Abkhazia and Georgia started to
change.72 In August 1991, the Georgian National Guard moved onto the Abkhaz capital.
One of the events that ignited the start o f a military conflict is the kidnapping o f two
Georgian high level politicians by the Gamsakhurdia troops to a town in Abkhazia. The
war broke out between the Georgian and the Abkhaz military units and the national guard
of Georgia entered the capital o f Abkhazia and plundered the city. Despite the fact that
the Georgian army had the upper hand at the beginning, the tide o f the war shifted as the

71 The on ly m easure taken by Gam sakhurdia adm inistration w as a pow er sharing agreem ent w ith
A bkhazians. A ccord in g to that agreem ent, “electoral districts w ould be dem arcated according to ethnic
lines e ffectiv ely giv in g each group a quota o f seats in the n ew 65-seat A bkhazian parliament. Thus the
G eorgian population representing (4 5 .7 percent o f the population o f A bkhazia in 1989) w ou ld receive 26
seats, the A bkhazians (representing 17.8 percent) w ould receive 28 seats, w h ile the other groups (prim arily
A rm enians [1 4 .6 percent] and R ussians [14.3 percent] w ould receive the rem aining 11 seats).” C oppieters
and L egvold , S ta te h o o d a n d Security, 95.
72 O 'B allance, W ars in the C aucasus, 1 9 9 0 -1 9 9 5 , 1 1 2 -1 3 2 .
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Abkhaz army started receiving reinforcements from the Northern Caucasus region.73
With the involvement o f Russia on the side of Abkhazia, the Georgians had to pull back
with a humiliating defeat. The war ended in 1993 with Abkhaz victory. Georgia and
Abkhazia signed a ceasefire agreement in September 1993 leaving the status o f the
Republic to future negotiations. With an agreement signed in 1994, Russian
peacekeeping forces were deployed on the borders to prevent further escalation of
violence. The war had devastating effects for both Abkhazia and Georgia apart from the
casualties reported to be around 4-8 thousand. The war especially damaged the Abkhaz
economy that very much depended on the stability o f the region. The war also created
further problems for both parties on the settlement of the issue of the repatriation of a
200,000-250,000 Georgian in Abkhazia who had to flee their homes in fear o f violence
and harassment after the Georgian attack on Abkhaz capital.74
The ceasefire agreement has been brokered by Russia in return for Georgia’s
acceptance to join in the CIS. In fact the rejection o f Georgian government to join in the
CIS has proved to be deadly for Georgia, since Russia in both the Abkhaz and the Osset
conflict actively supported the irredentist movements. The Shevardnadze government had
to bow to the Russian pressure to join in the CIS which eventually made it possible for
Georgians to reach to a ceasefire agreement with Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

73 “The N orth C aucasus (som etim es referred to as C iscau casia or C iscaucasus) is the northern part o f the
C aucasus region betw een E urope and A sia. T he term is also used as a syn on ym for the North C aucasus
E conom ical R egion o f R ussia. P olitically, the Northern C aucasus (territory north o f the Greater C aucasus
R ange) includes the R ussian R epublics o f the N orth C aucasus as w ell as several regions o f G eorgia and
A zerbaijan. A s part o f the R ussian Federation, the Northern C aucasus R egion is included in the Southern
Federal D istrict and con sists o f Krasnodar Krai, Stavropol Krai and the autonom ous republics: K arachayC herkessia, Kabardino-Balkaria, A d ygea, N orth O ssetia, Ingushetia, C hechnya, and D agestan. In G eorgia,
the N orth C aucasus includes the region s o f T usheti, K hevsureti, and K h evi.” “N orth C aucasus,” A vailable
[O nline]: < http://en.w ikipedia.org/w iki/N orthern C aucasus> \ \ 2 Septem ber 20061.
74 K onstantin O zgan, “A bkhazia— Problem s and the Paths to their R esolu tion ,” in C o n tra sts a n d S olu tion s
in the C aucasus, ed. O le Hoiris and S efa Martin Y uriikel (Aarhus, O akville, CT: Aarhus U n iv. Press,
1998), 196.
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United Nations involved in the peace process and supported Russian mediation
'T f

and deployment o f peacekeeping forces in May 1994.

Although the military conflict

ended between Abkhazia and Georgia, the main issue o f the status o f the Abkhaz
Republic remains unresolved alongside with the return o f a 200-250,000 Georgian
refugees settled in Tbilisi. The refugee problem has been one o f the most serious
problems that placed a pressure on the Georgian governments as the Abkhazians are not
in favor o f allowing a huge number o f Georgians in Abkhazia in fear o f returning to be a
small minority in their own territory.

South Ossetia
The conflict between South Ossetia and Georgia dates back to the times when
South Ossetia was made an autonomous region under Georgia by the Soviet
Administration in Moscow.

7 f\

Ossets considered this as a part o f a Russian strategy of

divide and rule which separated the South Ossetians from the North Ossetians.77 As it is
the case with Abkhaz people, the South Osset administration wanted to take advantage of
loosing Soviet grip on the republics and petitioned for unification with North Ossetia as

75 2 5 0 0 R ussian PKF dep loyed along w ith a 150 U N observers patrolling security zon e. S ee ibid., 192.
76 A s o f 1989, the autonom ous oblast o f South O ssetia w ithin G eorgia had a population o f nearly 100,000,
o f w hom 6 6 .2 percent were O ssetes and 2 9 percent G eorgians. A lo n g w ith them in South O ssetia reside
R ussians, G eorgians, A rm enians, G reeks— a total o f 4 0 nationalities. H a lf o f the fam ilies in the region w ere
o f m ixed G eorgian-O ssetian descent. T he O ssetes are descendants o f the ancient A lan tribes o f Iranian
stock. Som e o f them are O rthodox Christians and som e (in certain regions o f N orth O ssetia) are M uslim s.
“South O ssetia,” A vailab le [Online]:
<http ://w w w .p olicv.h u /~gom elau ri/sou th ossetia.h tm l> [12
Septem ber 2 0 0 6 ].
77 North O ssetia-A lan ia is one o f the sovereign republics o f R ussian Federation. It is situated on the
northern slo p es o f the central C aucasus betw een tw o o f the highest m ountain peaks in Europe, Elbrous
(5613m ) and K azbeck (5 0 4 7 m ). North O ssetia-A lan ia is on e o f the sm allest, m ost d en sely populated and
multi-cultural republics in R ussian Federation. The findings o f the last cen su s o f 1989 sh ow that the
population o f 6 4 6 ,0 0 0 inhabitants represents about 100 nationalities livin g on an area o f 8 ,0 0 0 sq.km . (81
p eop le to every sq.km .). V ladikavkaz is the capital o f N orth O ssetia-A lania. “The R epublic o f N orth
O ssetia,’’A vailab le [Online]:
< http://w w w .friends-partners.org/oldfriends/ossetia/index.htm l> [21 A ugust 2 0 0 6 ],
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an autonomous republic in 1990. In 1992 South Ossetia held a referendum and with a 99
percent o f support from its people; the South Osset administration demanded unification
with North Ossetia under Russian Federation as an autonomous republic. The Osset
demands were rejected by the Georgians and occasional fighting broke out as early as
1990 and intensified in 1991 and 1992.
Georgia was caught between a series o f ethnic troubles and internal power
struggles at a time o f transition form Soviet rule to a sovereign independent state.
Especially the internal power struggle hampered Georgian efforts to deal with these
issues effectively. After the removal o f Gamsakhurdia regime in 1991 by a violent coup
d'etat, Edward Shevardnadze, an experienced and respected Georgian leader took control
o f the Georgian government.78 It was up until 1995 that Shevardnadze had to deal with
serious internal opposition which he skillfully eliminated one by one. Even after the
removal o f Gamsakhurdia, he continued to pose a threat to Tbilisi, as he organized
military factions in exile. Caught in the middle, the Georgian government had to deal
with these two sources o f conflicts at the same time which left the country in political and
economical turmoil. Coupled with Russian involvement, Georgia had hard times in
resolving ethnic issues. In the case o f South Ossetia, military confrontation took place in
South Osset capital and elsewhere in the Osset territory between Osset militias and the
Georgian army. As the Ossets received considerable support from North Ossetia and
Russia, the Georgian army got defeated once again and had to agree on a ceasefire
brokered by Russia. The agreement became possible after Georgia accepted Russian

78 For more on the details o f the internal struggle and chaotic environm ent during Gam sakhurdia regim e,
see Ghia N od ia, “P olitical Turm oil in G eorgia and the Ethnic P o licies o f Z viad Gam sakhurdia,” in
C o n te ste d B o rd ers in th e C aucasus, ed. Bruno C oppieters (Pleinlaan B russels: V U B U n iversity Press,
1996), 7 3 -9 1 .

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

164

troops on Georgia and in South Ossetia. A joint coalition was established to manage the
ceasefire and the Georgian, Russian and Osset peacekeeping forces.
The war between Georgia and South Ossetia resulted in the death o f 500-600
people. Around 12,000 Georgians (out o f approximately 30,000 living in South Ossetia)
left the region in several waves between 1990 and 1992. At the same time,
approximately 30,000 Ossets living in Georgia left for North Ossetia in response to
Gamsakhurdia’s nationalist outburst.

70

In this crisis and ceasefire, international organizations did not play a considerable
role other than an OSCE representative being present in the negotiations. The South
Osset conflict ended in a more peaceful manner than other conflicts we have seen in
Caucasus after the end o f the cold war. With Russian involvement and OSCE’s support
the parties agreed to stop to use to threat to use military force in resolving the existing
disagreements. A series o f negotiations took place starting with 1992 towards 1996.
However the talks between two sides have not produced outcome that is conducive to a
permanent peace in the region. The issue o f the status o f South Ossetia remains to be an
obstacle for a final resolution of the crises between two parties. As long as the issue
remains unresolved, the Osset problem will continue to be a concern for instability for
both Georgia and Caucasus. Torn between ethnic conflicts and internal power struggle,
Georgia suffered badly in the phase o f transition after independence.80 The conflicts and
human suffering in Georgia and in other parts o f the Transcaucasus region created a zone

79 C oppieters and L egvold , S ta te h o o d a n d Security, 107.
80 Z am an G a ze te si report that the internal con flicts in G eorgia although at a sm aller lev el still p o ses a threat
to the stability o f the region. Z am an G azetesi, 19 M arch 2 0 0 4 .
h ttp ://w w w .zam an .com .tr/7b E d ish aberler& alt=& trh=20040319& hn=27908 (A ccessed on M arch 19 2 0 0 4 )
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of instability.81 The extent o f the wars and the damage inflicted on the economic and
social lives o f the people in the Transcaucasus area heavily affected the future prospects
for prosperity and transition to democracy in the whole region.
Having examined the extent o f the military conflicts and wars in Caucasus region,
we may move onto the investigation o f the impact of these wars on the interstate
relationship and cooperation on the issue o f oil development in the Caspian region.

MILITARY CONFLICTS IN THE CAUCASUS AND THE CASPIAN OIL
DEVELOPMENT
The intensity and the extent o f the violence in the region gathered international
attention due to the spread of gross human right violations. Coupled with the
geostrategic importance of the region for external powers and the existence o f rich oil
resources, transcaucasian region and the military conflicts in the former Soviet Union
dominated the political agenda o f major external powers alongside with international
institutions. Despite the fact that powerful states in the region tried to play a role in the
settlement o f the disputes, the initiatives by these states and the international institutions
did not produce a considerable positive outcome in terms o f the achievement o f a
permanent peace in the region. Apart from the devastation of the cities and nation states,
the wars in Transcaucasia region crippled the possibility o f economic development
considering the already existing difficulties that are accompanied with the transition from
communist economic system to market economy. The states, directly or indirectly
involved in the conflict, could not achieve a level o f cooperation that would create an

81 For more inform ation on the atrocities against civilian s and ethnic groups in G eorgia, see Denber,
B lo o d sh e d in the C au casu s.
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environment for economic development through internal and external investments. In
this part of the chapter, I would like to focus on the reasons behind the failure for
cooperation for the settlement o f armed conflicts and their direct or indirect impacts on
the development o f oil industry in the Caspian region.

PEACE PROCESS IN CAUCASIA AND INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS
As soon as the armed conflict started between Azerbaijan and Armenians of
Nagorno-Karabakh, international institutions and regional actors offered their assistance.
However, despite the long and persistent efforts o f Minsk Group under OSCE, the peace
process failed utterly. In fact OSCE was the only international organization in the region
to provide any sort of mediation between conflicting parties.
The role o f international institutions in preventing armed conflict is one of the
issues that has been extensively discussed in international relations theory. Scholars of
neoliberal thought asserted the usefulness o f international organizations (10) in the
settlement of the disputes among states.82 According to neoliberals, institutions can
“provide information, reduce transaction costs, make commitment more credible,
establish focal points for coordination and in general facilitate the operation of

82 T he literature on the issu e is huge and expanding as n ew studies add up. For m ore details on the n eo
liberal perspective see R obert 0 . K eohane and Joseph S. N y e, P o w e r a n d In terd ep en d en ce (N e w York:
Harper C ollins, 1989); Oran R. Y oung, “International R egim es: Toward a N e w T heory o f Institutions,”
W orld P o litic s 39, no. 1 (O ctober 1986); Oran R. Y oung “T he E ffectiv en ess o f International Institutions:
Hard C ases and Critical V ariables,” in G o vern a n ce w ith o u t G overnm ent, ed. Jam es M . R osenau and ErnstOtto C zem piel (Cambridge: C am bridge U n iversity Press, 1992); John Gerard R uggie, “C ontinuity and
Transform ation in the W orld Polity: Toward a N eorealist S y n th esis,” W o rld P o litic s 3 5 , no. 2 (January
1983); A lexander W endt, “C onstructing International P o litics,” In tern a tio n a l S ecu rity 2 0 , no. 1 (1995);
Charles A. Kupchan and C lifford A. Kupchan “T he Prom ise o f C o llective Security,” In tern a tio n a l S ecu rity
2 0, no. 1 (Sum m er 1995); John Gerard R u ggie, “T he F alse Prem ise o f R ealism ,” In tern a tio n a l S ecu rity 20,
no. 1 (Sum m er 1995); R obert O. K eohane and L isa Martin, “T he Prom ise o f Institutionalist T heory,”
In tern a tio n a l S ecu rity 2 0 , no. 1 (Sum m er 1995).
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•

reciprocity.”

83

On the other hand, the neo-realist theory claims that IOs do not play a

major role in international relations that the role of IOs in affecting the state behavior in
international arena is limited. Neorealists focus on the role of state as an actor in an
anarchic international system where each individual actor pursues their own interest.84
According to the realists, cooperation among states is only possible if it is meaningful in
terms of their national interests. Relative gain considerations jeopardize international
cooperation. Additionally, fear o f being cheated in cooperation drives states away from
cooperation. It is because that, in absolute gain, states focus only on their gain but in real
world states pursue relative gain that calculates its sheer gain on the basis o f other’s gain
and loss.85 For realists, institutions reflect state calculations o f self-interest based
primarily on concerns about relative power; therefore Institutions do not have significant
effects on state behavior.
In the case o f Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and the other conflicts that have taken
place in the region, the role o f international institutions remained very limited. In terms
o f the explanatory power o f the IR theories, neo-realist school o f thought could be
applied to the events that that have taken place in the region. Policies o f the states in
conflict and also the external powers that were involved in the peace process could better
be explained through neo-realist explanation o f interstate interaction. First o f all, despite
the mediation efforts by IOs and the neighbor countries, the conflicting parties did not
83 Robert O. K eohane and L isa L. Martin, “ The Prom ise o f Institutionalist Theory: R esp on se to John J.
M earsheim er,” Jou rn a l o f International Security 2 0 , no. 1 (Sum m er 1995): 42.
84 T he literature on the issue is quite exten sive. T he fo llo w in g articles and b ook s tou ch es upon the
realist/neo-realist p erspectives on the issue stated above: John J. M earsheimer, “T he F alse Prom ise o f
International Institutions” ; L isa L. Martin and B eth A . Sim m ons, “T heories and E m pirical Studies o f
International O rganizations, ” In tern a tio n a l O rg a n iza tio n 52, no. 4 (1998); Randall L. S ch w eller and D avid
Preiss, “A T ale o f T w o R ealism s: E xpanding the Institutions D ebate,” M ersh on In tern a tio n a l S tu dies
R eview 4 1 , no. 1 (M ay 1997).
85 For more on the realist v ie w s, see M orgenthau, P o litic s a m o n g Nations', W altz, T heory o f In tern a tio n al
Politics', and K eohane, ed., N eo re a lism a n d its C ritics.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

168

consider ending the armed conflict as a viable option. This is particularly related to the
nature of the issue at stake. Armenians and other ethnicities considered their
independence and sovereignty as an issue o f utmost importance (high politics). As neo
realists would suggest the likelihood o f regimes and international institutions to play an
important role in high politics is very low.86 In light o f the rising nationalism on the host
nations, the ethnicities deemed it an issue o f life and death to protect their borders and
identities. “Rivalries, such as those in Nagorno-Karabakh, are not disposed to local
solutions because the rivals tend to view their security relations as a zero-sum game in
which the perceived gain o f one side is considered a loss for the other. In such cases
there is little room for bargaining or negotiations between rivals, or among factions,
within a group or state. The Karabakh Armenians and the Azerbaijanis see the very
survival and legitimacy of their states at stake.”87 Under these circumstances and this
line of thought, the conflicting parties did not pay much attention to the mediation efforts.
As in the case o f Nagorno-Karabakh and Azerbaijan, temporary cooperation on peace
issues has been used to regroup their forces to launch fresh attacks on adversaries.
Another factor that contributed to the failure o f interstate cooperation is the zerosum thinking o f the parties in conflict. A gain by one side is considered as a loss for
other party.

88

P. Terrence Hopmann suggests that, “third parties can be especially helpful

in directing negotiations away from a zero-sum conflict model toward a more problem

86 M earsheim er su ggests that “Liberal institutionalism is gen erally thought to be o f lim ited utility in the
security realm , b ecau se fear o f cheating is considered a m uch greater obstacle to cooperation w hen m ilitary
issues are at stake.” M earsheim er, “The F alse Prom ise o f International Institutions.”
87 W endy B etts, “Third Party M ediation: A n O bstacle to P eace in N agorno-K arabakh,” S a is R eview 19, no.
2 (1999): 167.
88 “Armenia: E x-Speaker Says A uthorities Lack P olitical W ill for Karabakh Settlem ent,” M E D IA M A X , 12
M ay 2 0 0 4 . S ee also “M inister Says N agorno-K arabakh M ust B eco m e Party to P eace T alks,” N O Y A N
T A P A N , 6 M ay 2 0 0 2 , FBIS-SO V— 0 5 1 0 , 2002.
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solving orientation.”89 Another factor that stalled the negations and rendered the efforts
o f OSCE’s Minsk Group is the deeply ingrained disputes between the Azeri and
Armenian nationalists. The historical factors and current developments draw each party
to extreme distrust and a dehumanization of enemy which eventually made it difficult to
come to compromise despite the intense efforts spent by the members o f Minsk Group
This again coincides with the neo-realist approach which suggests that states in
international arena cannot trust adversaries and has to rely on their own resources for
survival. The prevalent distrust and suspicion against adversaries in the regional conflicts
may prolong the security dilemma and is already leading to arm procurement.90 As Katik
suggests, “the strengthening o f naval forces and border troops would serve only to
increase the insecurity o f the each o f the littoral states at this stage.”91
Most o f the points stated above could also be applied to the conflicts in Georgia
and Chechnya as well. The Abkhaz and South Osset conflicts developed in the same line
with Azerbaijan and Armenia. Ethnic groups had to resort to military means under the
perception that the Georgian pressure is directed at their very own survival as an entity.
John Mearsheimer suggests that combatants are motivated by a security dilemma relating
to power politics, prompting wars o f territorial expansion.92 The international institutions
again proved to be useless in bringing a final solution to those conflicts considering the
fact that the ceasefires that stopped these conflicts were brokered by Russia and yet no
final solution has emerged. OSCE’s attempt can be categorized under different phases.
89 Q uoted in B etts, “Third Party M ediation,” 5, see also P. Terrence H opm ann, The N eg o tia tio n P ro c e ss
a n d the R eso lu tio n o f In tern a tio n a l C on flicts (C olum bia: U n iversity o f South Carolina Press, 1998), 242.
90 Security D ilem m a ex ists w hen m any o f the m eans by w hich a state tries to increase its security decrease
the security o f others. Charles L. Glasier, “The Security D ilem m a R evisited ,” W o rld P o litic s 50, no. 1
(1997): 171. For m ore details on Security D ilem m a, see Jervis, “C ooperation under the Security D ilem m a,”
1 6 7 -2 1 4 .
91 Katik, “M ilitarisation o f the Caspian Sea,” 308.
92 John M earsheim er, The T ra g ed y o f G re a t P o w e r P o litic s (N e w York: W .W . N orton, 20 0 1 ).
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The initial years o f OSCE’s involvement in the conflict was dominated by small
countries o f Europe with less interest in the region. The initial years also coincides with
less Russian resistance within OSCE. As the Armenians continued to push towards
Azerbaijani territories and captured many o f the strategic cities, the concerns over the
conflict increased especially when it became a threat to regional countries. In the second
phase o f the mediation efforts, OSCE has been strengthened by the support o f the United
States, France and Turkey. In 1993, Minsk Group proposed an agreement for ceasefire
and asked Armenians to evacuate Kelbajar. The Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians rejected
the proposal on the ground that controlling the Kelbajar area provides them a security and
a lifeline to Armenia. The very next month they started a new series o f attacks on
Azerbaijan and the OSCE’s proposal has been rejected. Despite the internal disturbances
created by Russia within OSCE roof, the Minsk Group continued to work on the issue. A
draft proposal was accepted by all the OSCE members including Azerbaijan in Lisbon
Summit in December 1996. The document called for a settlement between Azerbaijan
and Armenia based on Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity and highest form of selfgovernment for Nagorno-Karabakh and protection for Armenian people. Despite the
unanimity o f the OSCE members, Armenia vetoed the proposal on the ground that it does
not accommodate Armenian needs and requests. After the inclusion o f France and the
United States in the administrative chambers o f Minsk Group, in 1997 the three chairman
o f the Minsk Group proposed a phased settlement to the dispute. The proposal asked for
the return o f the occupied territories to Azerbaijan and settlement o f the issue o f refuges
by allowing them to return their homes. These were expected to be followed by the
lifting o f the Turkish-Azeri blockade on Armenia and deployment o f Peacekeeping
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forces. The issue o f the statues o f Nagorno-Karabakh was to be settlement in the second
stage. Azeris accepted the plan but the Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians again rejected the
plan immediately on the ground that it does not provide Armenians sufficient guarantees.
In the coming years, the OSCE members continued their efforts and tried to react to an
acceptable settlement through direct negotiations starting with 1999. The presidents of
Armenia and Azerbaijan met in Washington in 1999 but the meeting was not particularly
productive in terms o f improving the conditions. The same pattern o f mediation efforts
and bilateral talks continued up to our day without much improvement. The OSCE as an
institution failed in attempts at bringing a final resolution to the conflict.
One o f the main reasons behind the ineffectiveness of International Institutions is
the defection o f the major actor; namely Russia to involve in joint decision making. The
unilateral initiatives o f Russia raises the question about the effectiveness o f IOs in
conflict resolution and providing a cooperative environment. The attitude o f Russia in
NK peace process and ineffectiveness of OSCE and UN makes the neorealist claim more
applicable in such circumstances; as Menzel puts it, “Contrary to the institutionalist
desire that regimes makes a difference, neorealist criticism of regime is applicable:
cooperation via regime is a matter o f convenience easily cast away if unilateralism
promises better results from the perspective o f national interest”93 The problem here is
that, OSCE does not possess troops and military assets to deploy or to intervene in case
o f an emergency conflict. OSCE needs the facilities o f NATO or WEU to engage in the
crises.94 But, taking into consideration o f the decision-making procedures both in OSCE

93 M en zel, D o o m e d to C o o p era te , 141.
94 A t June 1992, foreign m inisters con feren ces in O SL O , N A T O pledged to support on a case by case basis
in accordance w ith its ow n procedures, peace keeping activities, under the resp on sib ility o f the O SC E ,
including by m aking available A llian ces forces and expertise.
Charles Krupnick, “E urope’s
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and in NATO, it becomes obvious that a decision to intervene militarily in a conflict is
very difficult therefore makes OSCE useless and ineffective in providing an enforcement
mechanism in the events o f mediation.
Displacement of more than a million Azeri and Armenians forced the
involvement o f the regional countries of Iran and Turkey. Due to the precarious ethnic
situation in Iran, Iran had to involve in the process to control the passage o f the refugees
and also to stop them on the border to prevent a complication in the Azeri populated
Northern Iran.95 Iran offered its assistance on several occasions to control the situation
and the armed conflict. First, all o f the countries involved in the process hoped to be in a
leading position in the settlement of disputes which is expected to bring a some sort o f a
reputation in the region. This type o f consideration and thinking created lots o f problems
in the peace process and mediation efforts. As each actor came up with its own proposal
for the settlement of the issues, it created confusion for the parties in conflict. All o f a
sudden, they found themselves in a position to choose among the best offer and support
certain proposals over others. “The intervention o f mediators is legitimized by the goal of
conflict reduction, which they typically proclaim. Their desire to mediate is, however,
intertwined with other motives best described within the context o f power politics ...
mediators are players in the plot o f relations around the conflict, with some interest in its
outcome; otherwise they would not mediate.”96 The proposal brought up by Turkey, Iran
and Russia reflected their own version o f a solution that conflicted with each other. In

Intergovernm ental N G O : T he O SC E in E urope’s E m erging Security Structure,” E u ro p ea n S ecu rity 7, no. 2
(Sum m er 1998): 34.
95 A bdollah R am azanzadeh, “Iran’s R ole as M ediator in the N agorno-K arabakh C rises,” in C o n te ste d
B o rd ers in the C aucasus, ed. Bruno C oppieters (Pleinlaan Brussels: V U B U n iversity Press, 1996).
96 Saadia T ouval and I. W illiam Zartman, “M ediation in International C o n flicts,” in M ed ia tio n R esearch ,
ed. K enneth K ressel and D ean G. Pruitt (San Francisco: Jossey-B ass Publishers, 1989), 117.
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other words, the conflict has been transferred to the mediators.97 Nevertheless, the
attempts made by these states carried the goal o f achieving a solution brought by them as
this would increase their status in the region. As we have indicated in the previous
chapters, Russia, Turkey and Iran compete for influence in the region. That competition
also took place in the mediation efforts; which resulted in confusion and delay and also
limited their ability to act as a neutral agent in the process. “The existence o f parallel
mediation tracks led to the parties’ attempts to play one mediation off against the other, to
QO

shop around for more advantageous terms.”

Dina Malysheva argues that “attempts to

normalize the situation in the South Caucasus by reaching a consensus on the principles
o f peaceful coexistence in the region are impeded by the great divergence o f interests of
the regional countries and deeply affected by the attitudes of the principal actors... .at this
point, Armenia and Azerbaijan are unable to agree on any of these issues including the
prospects for settling Karabakh conflict and achievement o f regional security. Far from
helping to phase out the current confrontation in the Caucasus, this serves to enhance the
trend towards polarization, with Armenia, Iran and Russia facing Azerbaijan, Georgia
and Turkey backed by the USA and NATO.”99
The parties to the conflict rejected the participation of some mediators because of
their involvement in the conflict on the side o f their adversaries. The Armenian
opposition to Turkey and Azeri suspicion towards Russia could be considered as an

97 A quotation by in M ay 1993 explains the situation in a very su ccin ct w ay. “T o m y great regret, the war
betw een A rm enia and A zerbaijan long ceased to be a war b etw een tw o rivals from the C aucasus. T his is a
war in w hich the com bating p eo p les have b ecom e the paw ns o f the m ightier p o w ers.” “T he R ole o f
Caspian Oil in M aintaining Stability in the C aucasus R egion: In the C ase o f M ountainous Karabakh
C onflict,” Chapter 1, A vailab le [Online]: < http ://w w w .zerbaiian.com /azeri/dadash2.htm > [9 Septem ber
2 0 0 6 ].
98 C ornell, S m a ll N a tio n s a n d G re a t P o w ers, 113.
99 M alysheva, “T he C on flict in N agorno-K arabakh,” 280.
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example to these. As the efforts of the regional powers have been seen biased by the
warring factions, the mediation attempts failed in many instances.
The role o f Russia however should be discussed in detail here since the
development o f the armed conflicts and the ceasefire agreements has a lot to do with
Russian policies and its involvement. A general Russian policy to reestablish a certain
level o f control in the region played a big role in the development o f the aforementioned
crises and armed conflicts.100
In that line o f thinking, Russian policy was concentrated around establishment of
a military presence in Azerbaijan and Armenia. The shift in Russian policies towards
ethnicities and Caspian states coincides with their choices to allow Russian forces on
their territory.101 Although Russia sided with Azerbaijan for a long time, after the rise of
nationalist movements and anti-Soviet sentiments in Azerbaijan, Russia provided full
support to Armenia and transferred large amounts o f weaponry. Soon after the Azeri
government joined in the CIS, Russia started to back Azerbaijan and in 1994 a ceasefire
was brokered by Russia.102 The same attitude was also visible in the Georgian
conflicts.103 Only after the Georgian government allowed Russian troops on Georgian
soil, the ceasefire entered into force through Russian mediation.104
Despite the fact that the OSCE and in some cases UN involved in the peace
process in Transcaucasia region, the ceasefire agreements have been reached through
100 Suzanne C row, “ R ussia S eek s Leadership in R egional P eacek eep in g,” RFE /RL R esea rch R ep o rt, 9 April
1 9 9 3 ,2 8 .
101 Betts, “Third Party M ed iation ,” 1 7 1 -7 3 .
102 A ydin B a la y ev and A lia g a M em ed ov, “T he Karabakh C on flict and Present D a y Situation,” 3 4 5 -5 5 .
103 A lthough R ussia in volved in p eacek eep in g activities som e state that R ussia is interested in k eep ing the
region destabilized. On the other hand som e argues that rather than instability, “the contem porary status
quo lacking a full solution therefore seem s to suit R ussian ob jectives best.” M en zel, D o o m e d to C o o p era te,
129.
104 For more details on the R ussian activities to m aintain its influence in the region, see Arslan,
“A zerbaycan E konom isinde G ecis D o n em i,” 1 2 5 -2 5 3 .
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Russian initiatives leaving no ground o f success for international institutions. After years
of armed conflict and negotiations, the transcaucasia region remains to be an area of
potential violence since no permanent solution to the disputes have been reached. For the
time being, parties to conflict see it in their interest to avoid another military
confrontation as it has proved to be very costly in terms o f lives that perished and the
devastation that it left behind

CONCLUSIONS: INSTABILITY AND OIL DEVELOPMENT
The instability caused by the wars in Azerbaijan, Armenia, Chechnya and
Georgia affected the development o f oil industry in the Caspian region. First o f all, up
until the signing of the ceasefires agreements, there has been no serious development in
the Caspian region. The countries of the Caspian states and especially Azerbaijan as an
oil producing country had to use their national resources for the compensation o f the war
and reconstruction o f the country. If anything that the conflicts caused in the Caspian
region is the use o f national resources for war and after war reconstruction. However,
these resources could have been effectively used for the early development o f oil reserves
which would have opened way for an earlier development in the export o f oil from
Caspian to other countries. President Ilham Aliyev confirmed this that “the absence o f a
solution to this problem represents a constant source o f considerable danger for the
region. And my opinion is that the sooner this conflict is settled, the quicker peace and
prosperity come to the region and the risks are reduced,” 105 The signing o f the Contract

105 “A zerbaijan President C alls Karabakh C on flict Source o f D anger for R eg io n ,” Interfax T 0 8:52:47Z ,
T uesday, 2 9 A ugust 2 0 0 6 .

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

176

o f the Century became possible after the end o f the conflict between Azerbaijan and
Armenia in 1994.106
The Caspian oil reserves are located mostly offshore and require a high tech
drilling equipments which are not available to Caspian states. The old Soviet oil industry
and equipment no longer effectively served the purpose. Depended on the oil reserves,
Caspian states were in need of serious foreign involvement in the oil industry. However,
the political instability in the region and wars prevented the flow of foreign investment in
the Caspian Sea. Investment in oil industry requires huge commitments and a large
amount o f money which makes the oil companies very sensitive to the present and future
stability o f the region.107 Having seen this necessity and the need for foreign direct
investment (FDI), Azerbaijan accepted the ceasefire agreement and focused on more on
the oil industry and export.
However, a permanent stability in the region is far from complete as the
fundamental issues between states remain to be resolved and potential for an escalation o f
armed conflict is possible in the future depending on the course o f developments and
interstate relationships.

108

The involvement o f the United States in the peace process in

the region could be considered form this perspective, with the arrival American oil
companies and the rising investment, the U.S. government started to pay more attention

106 W e m ay su g g est that the war betw een Azerbaijan and A rm enia at least slo w ed dow n A zeri o il industry
and export by four years considering the start and end o f the co n flict betw een tw o rivals. One m ay also
su ggest that the war has slo w ed dow n the d evelop m en ts by more than 4 years considering the fact that
A zerbaijan had to spend som e o f its national resources and efforts for after war reconstruction and
rehabilitation.
107 S ee S teve A . Y etiv , “P eace, Interdependence, and the M iddle East, P o litic a l S cien ce Q u a rterly 12, no. 1
(1997): 36.
108 I f either country (G eorgia and/or A zerbaijan) w ere affected by internal turm oil due to unsettled
su ccession problem s, popular discontent m ight w ell be directed against the p olitical establishm ent. T his in
turn w ould trigger the flight o f international investm ent. U rs Gerber, “W hither South Caucasus: T o
Prosperity or to C onflict?” in The C aspian : P o litics, E n ergy a n d S ecu rity, ed. Shirin A kiner (London:
R outledgeC urzon-T aylor Francis Group, 2 0 0 4 ), 326.
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to the Caspian affairs.109 As Kenneth Weisbrode confirms, “The incentive o f the U.S.
and Turkey to control any renewed conflict has increased with growing commercial
investment in the region.” 110 In 1997, alongside with France, the United States joined in
the Minsk Group as a co-chair to promote peace talks between Armenia and Azerbaijan.
For United States, “conflict resolution efforts are motivated by the underlying strategic
objective o f realizing an east-west corridor. This implies that as Washington became
more interested in the Caspian Sea’s energy resources, the interest in the solution of
Karabakh conflict grew, precisely because the potential for conflict poses risk for
investors. Yet, if this conflict is resolved, further opportunities for regional cooperation
will emerge.” 111
Yet, the instability in the region and the conflicts between different groups
continued to pose problems for the development o f oil business in the Caspian region.
Especially within the discussions o f pipelines and possible routes towards open seas, the
existing conflicts and potential for escalation posed serious threats.112 As the proposed
pipelines had to go through certain areas in the region, where the security o f the pipelines
could not be guaranteed because o f the potential for wars and trouble spots, the

109 A lthough the U nited States supported the territorial integrity o f Azerbaijan, a pow erful Arm enian lobby
in the U nited States affected U .S . in volvem en t in the region and precluded A zerbaijan from receivin g U .S .
aid through Section 9 0 7 o f the Freedom Support Act; despite the fact that A rm enia currently occu p ies a 20
percent o f A zeri territory. A s the U nited States g ot in volved in the Caspian Sea oil d evelop m en t process,
the impact o f A rm enian lobby is doom ed to fade because o f the vast influence o f o il lobby in the U nited
States. (For m ore on the A rm enian L obby and changing balance in W ashington see Chorbajian, The
M akin g o f N a g o rn o -K a ra b a k h , 2 0 -2 2 .)
110 W eisbrode, C en tra l E u rasia: P rize o r Q uicksand?, 32.
111 M enzel, D o o m e d to C o o p era te , 126.
112 “N o t on e drop o f A zeri oil w ill flo w from the C aspian to international m arkets.” R. K ocharyan, the
president o f A rm enia. “T he R ole o f Caspian O il in M aintaining Stability in the C aucasus R egion: In the
C ase o f M ountainous Karabakh C on flict,” Chapter 2 , A vailab le [Online]:
< http://w w w .zerbaiian.com /azeri/dadash3.htm > [2 D ecem b er 2 0 0 4 ].
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development of pipeline projects have been delayed for some tim e.113 Because o f the
Azeri Armenian conflict, the proposed Baku-Ceyhan pipeline had to be extended towards
Georgian territory, despite the fact that route towards Armenia to Turkey could have been
a lot easier and cheaper.114 Yet any proposal o f such nature has been immediately
rejected by Azeris. The same is true for an Iranian option that has been fiercely opposed
by the United States because of the conflict between Iran and the United States. The
conflicts and wars in the region reduced the possible options for the development o f oil
industry and the pipeline proposals; as it is also true for Russia that the Chechen crises in
the region diminished the potential for Northern route as a viable option for the
transportation of the Caspian oil. Although the conflicts in the region have been frozen,
it still poses a threat to the development o f oil industry in the Caspian region and also for
smooth functioning o f the economies o f the regional states.
Apart from the human sufferings and the devastation that the armed conflicts have
left behind, the development o f oil industry in the Caspian Sea region has also been
affected. Although these conflicts did not stop the eventual start o f the improvements
and investments in the oil industry, they have certainly slowed down the progress and
prevented an effective and a steady development in the Caspian Sea region. For the
future o f the region and development o f oil reserves in the Caspian Sea, it is important to
note that “the necessary investments will only flow if investors can be assured of
113 A zerbaijan and International oil com panies have alw ays had great concerns on the security o f the BakuN ov o ro ssiy sk pip elin e over its security and viab ility as a stable option. D uring the fight b etw een C hechnya
and R ussia, the pip elin e has been dam aged and sabotaged by the C hechen insurgents. T h ey have also used
the p ipeline to threaten the R ussian m ilitary operations in the region. A d d ition ally, the local people
d evelop ed a habit o f breaking into the pip elin e to steal oil. D esp ite the fact that R ussia insisted on the
B ak u -N ovorossiysk as M EP for A zeri oil, it could not provide a safe and a secure passage for the
transportation o f A zeri oil.
114 D esp ite the sign in g o f the ceasefire agreem ents b etw een G eorgia and South O ssetia, the B aku-C eyhan
p ip elin e’s security has been questioned on the ground that it p asses through som e o f the areas that has
w itn essed ethnic co n flicts in G eorgia.
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adequate profits, this will require stability, the rule o f law, a basic perception of
prosperity and some degree o f democracy in the region. Hence, the future prosperity o
the region will depend in large measures on issues o f stability and security.” 115

115 Gerber, “W hither South C aucasus?” 3 2 2 -2 3 .
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CHAPTER VI
THE ROLE OF INSTITUTIONS IN THE CASPIAN SEA REGION

The oil and gas reserves o f the Caspian states are still underdeveloped more than a
decade and a half after their independence. After the dissolution of the Soviet Empire,
there was a wide consensus among energy economists and experts that the countries of
the Caspian region would become important players in international oil markets. The
disappointing level of developments should not be attributed to the absence o f an interest
and/or enthusiasm in these countries. In contrast, the countries o f the Caspian Sea have
been quite enthusiastic about the development o f their oil industry and the potential for
their economies. A bleak picture o f the economies o f the Caspian states and the fading
expectations about the future prosperity that is expected to come with oil exports raises
questions about the future prospects for the development o f Caspian oil resources. The
question here is not about the potential o f the oil resources to provide wealth and
economic opportunities for the Caspian states, but about the issue o f the slow
developments o f the oil industry, contrary to the expectations and the desires o f these
states as well as international oil companies which has so far invested millions o f dollars.
In this chapter, I will focus on the role of international institutions in resolving the
interstate conflicts and issues in the Caspian region. By doing so, I intend to explore the
role of IOs in the achievement o f cooperation among states on the development of the
Caspian Sea oil reserves. As we have argued in the previous chapters, cooperation
among the states in the Caspian region over the development o f Caspian Sea oil reserves
has been quite slow and/or absent in some instances. If International Organizations are
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said to be an important mechanism through which states achieve cooperation on varieties
o f issues in different realms, we should be looking at the Caspian environment and try to
find out why IOs in the Caspian region proved to be ineffective in the achievement of
interstate cooperation, especially over the development o f Caspian oil industry.
The Caspian region has been under Soviet rule for the last seventy years. The
issues in the region have been dealt with under the terms o f the Soviet rule. The countries
o f the Caspian Sea did not have chance to establish interstate institutions to deal with
economic and political issues. As it is the case for the Central Asian countries, the
transition period has proved itself to be very painful for the Caspian states as they have
found themselves in an environment surrounded with, political, economic, social and
ecological issues some o f which are deeply rooted in the legacy o f Soviet Union to
establish a firm control over the region.
Nonetheless, the former Soviet Republics struggled to find their way onto a
straight path on their own with limited success. A region o f high geopolitical value and
rich oil reserves was not expected to be left alone. The involvement o f the external
powers and the competition for influence in the region complicated the efforts o f the
Caspian States to consolidate themselves as stable political entities. Alongside with the
Central Asian states and other former Soviet republics, the Caspian states were pressured
into working their issues through establishment o f international institutions with the
initiation of the CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States) by Russia, an international
organization emerged in the region and established itself as an important body in the
regional affairs o f the Caspian and the Central Asian states. Along with the CIS as an
international organization, some other institutions played important role in the Caspian
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region. The establishment o f GUAM by Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova and
the involvement o f OSCE in the economic, political and security realms provided
multiple venues for interstate cooperation and resolution o f issues among regional
countries. Despite the availability o f International Organizations (IOs or IGOs), the
resolution o f regional issues under organizational structure has not been quite effective.
The role o f IOs in resolving issues among states and increasing the possibility of
interstate cooperation has been recognized by the neoliberal school in International
Relations Theory. The success of the International Organizations in Europe to bring the
European States together and provide a forum for the discussion o f the deep rooted
conflicts has been given as an example for the potential o f IOs to provide peace and
resolution to conflicts. The neorealist school on the other hand, disregards the potential
for a great success under 10 roof and considers the possibility o f conflict resolution and
peace very limited.

INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS IN THE CASPIAN CONTEXT
Before going through the examination o f particular international and regional
organizations that existed in the Caspian region, some o f the basic discussions in
International Relations Theory over the role o f Intergovernmental Organizations (IGOs)
in international relations will be covered.1

1 T his is not intended to be a com p reh en sive analysis o f the current debate b etw een neorealists and
neoliberal sch ools. For more inform ation on the details o f liberal perspective, see K eohane and N y e, P o w e r
a n d In terd e p e n d en c e; Oran R. Y ou n g, “International R egim es: Toward a N e w T heory o f Institutions,”
W orld P o litic s 39 (O ctober 1986); Y ou n g, “The E ffectiv en ess o f International Institutions” ; R uggie,
“C ontinuity and Transform ation in the W orld P olity” ; W endt, “Constructing International P o litics” ;
Kupchan and Kupchan “T he Prom ise o f C ollectiv e Security” ; R u ggie, “T he F alse P rem ise o f R ea lism ”;
K eohane and Martin, “T he Prom ise o f Institutionalist T heory” ; K eohane and Martin, “ T he Prom ise o f
Institutionalist Theory: R esp on se to John J. M earsheim er,” 42; Martin and Sim m ons, “T heories and
Em pirical Studies o f International O rganizations” ; S ch w eller and Preiss, “A T ale o f T w o R ea lism s” ;
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An institution is defined as a “set o f rules that stipulate the ways in which state
should cooperate and compete with each other.”2 The differences between realists and
liberal thinkers in their perception o f states in international arena as an actor give rise to
the differences in their approach to international institutions.
The realist paradigm assumes that there is a power struggle between states. Their
aim is to be the dominant actor in international arena as well as preventing the other
states from gaining power. In this setting, the struggle is continuous and the space for
cooperation is very limited that makes global peace impossible. The ordering principle in
international politics is anarchy and each state has to rely on its military capabilities.
Since no state can be sure about the others’ intention, competition is continuous. The
•5

basic motive for the state is survival and they need military power for potential threats.
In doing so, they want to maximize their relative gain. According to the realists,
cooperation among states is only possible if it is meaningful in terms o f their national
interests. An important point here is the analysis o f relative/absolute gain that jeopardizes
international cooperation. Additionally, fear o f being cheated in cooperation drives states
away from cooperation. It is because that, in absolute gain, states focus only on their
gain but in real world states pursue relative gain that calculates its sheer gain on the basis
of other’s gain and loss.4

B aldw in, N eo re a lism a n d N eoliberalism ', M ilner, “International T heories o f C ooperation A m on g N ations:
A R ev iew E ssay,” 4 6 6 -9 6 . For the details o f the neoliberal approach to the on g o in g debate see
M earsheimer, “T he F alse Prom ise o f International Institutions” ; Martin and Sim m ons, “T heories and
Em pirical Studies o f International O rganizations.”
2 M earsheim er, “T he False Prom ise o f International Institutions,” 8. In clarifying the definition,
M earsheim er says that institutions include the description o f the norms that regulates state behavior and
proscription o f unacceptable kinds o f behavior. H e also argues that realism sees institutions as the
reflection o f the distribution o f pow er in the w orld.
3 Joseph M . G rieco, “A narchy and the L im its o f C ooperation, 4 8 5 -5 0 7 .
4 For more on the realist v ie w s, see M orgenthau, P o litic s a m o n g Nations', K enneth N . W altz, T h eory o f
In tern a tio n a l P o litic s (R eading, M A: A d d iso n -W esley , 1979); K enneth W altz, “A narchic Orders and
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For realists, institutions reflect state calculations o f self-interest based primarily
on concerns about relative power; as a result, institutional outcomes invariably reflect the
balance o f power. Institutions, realists maintain, do not have significant independent
effects on state behavior. However, realists recognize that great powers sometimes find
institutions— especially alliances— useful for maintaining or even increasing their share
o f world power. For example, it was more efficient for the United States and its allies to
balance against the Soviets through NATO than through a less formal and more ad hoc
alliance. But NATO did not force its member states to behave contrary to balance-ofpower logic.5
Neoliberals criticize neorealist approach on the bases o f the lack o f any sort of
approach that under what circumstances realist paradigms operates. They, thereby assert
that, institutionalizm as theory offers the explanation o f the conditions under which it
operates and plays its role. Liberals claims that “scientific theories should specify the
conditions under which the theory is expected to hold a priori.”6 By the same token,
institutionalists explain the benefits o f institutions that help the states to cooperate if they
really wish to cooperate. According to Keohane and Martin, institutions can “provide
information, reduce transaction costs, make commitment more credible, establish focal
points for coordination and in general facilitate the operation o f reciprocity.”7
In Triangulating Peace, Russett and. Oneal find positive correlation between the number
of membership o f a state’s in International Organization and the likelihood o f conflict.

B alance o f P ow er,” in N eo re a lism a n d its C ritics, ed. R obert O. K eohane (N e w York: C olum bia U n iversity
Press, 1986); B ald w in , N e o re a lism a n d N eoliberalism ', K eohane, ed ., N eo rea lism a n d its C ritics.
5 M earsheim er, “T he F alse Prom ise o f International Institutions.”
6 K eohane and Martin, “ T he Prom ise o f Institutionalist Theory: R esponse to John J. M earsheim er,” 41.
7 Ibid., 42.
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According to Russett and Oneal, states with high number o f 10 membership are less
•

likely to involve in armed conflicts.

8

Neoliberalists strongly oppose to the realist claim that the institutionalists can
only explain the issues in economy but in the field o f security it simply does not apply.
They assert that, institutionalizm does not ignore an important area that states are
continuously interacting. Institutions can provide information that can also lead
cooperation in security fields. This can eliminate the basic issue o f worst-case
assumptions of the states about each other’s intentions. According to Mearsheimer, when
states cooperate with each other, the major concern is not absolute gain but relative gain.
Therefore Mearsheimer concludes that “institutions have minimal influence on states’
behavior and thus hold little promise for promoting the stability in the post-Cold War.”9
The institutional theory contends that relative gain concern is conditional and is
not valid at all time. Thus, Liberal Institutionalists try to determine the conditions under
which relative/absolute gain does or does not constitute a problem for states, and the role
of institutions when distributional issues are at stake. They assert that, institutions can be
helpful in the bargaining process by providing information thereby creating a transparent
environment for states to negotiate their issues. Keohane and Martin emphasize on the
creation of the institutions by states. If they are created by states, we can ask why states
would create such institutions if they did not trust and expect them to play a role. If the
institutions are not going to be helpful anyway, why states devote such amount of

8 Bruce R usset and John R. O neal, T rian gu latin g P ea ce: D em o cra cy, In terdepen den ce, a n d In tern a tion al
O rg a n iza tio n s (N e w York: N orton, 2 0 0 1 ), 1 5 7 -9 6 .
9 M earsheim er, “T he F alse Prom ise o f International Institutions,” 7.
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resources for them ?10 Keohane and Martin argues that “the necessity for institutions does
not mean that they are always valuable, much less they operate without respect to power
and interests, constitute a panacea for violent conflicts or always reduce the likelihood of
war. Claiming too much for international institutions would indeed be a ‘false promise.’
But in a world politics constrained by state power and divergent interests, and unlikely to
experience effective hierarchical governance, international institutions operating on the
basis o f reciprocity will be components o f any lasting peace.” 11

COMMONWEALTH OF INDEPENDENT STATES (CIS) AND REGIONAL
COOPERATION
CIS has been one of the institutions that served as an important forum for the
republics o f the former Soviet Union. It has also been an arena where member states
voiced their criticisms and concerns against each other. It is important in the sense that
development o f CIS as an institution and the developments within the CIS reflect the
general trends in the region and the nature o f the interstate relationship. For this reason,
in this chapter I will look at the major developments within the CISto identify the impact
of this institutional structure on the interstate cooperation in the Caspian region and on
the development o f the Caspian oil.
In the aftermath o f the dissolution o f the Soviet Union, Gorbachev and Yeltsin
were in search o f another entity to replace Soviet Union. At a time o f confusion and
10 K eohane and Martin g iv e som e exam p les that sh ow h ow institutions w orked in regulating interstate
behaviors. T he first exam ple is the European Court o f Justice that had an im pact on “European integration
transform ing political into legal issu es w ith he aid o f transnational law yers and ju d g es.”
K eohane and Martin, “ T he Prom ise o f Institutionalist Theory: R esp on se to John J. M earsheim er,” 4 8. The
second exam ple is the role o f EC in reducing the doubts am ong European states. T h ey say that, EC has
done a lot in preventing cheating and facilitating cooperation and coordinating sanctions.
11 Ibid., 50. S ee also Charles A . Kupchan and C lifford A . Kupchan, “C oncerts, C o llectiv e Security, and the
Future o f Europe,” In tern a tio n a l S ecu rity 16, no. 1 (Sum m er 1991): 1 1 4 -6 1 .
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chaos, everyone had a different view about the future o f the Soviet Union. While
Gorbachev favored a more centralized union with the former Soviet Republics, Yeltsin
sought for a loose and a decentralized system of unity that would give the central
government only the powers that the participating republics were willing to cede.12 On
the other hand, the newly independent states o f the former Soviet Union were not in a
position to join in an organization that would jeopardize their sovereignty. Ukraine, as an
important part o f the Slavic world, enthusiastically favored independence and rejected
Russian plans to establish a new form o f supranational entity. Appalled with the
Ukrainian move, Russian Federation quickly moved and in December 1991 established
Commonwealth o f Slavic States (CSS). This was a loose organization in which member
*

States enjoyed full sovereignty.

13

•

Only with this condition Ukrainian president Leonid

Kravchuk agreed to sign the Union. The establishment o f a Slavic block alarmed some of
the former republics in Central Asia. Being left out o f the new establishment, the Central
Asian states especially Kazakhstan wanted to participate in the CSS. Under the new
conditions the new organization renamed to Commonwealth o f Independent States with
an open membership to all former Soviet Republics. With the signing o f Alma-Ata
protocol, other Central Asian and Caucasus states joined the Union along with Moldova.
Only the Baltic States rejected from the very beginning to be a part o f any other
establishment that would involve a level o f integration with Russia.
During the first years o f the establishment o f the CIS, the Union had no clear
vision or a policy regarding the management o f the issues among the members and the

12 John B. D unlop, The R ise o f R u ssia a n d the F a ll o f S o v ie t E m p ire (Princeton, NJ: Princeton U n iversity
Press, 1993), 2 6 6 -6 7 .
13 Robert H. D onaldson and Joseph L. N o g e e, The F o reig n P o lic y o f R ussia: C h a n g in g System s, E n du rin g
Interests, 2 nd ed. (A rm onk, N Y : M .E. Sharpe, 2 0 0 5 ), 181.
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future projects related to integration. The evolution o f the CIS as a regional organization
coincides with the developments in Russian domestic politics. Just after the
independence a liberal trend dominated the Russian political thinking. Within the
framework of westward policies, market economy and democratization o f Russian
institutions, the Russian approach to CIS and its policies have been quite constructive.14
As the priority was given to integration with West and modernization o f the country to
western standards, the countries o f the former Soviet Union enjoyed a great level of
independence.15 During the first years o f the CIS’s establishment, the response o f the
countries o f the former Soviet Union differed from each other owing to geography,
economic interdependence and the legacy o f the past.
The Central Asian countries surprisingly are the ones that enthusiastically
supported the consolidation of CIS as a regional organization to manage, economic,
political and security issues. The level o f economic dependence played a big role in the
Central Asian countries’ decision to work within an institutional framework. As Odom
and Dujarric explains the reaction o f the Central Asian states:
The old com m unist rulers w h o rem ained in pow er in all states but K yrgyzstan w ere
reluctant to break fu lly w ith the R ussian-dom inated organization. T h ey w ere not anxious
to see the old com m and econ om ic arrangements o f the so v iet system collap se. N or did
th ey w ant to see the exp an sion o f popular participation in their ow n countries. Like their
conservative counterparts in M o sco w , th ey sought to slo w dow n even stop the transition
to liberal dem ocracy and market e c o n o m ies.16

14 A le x Pravda, “R ussia and the N ear A broad,” in D ev elo p m en ts in R ussian P o litic s, eds. A le x Pravda and
Z vi G itelm an (Durham , N C: D uke U n iversity Press, 2 0 0 1 ), 215; N ic o le J. Jackson, R u ssian F o reig n P o licy
a n d the CIS: Theories, D e b a te s a n d A ctio n s (L ondon, N e w York: R outledge, 2 0 0 3 ), 5 1 -5 4 .
15 R ussian F oreign M inister visited the Central A sian countries in April 1992 but by that tim e A m erican
counterpart had already paid three visitis to the region. D incer Tascikar, “Orta A syadaki E konom ik
Reform lar ve Y en i B uyuk O yun,” in Turk C u m h u riyetleri ve P e tro l B orn H a tla ri, ed. A llaeddin Y alcinkaya
(Ankara: B aglam Y a yin cilik , 1998), 236.
16 W illiam E. O dom and Robert Dujarric, C om m on w ealth o r E m pire?: R ussia, C e n tra l A sia a n d the
T ranscau casu s (Indianapolis, IN: Hudson Institute, 1995), 12.
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The economies o f the former Soviet Union are strongly linked to each other. An
old Soviet policy to maintain control and dependence was the distribution o f economic
sectors to different countries. While Central Asian countries produced cotton, they had to
send it to Russia for processing. Likewise, other sectors in the industry were also closely
interlinked among the former Soviet Republics.17 Caught in a complex web o f economic
and political issues, the Central Asian countries strongly opted for an institution like CIS
and adamantly supported Russia throughout the 1990s in its quest to strengthen the CIS
as an effective mechanism in the management o f regional and interstate affairs.
Contrary to the policies o f the Central Asian states, Azerbaijan and Georgia
maintained a distance from any type o f organization that might eventually lead to Russian
domination of its members. The historical experiences and the Russian brutality in
suppressing the independence movements in these two countries (1989-Georgia, and
Black Friday in 1991 in Azerbaijan) mainly forced these countries to abstain from joining
in the CIS. Armenia, on the other hand, as a Caucasus state preferred to be a part o f this
organization as it saw the possibility o f Russian alliance in Armenian war against
Azerbaijan.

18

Moldova followed Azerbaijan and Georgia in its decision not to be an

integral part o f this establishment because o f the same types o f concerns and the role of
Russia in an internal crisis in Moldova erupted in 1992. As we can see from the different
reactions o f the former Soviet Republics towards CIS, the nature o f the new organization
was not known to its members and each country had their own considerations and
expectations. The absence o f a clear vision and policies governing the interstate
relationship under CIS roof continued up until the time Russia started to place a certain

17 Tascikar, “Orta A syadaki E konom ik Reform lar v e Y en i B uyuk O yun,” 2 3 5 -3 6 .
18 H enry E. H ale, “Independence and Integration in the C aspian B a sin ,” S ais R e v ie w 19, no. 1 (1999): 169.
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level o f importance to its relationship with its Near Abroad.19 The rise o f concerns over
Near Abroad is related to the insurgence o f nationalism within Russian domestic circles.
As the liberal policies of Yeltsin administration produced no promising results and the
internal economy worsened in the light o f new market policies, Russian nationalism and
the critique of Yeltsin’s western policies gained momentum. Yeltsin administration did
not just ignore the domestic trends in favor o f the establishment o f Russian sphere of
influence in the Near Abroad but followed a moderate path to accommodate the domestic
constituency. Internal pressure within Russia increased to establish integration with the
CIS countries and the Russian government stepped up to develop integration with CIS
countries under CIS roof.20
This move was welcomed by some Central Asian states while the governments of
Georgia, Azerbaijan, Moldova and Ukraine strictly opposed to a process o f integration
with Russian Federation under CIS. They have seen it as a way o f Russian policy to
maintain control over the former Soviet Union states which Central Asian countries saw
as an opportunity to guarantee Russian support in economic, political and security
areas.21 Russia took certain steps to develop CIS into a fully fledged regional
organization which is able to provide security guarantees to its members at the same time
serve the purpose o f integration. The Russian policy to create a common CIS military
represents a classical example o f institutional dilemma in the post-Soviet world. The
differences among the member states became apparent as the Russian government

19 T he countries o f form er S o v iet U n ion that w ere o n ce part o f the U S S R h ave b een labeled as N ear Abroad
by Russians.
20 For m ore on the details o f the link b etw een R ussian d om estic p olitics and o f the gradual shift in the
R ussian foreign p o licies tow ards CIS and the, see Jackson, R u ssian F o reig n P o lic y a n d th e CIS, 6 0 -6 6 .
21 H ale, “Independence and Integration in the Caspian B a sin ,” 165.
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insisted on joint military space under CIS.22 It was clear from the very beginning that the
command of the CIS army was to be given to Russian commanders. Some o f the
member states stated their desire to establish their own military structure and opposed
Russian proposal for a CIS army to protect the joint military space. Opponents o f
integration perceived this as a clear threat to their independence and cast their veto in the
negotiations. In the end, the idea for a joint army had to be abandoned but member states
agreed to establish a Council of Defense Ministers based in M oscow.23
CIS integration o f the member states under a joint military or a common
economic zone encountered numerous problems. First o f all, decisions taken by the
member states of the CIS were not compulsory and there has not been a mechanism to
enforce the CIS directives and policies. Member states were free to join in certain
agreements and they were also free to apply or ignore the provisions set forth in the
treaties and agreements. “Decisions require the unanimous consent all those voting. As a
mater o f practice, most o f the decisions reached have not been put into effect. Not
infrequently, several members failed to appear in scheduled summit meetings. By failing
to participate in a CIS decision, a member is free to opt out o f compliance, but even those
members participating in decisions and agreeing with them are not obliged to comply and
often do not. President Nur Sultan Nazarbayev o f Kazakhstan, one o f the most ardent
supporters o f integration, complained in 1994 that o f 452 agreements signed within the
CIS framework most were never implemented.” 24 Most o f the important agreements had

22 It took years for R ussia and other m em ber states to com e to realize that the idea o f a jo in t m ilitary space
cannot be applied across a large geography w ith different security concerns and allian ces. For m ore on the
details o f the debate am ong the m em bers o f CIS see O dom and Dujarric, C o m m o n w ea lth o r E m pire?, 1 5 30.
23 B y m id -1 9 9 3 , all support for a unified CIS com m and has dissipated and on June 15, its abolition w as
announced in M o sco w . D on ald son and N o g e e , The F o reig n P o lic y o f R u ssia, 184.
24 Ibid., 182.
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to be ratified by the parliaments o f the member states before entering into force. The
loose decision making and enforcing mechanism seriously harmed the effectiveness of
the CIS as a regional institution. Another factor that discredited the CIS from the very
beginning is the suspicion towards Russia and its assertiveness within CIS for integration.
Some o f the member states considered this as a direct infringement upon their survival as
a sovereign and independent entity.25 Despite the fact that CIS has been developed by
Russia to promote integration, in the following years, member states turned CIS into a
forum to discuss post-Soviet transition process and problems and cast their complaints
towards Russia. The extent o f the criticisms and pressure from member states
occasionally left Russia in a difficult situation; such that even Russia had to abstain from
signing o f many treaties and protocols developed under CIS roof.26
Another aspect o f integration under CIS is the establishment o f free economic
zone and the linking o f the economies o f the member states. Starting with 1992, the
differences in economies and future prospects and domestic remedies taken to improve
economic structure created confusion and disagreement. Economic integration has been
seen as an integral part o f integration under the CIS and member states signed numerous
treaties and agreements regarding the management o f economic policies o f the CIS states
and the increasing o f the trade relations. The difficulties attached to the transition from
command economy to market economy greatly circumvented the efforts of member states

25 Ukrainian President V iktor Y u sh ch en k o said that U kraine is “against the creation o f supranational bodies
within the fram ework o f the CIS. I f w e d iscu ss the eco n o m ic part o f our relations, w e cannot support those
principles in line w ith w hich w e can build relations w ithin the fram ework o f the S in gle E con om ic Space ( o f
Ukraine, Belarus, R ussia and Kazakhstan) if, for exam ple, th ese principles end up dam aging our integration
into Europe. R ationalization o f relations w ithin the fram ework o f the CIS should take place in the interests
o f countries, at the tech n o lo g ica l and eco n o m ic level, w here w e can k n ow o f the rational benefits for
participant states.” “Ukrainian, G eorgian Presidents N o te N eed For 'E conom ic Rationale' in C IS,” K IE V
IN T E R F A X -U K R A IN E -T 18:01:46Z , 25 M arch 2 0 0 5 .
26 “R ussia W on't T ake Part in S om e CIS A greem en ts,” IN T E R F A X -T 11:29:01Z, 2 6 July 2 0 0 5 .
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to manage their economies under CIS terms. A search for a better and more effective
economic management is also directly related to the development o f oil in the Caspian
Sea region. That is why the economic developments in Russia and elsewhere in the CIS
forced the Caspian states to develop their own economies within the context o f available
resources. Therefore the trend towards the development o f oil resources is directly
related to the economic environment that the Caspian states found themselves in after the
dissolution o f Soviet Empire and Russian unilateral policies to secure its economic
future.
The Russian unilateral policies towards liberalization o f its economy and the
drastic measures taken by Russia to stabilize its monetary polices had negative impacts
on the former Soviet Republics which were very much depended on the stability o f the
Russian currency “ruble” as they had not established their own currency. In 1992, the
Russian Federation introduced price control at domestic level and adapted new
regulations concerning the monetary transactions with Banks outside the federation.27
Caught in the tide o f Russian liberalization o f its economy, the ruble zone had
great difficulties in the management o f their economies. The unilateral policies of
Russian Federation forced the CIS states to develop their own economic policies and
•

projects.

28

•

Dependence on Russian economic system have had dramatic affects and after

1993 Russian decision to impose restrictions on the use o f ruble in Russia printed before
1993.

29

Member states adapted new polices and introduced their own currencies against

the Russian unilateral approach. The gap between rhetoric and reality grew bigger in the

27 D onaldson and N o g e e, The F o reig n P o lic y o f R u ssia, 193.
28 Pravda, “R ussia and the N ear A broad,” 2 1 5 -2 4 .
29 N ozar A laolm olk i, Life a fter S o v ie t Union, the N e w ly In d ep en d en t R ep u b lics o f T ran scau casu s a n d
C en tra l A sia (A lbany: State U n iversity o f N e w Y ork Press, 2 0 0 1 ), 2 7 -2 9 .
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coming years within CIS. The concept o f economic integration have proved to be false
especially after the signing of many agreements on the establishment o f Unified
Monetary System in 1992, Common Market 1993 and Single Economic Space intended
to integrate the economies of CIS states but have never been materialized in the absence
of a clear compliance problem by member states.30
The failure o f the Joint Military Force under CIS and the establishment o f a
Unified Economic Space made the organization ineffective in those realms. But Russian
insistence on the creation of a sphere o f influence over CIS continued throughout the
decade. In fact, Russian persistence increased as the domestic pressure intensified in the
light of the external developments that have been perceived as a threat to Russian
influence in the region. The enlargement o f NATO towards Russia and the extension of
Peace for Partnership Program agitated the extremists in Russia and provoked the
Russian government. In a speech delivered to Federation Council, Russian foreign
minister Andrei Kozyrev announced that “Russia is making every effort to combat the
drive for some CIS states to join NATO. At the time, the official Russian attitude towards
NATO was becoming increasingly negative. NATO was accused o f being wedded to the
stereotypes of bloc thinking and Russia was indecisive about the extent to which it would
participate in the Peace for Partnership Program.”31 Especially the developments that
have taken place in the area o f oil development in the Caspian region and the
involvement o f western oil companies and the United States forced Russia to take
countermeasures to maintain an exclusive Russian sphere of influence in the Near

30 Ukraine did not put its signature on the establishm ent o f a free trade zon e w hich has been seen as an
important cornerstone in the d evelop m en t o f CIS. “B D T ’nin Serbest Ticaret Giri§imi U krayna’y a T akildi,”
Z am an G a zete si, 6 April 2 0 0 5 .
31 Jackson, R u ssian F o reig n P o lic y a n d the CIS, 74.
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Abroad. This gave rise to Russian efforts to consolidate its presence in the countries of
Central Asia and Transcaucasia. The events that followed the rejection of the Georgian
and Azeri government to join in the CIS should be viewed within this framework. Russia
has actively followed policies that could pressure these states into joining CIS. The
ethnic conflicts in Georgia, Moldova and Azerbaijan provided a golden opportunity for
Russia to convince these states into joining the CIS. After a few years o f conflict and
negotiation, Azeri, Georgian and Moldovan governments revised their polices and
reluctantly joined in the CIS.

T9

This has given Russia the opportunity to deploy Russian

troops to maintain stability in the conflict zones also the ability to influence local
governments into Russian objectives. The Tashkent Treaty on Collective Security signed
on May 1992 could also be considered as a Russian move to increase its military
presence in the territories of member states. Bilateral agreements on the joint protection
of the borders and the establishment o f a Common Air Defense System under CIS were
intended to serve Russian domination o f its Near Abroad. However, the responses o f the
member states and the following developments limited the effectiveness o f the Russian
maneuvers. First o f all, Moldova and Ukraine never joined in Tashkent Collective
Security Treaty leaving the initiative less than a common objective within CIS.
Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan and Georgia withdrew from treaty in 1999 on the ground that it
did not serve their interests and the treaty only aimed at the extension o f Russian
domination of CIS.33

32 T he fo llo w in g are the dates that CIS m em bers jo in ed in the organization: R u ssia 1991, B elarus 1991,
Ukraine 1991, M o ld ova 1991, Kazakhstan 1991, A zerbaijan 1991, A rm enia 1991, K yrgyzstan 1991,
U zbekistan 1991, Tajikistan 1991, G eorgia 1993; in Feb 2 0 0 6 , w ithdrew from the C ouncil o f D efen se
M inisters, Turkm enistan 1991; w ithdrew 2 0 0 5 , associate m em ber sin ce then.
33 G eorgian President Shevardnadze said that “o n ce a treaty o f cooperation in the sphere o f d efen se is
signed, w e w ill continue cooperation w ith R ussia, the scale o f w hich w ill depend on various circum stances.
T he fact that not all countries have extended the CIS co llectiv e security treaty, w hich has not been w orking
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Russia demanded a special recognition in many occasions from the UN in the
Near Abroad as a privileged actor including the recognition o f rights to deploy Russian
forces if the developments posed a threat to regional stability and to Russian interests.
These have been rejected by the UN and the OSCE and been opposed by major regional
powers34 as well as some CIS members; especially the states o f the Caucasus region.35 In
an address to UN General Assembly in September 1993, Andrei Kozyrev “defended a
special peacekeeping role for Russia in the CIS states and demanded that Russian
peacekeeping forces be given the status o f UN peacekeepers.”36
The deployment of Russian peacekeeping forces throughout the CIS coincides
with Russian imperialistic policies.37 Russian policymakers claim that Russia is affected
by the developments in the CIS and has to involve in order to maintain stability in the
region on the following grounds:
•

Russia has a responsibility to protect Russian minorities in the territories of
the former Soviet Republics

•

Any conflict in the region carries a potential to spread Russia

•

Need for control o f the Islamic Fundamentalism as it may spread to Russian
Federation

anyw ay, should not be over dramatized. Our refusal to extend it d oes not sig n ify that w e have withdrawn
from it.” “Shevardnadze Talks o f N e e d to Transform G U A M G rouping,” M o sco w Interfax, reported in
F B IS-SO V -19 9 9 -0 4 1 9 , 19 April 1999.
34 Turkey for its part tried to keep a balanced distance to the d evelopm ents in the form er S o viet U n ion pot
to alarm R ussia. For more inform ation on the Turkish approach to C IS, see A . Suat B ilg e, “C om m onw ealth
o f Independent States and Turkey,” E u rasian S tu d ies 1, no. 4 (1 995): 6 3 -1 0 0 .
35 R ussian Foreign M inister also sought legitim acy for R ussian p eacek eep in g rights w ithin CIS through
OSC E, EU and Arab States. RFE /RL D a ily R eport, no. 147, 4 A ugust 1993.
36 Odom and Dujarric, C om m on w ealth o r E m pire?, 31.
37 For more on the R ussian im perialistic p o licies see D im itri K. Sim es, A fter the C o lla p se: R u ssia S eeks its
P la c e as a G re a t P o w e r (N e w Y ork, N Y : Sim on & Schuster, 1999).
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•

Separatist movements outside of Russian Federation might encourage
separatist movements in Russia

The idea o f peacekeeping within CIS was first brought up by the president of
Kazakhstan in 1992 and approved by the ten o f the fourteen states. Initially the nature of
these operations were formulated after the general UN principles; such as, mutual consent
of the parties in conflict to accept peacekeeping forces, voluntary participation, joint
command.. .etc. However, within the CIS context, the deployment o f peacekeeping forces
carried different patterns in each o f the five major armed conflicts that broke out within
the territories of the member states. (Tajikistan, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Moldova)
We may argue that the CIS has been in a steady decline considering the fall in its
effectiveness as an instrument in providing cooperation on political, economic and
security issues.

It has actually become a tradition within CIS that member states put

their signatures on treaties and agreements without much consideration and expectation.
Implementation of these treaties and agreements has usually failed because o f the absence
of a sanctioning system and the reluctance of member states to comply with CIS norms.
Meetings o f the CIS and its subunits are not attended by all of the member states and
on

unanimity is hardly a case on many issues.

Because of the ineffectiveness o f CIS as an

organization to enforce its rules and regulations over member states, CIS could not

38 Turkmenistan leader N iy a z o v claim ed that CIS has b ecom e a p olitical institution and therefore th ey see it
is in their best interest to w ithdraw from the organization. T he neutrality o f Turkm enistan prevents it from
b ecom in g a part o f m ilitary alliances. “A jkabat, B D T ’den K opuyor,” Zaman G a zetesi, 28 A u gu st 2 0 0 5 .
39 Z am an G a ze te si reports that the m em ber states o f CIS can no longer co m e together full cadre and
K rem lin is getting used to the idea that CIS m ay d isso lv e in the future. “B D T Z irvesi Son K ez mi
T oplam yor?” Z am an G a zetesi, 2 7 A ugu st 2 0 0 5 .
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achieve an international recognition as a viable instrument in the territories o f the former
Soviet Union.40
This is not to ignore the partial success o f CIS in some areas such as the
negotiation o f the issues among member states arising from the independence from
Soviet Union and sharing o f the resources left on the territories o f CIS members after the
dissolution of the Soviet Union.41 Immediate problems just after the independence have
been dealt with under CIS roof and especially the Central Asian states found it useful to
bring up their concerns and demands from Russia. Despite the fact that CIS has served
some purpose but failed to develop into fully fledged regional organizations, no one is in
favor of a policy to dissolve the establishment at a ll42
Unlike the CIS countries, Russia switched to making bilateral agreements with
CIS states after it has become clear that Russia will not be able to pass its policies within
CIS under a common ground where CIS states could oppose Russia altogether. The

40 A fter the withdraw al o f G eorgia and A zerbaijan form T ashkent C ollectiv e Security Treaty, A rm enia
seem s to be the on ly loyal m em ber o f the CIS in the C aucasus region. “G eriye bir Erivan K aldi,” M illiyet
G a zetesi, 2 7 M arch 2 0 0 5 .
41 T he countries o f the form er S o v iet U n io n inherited a large am ount o f m ilitary establishm ents and arms.
T he nuclear w eapons stationed in som e o f these countries presented a great d ifficu lty and a danger to
R ussia and later the U nited States. S om e o f th ese issu es w ere negotiated under CIS r o o f but som e major
problem s needed to be resolved w ith the assistance from the U nited States.
42 CIS Foreign M inisters and other agen cies continued to w ork on certain issu es and aim ed at reform ing the
CIS institutions. CIS has long been blam ed to be an in effective institution in addressing the regional issues.
“CIS Foreign M inisters to D iscu ss R eform ing CIS Institutions,” In terfax-T 15:35:36Z , 17 April 2 0 0 6 .
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establishment o f Air Defense System43 through bilateral talks with the member states
produced positive outcomes for Russia except, Azerbaijan and Moldova.44
The effectiveness of CIS has been curbed by the lack o f commitment from the
member states. The lack o f trust in the institution stems from the fact that some member
states joined in the CIS reluctantly under Russian pressure. The Russian pressure on
Azeri and Georgian governments is an indication o f this nature and also an explanation
for the commitment gap.45 In addition to this is also the widespread suspicion on the side
of many CIS member states that CIS is intended to be a mechanism to promote Russian
interests in the region. The Ukrainian opposition to CIS along with Azerbaijan and
Georgia mainly concentrated on the possibility o f integration under CIS to replace Soviet
Union. Ukraine’s suspicion and resistance is considered to be one o f the main obstacles
for Russia to advance its interests and policies within CIS and prevented the development
o f CIS as a more viable regional organization. Compared to the other international
organizations, the commitment gap and the involuntary membership present a big
differentiation.
Another important difference between the CIS and other international
organizations is the fact that CIS states and especially Russia failed to develop a
43 K yrgyz D e fen se M inister Ism ail Isakov praises “T he R ussian party's assistance in the fram ework o f the
CIS U n ified A ir D efen se S ystem is o f great im portance for our republic. The K yrgyz A ir D efen se Forces
have received m ilitary-technical assistance totaling 15 m illion rubles ($ 5 5 7 ,0 3 0 ) by n o w .” “K yrgyzstani
M inister Praises Air D e fe n se C ooperation w ith R ussia,” A g en tstvo Voyennykh N o vo stey, R eported in
In terfax-T 08:46:05Z , 12 M ay 2 0 0 6 . “A n agreem ent to set up a single regional air d efen se system for
R ussia and B elarus w ill be signed late in 2 0 0 6 , said the state secretary o f the Belarusian Security C ouncil,
V iktor Sheim an.” (“R ussia-B elarus C om m on Air D efen se D ea l to B e Sign ed Late 2 0 0 6 ,” InterfaxT 13:44:29Z , 21 Septem ber 2 0 0 6 . S ee also “R ussia C om pletes D eliv ery o f S -3 0 0 A ir D e fen se S ystem s to
B elarus,” Interfax, 2 9 M ay 2 0 0 6 .
44 “Crash o f the C om m onw ealth B eg in s w ith D isintegration o f D efen se Structures: R ussia's C losest
M ilitary A llies Are L eavin g,” FBIS T ra n sla ted Text T 14:42:05Z , N e za v isim a y a G a zeta , 31 A u gu st 2 005.
45 Speaking about the CIS, Y ushchenko said that today it is “a m achine w hich w as produced w ith such
great effort, but it g iv e s so little steam . H e said that its co efficien t o f ben eficial action is sign ifican tly low er
than the results w hich w ere expected. This is a fact w hich o b v io u sly every state is adm itting.” “Ukrainian,
G eorgian Presidents N o te N eed for 'E conom ic Rationale' in C IS.”
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comprehensive and universally recognizable set o f rules and policies to govern the
interstate relationship within the organization. The absence of a clear rules and
regulations left the member states unchecked and each of the member states acted in line
with their national interests. The reluctance to vest trust and sovereignty in CIS
management rendered the institution powerless when it comes to the enforcement o f the
mutual agreements and treaties.46
A vast divergence in the policies and expectations o f the CIS members also
contributed to the failure o f the organization while some Central Asian states inclined
towards Russia, some other states perceived that it is in their best interest to align with
Western states. For example, Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko said “the
pooling of efforts within the scope o f the Commonwealth o f Independent States is a
movement in the right direction. The pooling o f our efforts, resources and production
capacities, the strengthening o f cooperation in the international sphere benefits our
peoples.47 The split has seriously affected the policies o f the member states not to invest
too much in the CIS but rather look towards the W est48 Russian Deputy Foreign Minister
Grigory Karasin, in an interview with Rossiiskaya Gazeta, indicates this split within the

46 E xistence o f an enforcem ent m echanism increases the chances o f an organization to be m uch more
effective. Com pared to U N and Security C ouncil for exam ple, the relevant article o f the U N Charter g iv es
to the Security C ouncil both conciliatory and coercive pow ers. T he Security C ouncil can try to settle the
problem s b etw een the states by m eans o f negotiation, enquiry, m ediation, arbitration, ju d icial settlem ent or
regional as w e ll as other p eacefu l m eans o f their ch oice. In ca se o f a direct threat, to the p eace, the Security
C ouncil m ay leg a lly take stronger action, but the prerequisite for a strong action is that all m em bers should
d ecid e that the matter indeed threaten the peace (A rticle 3 9). T he Security C ouncil can also recom m end
tem porary m easures or m ove directly to a call on m em bers to apply diplom atic and econ om ic sanctions
(A rticle 4 0 , 4 1 ). T he Security C ouncil has the right to use armed forces provided by the m em bers o f the U N
(A rticle 4 2 , 4 3 ).
47 “Belarusian President Supports P oolin g o f CIS E fforts,” 1T A R -T A SS-T 13:40:30Z , 11 January 2 0 0 6 .
48 G eorgian D e fen se M inister Giorgi B aram idze told reporters in T bilisi that he w ould not be attending a
session o f the cou n cil o f C om m onw ealth o f Independent S tates’ (C IS) D e fen se M inisters scheduled for
today in M o sco w . B aram idze ju stified this d ecision b y tellin g reporters on W ednesday that the CIS is
“yesterd ay’s history,” and that G eorgia’s future w as “ in cooperation w ith N A T O D efen se M inisters.”
“G eorgian D efen se M inister D e fie s C IS,” IS N S E C U R IT Y WATC, 25 N ovem b er 2 0 0 4 . A vailab le [O nline]:
< http ://w w w .isn .ch /n ew s/sw /d etails.cfm ?ID = T 0230> [25 April 2 0 0 6 ],
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organization. “Numerous media reports that predict the imminent collapse o f the CIS
have appeared recently. Perhaps, I will disappoint you, but my first impressions regarding
the situation in the Commonwealth are much more optimistic.”49 Azerbaijan, Georgia,
Ukraine and Moldova are prime examples for anti-Russian, pro-Western states within
CIS.50 The extension o f the Peace for Partnership to the Caucasus and the Caspian region
could be viewed from this perspective. The desire o f Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia and
Azerbaijan to be a part o f NATO alliance in the future is a clear indication o f the huge
split between pro-Russian and pro-Western groups.51

GUAM AND THE REGIONAL COOPERATION IN THE CASPIAN SEA
The development o f GUAM as an organization characterizes the major split
within the CIS. GUAM is an acronym that stands for “Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and
Moldova.” One thing that is common among these states is the opposition to Russian
efforts for unification and integration under CIS to replace the former Soviet Union.52 It
is also the fact that three o f these four states are the victims o f direct Russian involvement
in their internal affairs and in the ethnic conflicts in their territories.

49 “R ussia A gain st ‘Forced D em ocratization ’ o f C IS,” IN T E R F A X -T 08:03:53Z, 16 A ugust 2 0 0 5 .
50 Belarusian president criticized the G U A M countries’ m o v e w ith regard to creating another unit that
w ould undermine CIS. H e said that “the situation is different in Ukraine and G eorgia. T he leaders o f som e
countries g o still farther in den yin g the p ositive role o f the CIS. U sin g the slogan s on quitting the CIS, and
setting up alternative association s, they are trying to w in points from their foreign patrons. “Belarusian
President Supports P oolin g o f CIS E fforts,” IT A R -T A S S -T 13:40:30Z , 11 January 2 0 0 6 .
51 M oldovan President V ladim ir V oronin said on 19 Septem ber that he w as disappointed by the d ecision
adopted by R ussia, K azakhstan, U kraine, and B elarus at the Y alta sum m it o f the C om m onw ealth o f
Independent States (C IS) to set up a S in gle E con om ic Space betw een the four countries, F lux and A FP
reported. V oronin said the d ecisio n w ill w ithout doubt lead to “a depreciation o f the CIS stock ” and, as a
result, M old ova is lik ely to “step up our efforts to jo in the E U .” In a statem ent released by the presidential
o ffice , V oronin said the four countries' d ecisio n sh ow s “the p o ssib le m odernization o f the CIS has been
abandoned for g o o d .” RFE/RL N ew slin e 7, no. 180, 2 2 Septem ber 2 0 0 3 .
52 “G U A M C ountries U nited by C om plaints against R u ssia,” R o ssiysk a ya G azeta, 2 D ecem b er 1997, 7
reported in F B IS -S O V -9 7 -3 3 7 , 3 D ecem b er 1997.
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The roots o f the establishment o f GUAM go back to 1996 where the leaders of
Georgia, Azerbaijan and Ukraine came up with the idea to resist Russia and benefit from
a possible oil boom in the Caspian Sea.53 Moldova joined in this group later in 1997. The
main idea behind this new establishment was “to have a western oriented integration
project of their own, built largely around efforts to create a ‘Eurasian Corridor’ of
highways, railroads and pipelines running form China to Europe in circumventing
Russia.”54
The members of GUAM have been careful in their policies not to antagonize
Russia. From the very beginning they have stated that the GUAM is purely an economic
union aimed at increasing trade relations and establishing areas o f cooperation in
transportation and commerce. They have also made it very clear that this initiative was
not directed in anyway at Russia. Speaking at a joint news conference with Georgian
President Mikheil Saakashvili in Kiev on Friday 25 March, Yushchenko said that “today
we are saying this: we are not leaving the CIS. Ukraine is ready to support all the rational
parts of this project.”55
In 1999, the member states o f GUAM met in Washington DC to clarify their
shared concerns and willingness to increase cooperation within GUAM. This has taken
place in the United States at the NATO’s 50th anniversary summit. This has indicated a
U.S. involvement in the process or at least an American support for the GUAM countries.
This has caused grievances for Russia as the American involvement in the CIS region has

53 H ale, “Independence and Integration in the Caspian B a sin ,” 181.
54 Ibid..
55 “Ukrainian, G eorgian Presidents N o te N eed for ‘E con om ic R ation ale’ in C IS.”
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been perceived as a threat to Russian interests.56 GUAM Member states have sought
some sort o f NATO link between NATO and GUAM in the areas o f security.57
However, the advancement o f GUAM as an organization in the areas o f security created
some concerns on the Russian side. Michael Waller argues that, “the existence o f GUAM
and the growing U.S. military presence in Central Asia after 11 September 2001 were
instrumental in the creation o f the Organization o f the Agreement on Collective Security
(ODKB) in Dushanbe in Tajikistan on 28 April 2003.”58
Uzbekistan also joined GUAM for a brief period and the name o f the organization
was changed to GUUAM. Because of the other issues of consideration Uzbekistan
decided to leave the institution in June 2002 claiming that GUUAM has been ineffective
as a security institution.59 “Less is better; yes, better, after Uzbekistan's departure, we will
not become more passive” said the head o f Georgia's Foreign Affairs Ministry, Irakli
Menagarishvili. “But we consider Uzbekistan an important partner and hope for its
return.”60 One o f the key aspects o f the GUAM is the bringing o f the Western countries
and institutions into the region to counter the Russian power and influence.61 Azerbaijan

56 Aleksandr D u gin et al., “G row ing, U n w elco m e U .S . Intrusion seen in C IS,” The C u rren t D ig e s t o f the
P o st-S o v ie t P re ss 57, no. 16 (M ay 2005): 1 -4 .
57 G U A M countries also considering a G U A M P eacekeeping force to be dep loyed w ithin the territories o f
G U A M countries. “G U A M C onsidering Creating a P eacek eep in g Force— A zeri M inister,” InterfaxT 13:01:07Z , 31 M ay 2 0 0 6 .
58 M ichael W aller, R ussian P o litic s T oday: The R etu rn o f a T radition (M anchester, N e w York: M anchester
U niversity Press, 2 0 0 5 ), 2 5 9 . T he agreem ent revived a treaty dating from 1992 that in volved R ussia,
Belarus, A rm enia, K azakhstan, K yrgyzstan and Tajikistan (T he C ollectiv e Security Treaty). The new
O rganization had the sam e m em bership. In its n ew form it has its ow n budget, secretariat, m ilitary sta ff
and rapid deploym ent force. Its main m ilitary base is at the Kant airfield in K yrgyzstan.
59 It is m ainly the R ussian anger that the Central A sian states had to consider sin ce their dependence on
R ussia far ex ceed s the C aucasus states.
60 “G U A M M em ber Foreign M inisters M eet in B aku to R ev iew C ourse after K arim ov D ecisio n ,” Baku
Zerkalo, 3 July 2 0 0 2 .
61 R ussia is opposed to the idea o f dem ocratizing CIS nations against their w ill and is concerned that such
m ethods could lead to instability and a grow th o f extrem ism , D ep u ty Foreign M inister G rigory Karasin said
in an interview w ith R ossiisk aya G azeta published on T uesday. “W e do not think that other international
players cannot have their sp ecific interests in CIS states, but w e cannot agree w ith any m ethods o f ‘forced
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has especially been very active in this realm

and sought for direct support from the

United States and NATO for the protection o f the oil pipelines and the security o f the
region.63
With members continuing to improve relations with each other,64 GUAM
continues to be an important institution for its members to cooperate on varieties o f issue
including the development and transportation o f Caspian oil.65 Azeri President Ilham
Aliyev responded to questions about the organization saying that “the organization
(GUAM) is assuming new forms. It is developing. We hope for fruitful work and expect
the summit to give even stronger impetus to the development o f our ties.”66 The desire o f
the member states to use GUAM actively stems from the fact that member states see it as
a useful tool to counter Russian imperialistic policies in the territories o f the former
Soviet Union. Compared to CIS, GUAM enjoyed a high level o f commitment by the

D em ocratization ’ in the form er S o v iet republics— w hether it be ‘colored revolu tion s’ or m edia and political
pressure on th ose w h o rule th ose countries,” he said. “It w ill inevitably lead to destabilization in the region
and a surge in extrem ism ,” Karasin said. R ussia has its ow n interests in form er S o v iet republics and w ill
defend th ese interests, the deputy m inister said “R ussia A gain st ‘Forced D em ocratization ’ o f CIS— D eputy
M inister.”
62 “A zerbaijan W ants M ore C ooperation W ithin G U A M — Foreign M inister,” In terfa x -T 1 4 :4 8 :4 7Z , 2
D ecem ber 2 0 0 5 .
63 “M oldovan President: G U A M M ust Draft A greem ent on C ooperation with E U ,” In terfax-T 14:48:47Z , 23
M ay 2 0 0 6 .
64 G eorgian President M ikhail Saakashvili said at a G U A M sum m it in K y iv on T uesday that “W e are
creating an organization w h ich w ill have viable m echanism s. R egrettably, the CIS has not accom p lish ed its
m ission . M o ld o va and G eorgia are having d ifficu lty transporting their cargoes. C ooperation in co llectiv e
security has not taken place either. A ll G U A M m em ber-states are prepared to cooperate in eco n o m ic and
security issu es and in the fight against separatism and terrorism. W e need this project from a com m ercial
standpoint. H ow ever, w hen it co m es to p olitics, it is ab solu tely essen tial.” “G U A M B eco m in g E ffective
International O rgan ization -S aak ash vili,” In terfax-T 13:39:49Z , 23 M ay 2 0 0 6 .
65 “G U A M C ountries to D isc u ss E nergy Security,” IT A R -TA SS-T 17:23:07Z, 14 February 2 0 0 6 .
66 A sked about energy projects A liy e v said: “N o sp ecific n ew projects are in m ind. W e are currently
involved o n ly in research.”
“G U A M D ev elo p in g D yn am ically— A zeri President,” In terfax-2 0 0 6
T 12:40:48Z , 2 2 M ay 2 0 0 6 .
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member states but the availability o f economic, political and military resources within the
institutions hampered the effectiveness o f the institution.67
On the other hand, the voluntary membership and the constructive efforts o f the
member states to improve GUAM increase the chances o f this organization to be
successful in its realm in the future. Although the potential for GUAM to expand is very
limited, the institution may continue to play a limited role in the Caspian-Caucasus area.
GUAM’s success will depend on its ability to bring external powers (United States and
Western States) into the region.68

OSCE AND THE CASPIAN REGION
OSCE is one of the other organization that have been involved in the
developments in the region starting with the break up o f the Soviet Union and the
acceleration o f the ethnic conflicts.69 OSCE has actively been involved in the settlement
of disputes among Azerbaijan and Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians and pursued a policy of
mediation in the armed conflict between Abkhazia and Georgia. With its organizational
structure and membership, OSCE is different from CIS and GUAM. OSCE is comprised
o f a large membership across Europe, Russia, Caucasus and the Central Asia. OSCE
enjoyed a high level o f legitimacy and neutrality in its mediation efforts in the Caucasus
57 R ovsen Ibrahimov, “T R A C E C A Programi ve Onun A zerbaycan Iqtisadiyyatinin Inkisafindaki R olu ,”
N asireddin T u si’nin 800 Y illik Jubilesi icin D u zen len m is K onferans, A zerbaycan B eyn elxalk q U niversiteti,
B aki, 2 -3 N isan 2 0 0 1 .
68 G U A M countries searching for options that w o u ld in v o lv e the W estern institutions to the region. “A new
m ilitarized form ation claim in g the role o f c h ie f CIS peacekeeper w ill soon appear in the p o st-S o v iet area.
T his w as declared in T b ilisi late last w eek at a m eetin g held by representatives o f m ilitary departm ents o f
G U A M (G eorgia, U kraine, A zerbaijan, and M old ova) m em ber states. In this respect, the G eorgian D efen se
M inistry noted that creation o f an inter-state p eacek eep in g battalion stem s from the plans o f G U A M
countries to participate jo in tly in p eacek eep in g and humanitarian operations conducted under the aegis o f
the CIS, O SC E, N A T O , and the E U .” Svetlana G am ova, “G U A M States D iscu ss CIS P eacek eep in g Unit;
U nrecogn ized R ep u b lics O p p osed ,” In terfax-T 14:56:37Z : N e za visim a y a G a zeta , 2 2 A u gu st 2 0 0 6 .
69 T he details o f O S C E ’s m ediation efforts have been covered in the previous chapter. H ere the focu s w ill
be more on its inability to contribute to interstate cooperation as an institution in the Transcaspian region.
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and in other areas that OSCE has involved. Compared to the advantageous position of
OSCE and the relative availability o f resources, its success has been limited in the
Caucasus-Caspian region.
One o f the issue areas that OSCE has been put to test is the internal conflicts in
the Transcaucasus region. OSCE pursued a policy o f mediation in the conflict between
Azerbaijan and Armenia and provided assistance to the settlement o f the disputes within
Georgia. OSCE’s failure in bringing a settlement among the parties to the conflict is
related to varieties of reasons; some of which are directly or indirectly related to the
structure o f the OSCE itself. Despite the OSCE’s large membership and neutrality,
OSCE lacked a mechanism to enforce any kind o f settlement on the conflicting parties.
Unlike CIS where Russia enjoyed a great level o f comfort in pressuring the opposing
parties towards certain directions, OSCE had to rely on the goodwill o f the warring
factions to resolve their issues and come to a compromise. This has made OSCE nothing
but an advisory mechanism such that Azeris and Armenians were in total freedom to
listen or to ignore. Under these circumstances, Azerbaijan and the Armenians of
Nagorno-Karabakh acted in line with their national interests and avoided making any
kind of compromise that would open ways for the resolution of the conflict. In addition to
the irreconcilable policies and attitudes o f the parties in conflict, OSCE had hard time in
controlling Russia in its pursuit o f unilateral policies to find a solution to the issues at
hand. The absence of congruity among the members o f OSCE towards a solution to the
conflict and the Russian efforts to remain as an influential power in the region by being
the one who could broker a ceasefire prevented OSCE from achieving a settlement to the
disputes and made OSCE ineffective in the affairs o f the Caspian region. It would be an
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incomplete analysis to declare OSCE as an organization that has failed in Transcaucasus
region without referring to the existence o f interstate rivalry and competition for
influence over the region and the active involvement o f external powers to impose their
orders that serve their interests best.

OSCE MINSK GROUP AND MEMBERS
In 1994, cease-fire between Azerbaijan and Armenia did not bring permanent
solution to the crises in the region. The United States and some western countries favored
a complete solution that would guarantee long-term stability in the region especially for
oil business to function/move on smoothly. On the other hand, the Russian view of
stability was different from that of United States and as long as Russia maintained strong
foothold in the region, occasional disruptions o f stability or conflicts did not constitute a
big problem. This way Russia would always use these developments to consolidate its
position in the Caspian Region. These fundamental differences in understanding and
expectations gave rise to series o f disagreements within OSCE Minsk Group’s effort to
bring permanent peace to Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Mediation attempts in 1997 and
the developments have shown that the effectiveness o f institutions or regimes depended
on the willingness o f the members to make certain compromises. Besides, the issue was
not only to bring peace to warring parties but also who would bring it and under what
conditions peace could be brokered. France in some occasions sided with Russia and
without informing the United States; they invited Yerevan and Baku to Moscow to
discuss the terms of a final resolution. In other occasions, members o f the Minsk Group
displayed different views/concerns about the peacekeeping forces that were to be
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deployed. In the end misunderstandings, security and relative gain concerns have
precluded OSCE from becoming effective in the solution o f Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.
Continuation o f the wars and conflicts directly prevented the development o f oil industry
in the region by rendering the interstate cooperation less likely, leaving the regional
stability in question. One o f the reasons that the efforts o f Minsk Group could not
produce expected outcome is the existence o f strong relative gain considiration between
Azerbaijan and Armenia. Although no one was satisfied with the status quo, they did not
want to deteriorate their position by making further compromises. Armenian main
concern is the possibility that Azerbaijan would profit from oil business and start
speaking from a military strength. Azerbaijan, on the other hand, felt itself as a victim of
aggression and did not want to let go o f the occupied territories that would weaken
Azerbaijan. Therefore any compromise each side was offered to make was perceived as
if the other side would exploit a relative gain to its advantage. 70
Regardless o f what had actually happened in the complex interstate rivalry in the
Transcaucasus and the Caspian region, the OSCE could not help to the achievement of
interstate cooperation in the Caspian region.71 The OSCE mission in the Caspian region
in the areas of democracy humanitarian aid, human rights and displaced persons provided
certain level o f success but far from achieving a considerable level o f change in the
policies o f regional states.

79

The contribution o f the OSCE to peace and interstate

70 N eorealist G rieco w ou ld su g g est that fear o f survival im peded the cooperation b etw een tw o states and
rendered the international initiative in effective.
A s neorealists w ould also su ggest, the absence o f
sanctioning m echanism m akes the international institutions ineffective, as in the case o f O SC E M insk
Group.
71 Em in Erturk, E kon om ik E n teg ra syo n T eo risi ve Turkiyenin lc in d e B ulundugu E n teg ra sy o n la r (Bursa:
E zgi K itabevi Y ayinlari, 1993).
72 D etails o f O SC E m ission in the Transcaucasus region can be found O nline at: T he O rganization for
Security and C o-operation in Europe (O SC E ), “R egions: C aucasus,”
< h ttp ://w w w .osce.org/region s/13001.h tm l> [22 Septem ber 2 0 0 6 ],
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cooperation in the region is yet to be seen but will largely depend on the willingness of
the member states to comply with OSCE policies and proposals and the consolidation of
OSCE’s hand by the major powers in the region.

INTERNATIONAL REGIMES AND OIL DEVELOPMENT IN THE CASPIAN SEA
Development of oil resources in the Caspian region requires a certain level of
interstate cooperation. We have considered varieties of factors that contributed or
prevented the achievement o f cooperation over the development o f oil industry. Apart
from the international institutions which have affected the courses o f the developments in
the region, and in a very limited way, contributed to interstate cooperation, existence or
absence o f international regimes may have affected the developments as well.
Regime analysis has been used for the last three decades to explore the patterns o f
state cooperation on different issue areas; ranging from aviation to environment and to
security. The discussions centered on the role o f the regimes to create a normative
framework to deal with specific issues and to achieve cooperation. We define regimes as
“set of implicit and explicit rules principles, rules and norms and decision making
procedures around which actor’s expectation converge in a given area o f international
relations.”

73

«

Since the international regimes can involve multiplicity o f issues, actors,

rules and decision-making procedures they can happen to be different from each other. It
might be the reason that we have a wide range o f arguments and point of views about
international regimes. While most o f the scholars, belonging to different schools, agree
on the possibility of success and cooperation in environmental and economic realms, the

73 Stephen D . Krasner, “ Structural C auses and R egim e C on seq u en ces,” in In tern a tio n a l R eg im es, ed.
Stephen D . Krasner (Ithaca: C ornell U n iversity Press, 1983), 2.
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role of the regimes in security arena is quite controversial. The discussion is mainly
between the scholars o f Neo-realism and Neo-liberalism as to whether the regimes are
autonomous actors in international politics or the extension and reflection o f states’
policies. Since the initial premises take us to different ends, both schools happen to be
advocating the extreme point of views, although they agree on the basic elements of
international system, which are the existence of anarchy and the importance o f states’
interaction at systemic level.
The supporters o f the international regimes emphasize their roles as a mediator to
achieve cooperation among states on different issue areas. Although it goes long to cover
the whole dimensions of the discussions on the possibility of cooperation and the
conditions under which it is more likely, we may give a short description o f the role of
international regimes in international politics to provide a preliminary insight into the
discussions.
Scholars o f international relations argue that regimes can serve many purposes to
help to the achievement o f cooperation.74 The first one is the mitigation o f the systemic
effects of anarchy, which is accepted to be a constraint on state behavior.75 Existence of
security dilemma and the relative/absolute gain analysis, which emerges out o f anarchy,
hinders the attainment o f international cooperation. Another factor is the absence o f a
world government to enforce the states to act according to certain rules and principles.
Under these conditions, we might easily conclude that cooperation seems to be less likely

74 R egim es constrain and regularize the behavior o f participants, affect w hich issu es am ong protagonists
m ove on and o f f agendas, determ ine w hich activities are legitim ized or condem ned, in fluence w hether
w hen and h ow co n flicts are resolved. D onald J. Puchala and R aym ond F. H opkins, “International R egim es:
L esson s from Inductive A n a ly sis” in In tern a tio n a l R egim es, ed. Stephen D . Krasner (Ithaca: Cornell
U niversity Press, 1983), 62.
75 O ye, ed., C o o p era tio n un der A n arch y, 11.
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under the systemic effects of security dilemma. The neo-liberal contention is that
regimes can facilitate cooperation by ameliorating anarchy. It is generally accepted that,
regimes provide transparency by increasing the availability of information and exchange
of it through the mechanisms o f the regime, which decreases the negative perceptions of
the states against each other.

7 ft

The third element that is made possible by the

establishment o f the regimes is the decreasing transaction costs. Under normal
conditions, it might take long to come together and create an environment for
cooperation. What regimes do is to provide a forum where states can easily communicate
with each other, which might increase the likelihood o f cooperation.77 The last one is the
possibility that regimes can provide issue linkage and can lengthen the shadow of
future.78 As the functionalists argue, linking different issues with each other can create a
spill over effect. Cooperation in one area can produce further cooperation on other areas.
In this context, what regime can provide is to initiate a process o f cooperation in some
areas that would spread to other areas in the future. These are the basic assumptions
about what regimes might provide to help to the attainment o f a certain level of
cooperation among the participating states.
The Realist argument contends that, cooperation through establishment of
international regimes is not likely to be successful and last long. The main reason for this
is the existence o f relative gain concerns and possibility o f cheating. Since states are
taken to be autonomous actors making cost-benefit analysis and pursuing pure national
interests, it is hard to bring them into a regime where they have to yield some
sovereignty. States are quite sensitive about their sovereignty, preservation o f their
76 Ibid., 2 0 ,
77 K eohane, A fter H egem on y.
78 M ilner, “International T heories o f C ooperation A m o n g N ations: A R ev iew E ssa y ,” 4 6 6 -9 6 .

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

212
territorial integrity and assuring their security through acquisition o f power. These lead
them to be highly suspicious about the agreements and negotiations concerning these
issues. Charles Lipson gives two reasons that why states are highly concerned about
cooperating on security issues.
•

The immediate and potentially grave losses to a player who attempts to
cooperate without reciprocation; and

•

The risks associated with inadequate monitoring o f other’s decisions and
actions.

70

The points stated above reflects the fact that, the distribution o f power and the
global hierarchy is an important element o f regime creation and maintenance. As in the
formation o f regime, the maintenance o f the regime also presents same patterns of
on

relationship.

Most of the scholars of international relations consider the influence of

hegemon as an important driving factor behind regimes. It both helps to the creation and
ni

the maintenance o f the regime.

Those other states whose interests are not in line with

the basic principles o f the regime might prefer to remain silent due to the fact that a short
or long term benefit o f compliance is more than non-compliance.

79 Charles L ipson, “International C ooperation in E con om ic and Security A ffairs,” in N eo rea lism a n d
N eo lib era lism : The C o n tem p o ra ry D eb a te, ed. D avid A . B ald w in (N ew York: C olum bia U n iversity Press,
1993).
80 A s Arthur A . Stein puts it, the sam e factors that explain regim e form ation also explain regim e
m aintenance change and d issolution. R eg im es are maintained as long as the patterns o f interest that gave
rise to them remain. Artur A . Stein, “ C oordination and Coordination: R egim es in an A narchic W orld,” in
In tern a tio n a l R egim es, ed. Stephen D . Krasner (Ithaca: C ornell U n iversity Press, 1983), 137.
81 A s K eohane explains, “the form ation o f international regim es norm ally depend on h egem on y and the
m aintenance o f order requires continued h eg em o n y .” K eohane, A fter H egem on y, 3 1 , 49.
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CASPIAN OIL AND REGIME FORMATION
Neoliberals argue that international regimes through several mechanisms increase
the likelihood o f cooperation. In the case o f the legal status o f the Caspian Sea, we have
seen a clear absence of implicit or explicit rules or norms governing the state behavior.
As the parties involved in the game pursued their own interests without considering the
other options that were less favorable to them, it has become more and more difficult to
adhere to certain rules and norms. The only rule that has been said to exist in the Caspian
oil was the upholding commercial rules. In many cases the United States and other states
affirm their adherence to commercial rules that they would pursue options that are
•

commercially more sound.

82

It could be the fact that zero-sum thinking prevented the

adherence and further establishment o f international regimes and norms. The OSCE
summit in Istanbul in 1999 is an example to this. Although it was supposed to contribute
to the establishment o f more friendly relations among countries and to create an
environment in which actors could negotiate their differences, it became an arena for
direct confrontation between Washington and Moscow. The chances for international
cooperation deteriorated and tension increased between opposing blocks. Under these
conditions, states pursued their options and used available resources to bring other parties
onboard. Turkish American front was able to get Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Georgian
support while Moscow and Iran remained opposed to the U.S.-led coalition. These
developments can easily be explained by the Neorealist approach as states in anarchic

82 T he on ly norm that w as supposed to guide the oil business in the Caspian region w as the adherence to
com m ercial viab ility that so m e statesm en from tim e to tim e referred to. H ow ever, as it has been seen in the
p olicies and inclinations o f the states, despite the com m ercial dictations, states pursued their ow n interests.
A clear exam ple to this is the U .S . p o licy tow ards Iran to exclu d e Iran from all oil deals despite the fact that
som e projects could have been more profitable i f they had been pursued as proposed by som e oil
com panies and Iranian governm ents.
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environment pursue self-interest policies and conflict with each other. Our discussion on
regimes, however, only represent the time around which the discussions on the legal
status of the Caspian Sea took place. As the time passed, the geopolitical considerations
and interstate relationships have also changed. The mistrust and competition that
characterized these times did not prevail all along the other developments in the Caspian
region. However, it would be safe to say that, up until the time o f the legal status issue no
international regimes were in place.
One o f the issues that is related to regime analysis is the legal status o f the
Caspian Sea and the conflict among the riparian states. The confusion over the status of
the Caspian Sea hampered the development o f oil industry for a long period o f time.
After the break up of the Soviet Union, the number o f the coastal states increased to five
giving rise to the emergence o f a new discussion regarding the use and management of
the sea.83 The Caspian Sea has been used jointly between Iran and USSR for the last
seventy years. No clear regime has ever existed nor the coastal states attempted to
develop a common ground for the management and exploitation o f the sea resources.
The arrival o f the new states and their enthusiasms about the use of oil resources under
Caspian Sea sparked a long controversy among the riparian states. The main issue of
contention centered on the legal status o f the sea and the issue o f delimitation versus
condominium. While powerful states o f Caspian Sea favored a regime o f condominium,
•

the newly independent states pushed for delimitation.

84

Condominium is a system of

management through which the issues in a particular area is governed by the participation

83 For more on the controversy am ong the riparian states, see D ekm ejian and Sim onian, T ro u b led W aters.
84 Cynthia M .C roissant and M ich ael P. Croissant, “T he L egal Status o f the C aspian Sea: C on flict and
C om prom ise,” in O il a n d G e o p o litic s in the C a sp ia n S ea R egion , ed. M ichael P. C roissant and B illen t Aras
(W estport, CT: Praeger, 1999), 25.
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Of

of each member state on an equal basis.

Delimitation refers to the demarcation o f the

borders among the coastal states where each state can enjoy complete freedom and
O /-

sovereignty over their shares.

Initially, Russia and Iran favored condominium over

delimitation since the regime o f joint governance would provide them a better
environment in which they can use their preponderance o f power over other states. The
newly independent states o f the Caspian Sea pushed for delimitation to escape Russian
and Iranian domination and also to be able to develop their oil resources freely.87
In addition to the political choices o f the coastal states, the economic benefits
attached to the division o f the sea also affected the developments and interstate
relationships. The division o f the sea, on the basis o f a median line, would provide
unequal percentage o f the sea to the Caspian states, instead of an expected 20 percent
share among five coastal states. As Geoffrey Kemp notes, Iran has a strong interest in
claiming a share o f the seabed beyond its own sector because the main oilfields lie in the
middle o f the Caspian Sea. The least promising waters are those off Iran.88
The main differences among the Caspian states continued to be a problem up to
day with varying degrees of change in the attitudes o f some of the member states. Due to
the changes in the international and regional political and economic environment, the
strong Russian behavior has changed and some bilateral agreements have been reached,
especially in the northern part o f the sea. The southern part of the sea remains to be an

85 Iran's lon g-recogn ized sector o f the Caspian Sea covers 12 percent to 14 percent o f its surface area. The
collap se o f the U S S R has changed neither the size nor the status o f the Iranian sector. H ow ever, Iran n ow
dem ands either a condom inium (or jo in t sovereign ty) that w ou ld a llo w it to claim equal proceeds from all
energy d evelop ed at the sea bed, regardless o f its investm ent in that d evelopm ent or the expansion o f its
sector to at least 20 percent o f the surface area and seabed. That territory includes part o f the oil-rich
A zerbaijani sector. A riel C ohen, “Iran's C laim over Caspian Sea R esources Threaten E nergy Security.”
86 For details o f the legal dispute, see H orton and M em ed ov, “L egal Status o f the Caspian S ea.”
87 Osman N uri A ras, A zera y ca n ’in H a za r E kon om isi ve S tra te jisi (Istanbul D er Y ayinlari, 2 0 0 1 ), 1 7 5 -2 0 6 .
88 G eoffrey K em p, “Iran and Caspian E nergy,” 57.
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issue o f contention and Iran stands firm on its original position on the legal status o f the
Caspian Sea.89
As we have indicated above, the creation or development o f regimes would have
helped to the achievement of interstate cooperation on conflicting issues. In the case of
Caspian Sea and the issue of the legal status o f the Caspian Sea, no regime has been
created by the coastal states. Therefore the inability of the Caspian states to create a
viable regime in the Caspian Sea might have undermined cooperation on the regional
issues including the development o f the Caspian oil resources.

CONCLUSIONS
The success or failure o f International Institutions in promoting peace and
interstate cooperation is not universal. The experience o f IOs in Europe is definitely
different than in the Transcaucasian world. There are indeed vast differences between
two regions. The political, economic, cultural and geographical differences may lead to
different outcomes in terms of the success or failure o f IOs.
The Caspian-Caucasian states have been under Russian control for centuries. Just
after the dissolution o f the Soviet Union these states started to interact within an
international environment as an independent actor. Compared to the European countries,
their experience in international politics and diplomacy is very limited. Only after two
deadly world wars European countries started investing on international institutions as a
guarantor o f peace and security. Their experience with each other and the destructiveness
o f the wars in Europe have had dramatic impacts on the minds o f the European leaders.
The newly independent states o f the Caspian and the transcaucasian states lack these
89 Aras, A zera yc a n 'in H a za r E kon om isi v e S tra tejisi, 198.
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experiences and are not ready to rely on International Institutions for their security.
Apart from the other factors mentioned in this chapter, this has tremendously reduced the
chances o f IOs to become an effective instrument in the settlement o f disputes.
In Triangulating Peace, Bruce Russet and John R. Oneal explain three important
aspects of Kantian Peace; Democracy, Interdependence, and International Organizations
all o f which are available in the European context. The concept o f democracy is very
new to the countries o f Caspian Sea. Although we can observe a certain level of
interdependent relationship among the countries o f the Caspian Sea, it is far from being a
factor contributing to peace and stability in the region. Russet and Oneal argue that three
legs of Kantian peace, democracy, economic interdependence and international
organizations generate virtuous cycles o f peace as opposed to vicious cycles o f war.
These three factors also positively affect each other. Existence o f one o f the legs
positively contributes to the success o f other generating a virtuous cycle o f peace.
Among the other factors that have been discussed above, the inability o f the
international and regional institutions in the Transcaucasus to generate peace and
contribute to the development o f the Caspian oil resources might also be explained by the
absence o f the three legs of Kantian Peace.
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CHAPTER VII
CONCLUSIONS

This chapter summarizes the major findings discussed throughout this
dissertation. It also touches upon some o f the issues raised in the previous chapters. This
chapter also ties the major issues discussed in the Caspian region to the current
developments in international arena where applicable.
This dissertation set out to establish a framework through which we would
understand the major issues that affected states’ decision to cooperate or abstain from
cooperation in the Caspian region over the issues related to the development o f Caspian
oil resources. This dissertation explores the underlying reasons behind the lack of
cooperation among the regional and external powers in the Transcaspian region.
Although the extraction and the transportation of Caspian oil has the potential to provide
economic development for the region as a whole and prosperity for the people o f the
Caspian states, Caspian governments have been unable to come up with a framework that
would provide a viable physical and political environment for the development o f the
existing petroleum reserves.
Within the same context, this dissertation also sought to understand the main
reasons behind the slow developments in the Caspian oil industry owing to lack of
cooperation among the states and non-state actors. This is especially important
considering the fact that it has been almost more than a decade and a h alf that the Caspian
states and western oil companies started investing in the oil projects.
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IMPORTANCE OF CASPIAN OIL IN TODAY’S WORLD
Looking at the rate of current oil and gas production in the Caspian Sea region,
one could assert that compared to Middle Eastern oil capacity or to the total oil
production in the World, Caspian region could only contribute a small percentage.1 (See
Table 6.1 and 6.2) It is true that Caspian oil would never be an alternative to Middle
Eastern oil but as many people acknowledge, the Caspian reserves may help to reduce the
dependence on Middle East.2 Diversification o f energy resources is an important element
o f energy security for the whole world. Though a small percentage, Caspian oil could be
a venue for energy diversification for some countries, especially the neighboring states;
i.e. Turkey, China, Japan and Europe.
Apart from the implications o f Caspian oil to the world, one o f the things to
consider is the contribution of Caspian oil to regional development. Most of the Caspian
countries have been suffering from economic problems since their independence from the
Soviet Union. As most of the governments o f these Caspian states foresee, oil and gas is
one of the biggest hope for these countries to fight poverty and underdevelopment. As
the economical and political turmoil dominate the region from time to time with varying
intensity, oil and gas export stands as the best possible option for improvement in all
areas. There is no doubt that money made from oil and gas export play crucial role in the
development o f the Caspian regional states. It could bring prosperity not only to the
exporting states but also to the whole region if the petro-dollars were used for the

11.5 percent currently and 3.0 percent by 2 0 1 0 . B est scenarios predict that Caspian o il could on ly reach up
to 5 percent o f total w orld ’s production by 2 0 1 5 or 2 0 2 0 .
2 G elb and T w ym an, ed s., The C a sp ia n S ea R egion a n d E n erg y R esou rces, 20.
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development and improvement o f the areas that need attention.3 In addition, the use of
oil resources in the ex-soviet states o f Caspian region is crucial for their economic
survival and independence.4
Though it has been said that Caspian oil would not change the balances in world
oil markets, in the light o f the recent developments and the sharply rising oil prices, the
Caspian oil would again prove to be very important. As the demand and the price o f oil
go up, the world is going to need to utilize every possible resource that can be put into the
market. Despite the difficulties o f extraction and transportation, and the political and
security issues related to the Caspian region, we come to realize the fact that international
cooperation is an important factor in realizing the use o f Caspian oil. Although there are
varieties of numerical figures and estimates about Caspian oil reserves, a steady 3 million
barrel by 2010 would have tremendous impact in the oil market. (Although it is below the
Saudi production, it is going to be more than the Kuwaiti production of oil.)5
Three variables have been explored to what extent they can explain the lack of
cooperation. Almost all o f the former Soviet Republics in the Caspian basin are heavily
dependent on the revenues coming from oil exports. (Share of oil and gas in Azeri
exports amounts to 90 percent while it is 80 percent in Turkmenistan and 65 percent in

3 One o f the problem s that the Caspian states had w ith oil driven eco n o m y is the expectation that oil
revenues w ould resolve m ost o f their econ om ical problem s. This expectation prevented them from m aking
substantial reform s in the eco n o m ic area.
4 A rm y M yers, Jaffe and R obert M anning, “The Shocks o f a W orld Cheap o f O il,” F o reig n A ffairs 79, no.
1 (January/February 2 0 00): 2 1 -2 2 .
5 “The Caspian is not and never has been a potential M iddle E ast,” Terry A dam s, a senior associate o f
Cam bridge E nergy R esearch A sso cia tes told the O il and M on ey conference. B ut w ith proven rem aining
recoverable reserves o f 1 5 -2 0 b illion barrels, and a potential for 50 b illion barrels— w hich w ou ld m ake it a
"superior N orth Sea"— the region is a strategically important source o f oil for the European U nion. B y
2 0 2 0 , crude production could reach 5 m illion barrels per day, w hich w ould equal on ly 3% -4% o f w orld
output. (A dam s is a form er head o f B P -led A zerbaijan International Operating C o. (A IO C ).) “Caspian O il
R em ains Crucial to Energy Security for W est,” The O il D a ily 5, no. 2 (N ovem b er 200 1): 11.
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Kazakhstan).6 Development o f an independent and healthy national economy surely rests
on their success to establish a functioning oil industry. In an attempt to answer the main
question asked with reference to the lack o f cooperation among major players in the
Caspian Sea region over the development o f the Caspian oil reserves, the following
variables have been investigated:
•

political rivalry among the regional actors as well as external players over
regional influence and control of oil resources in the Caspian Sea region,

•

armed conflicts and military confrontations that affected the interstate
relations in transcaucasia,

•

and the presence and effectiveness o f international institutions in the Caspian
Sea region.

Among the independent variables studied in this dissertation, geopolitical rivalry
seems to have the highest relevance with respect to the main question asked.
Geopolitical rivalry in this dissertation refers to the establishment o f a zone o f economic,
political and military influence/ control over the region. Political rivalry, on the other
hand, refers to the disagreements among internal and external players over the
development of the Caspian oil resources. Rivalry also differs from conflict in the sense
that it does not involve military confrontation and armed conflict.
Actors inside and outside the region see the region as their sphere o f influence
which makes it hard to cooperate on issues such as oil. The study o f the interstate
relations among the Caspian states and external powers has shown that the policies and
approaches adapted by the major actors in the great game o f the twenty-first century was

6 D ata gathered from W orld Bank Country B riefs and A zerbaijan M inistry o f F inance Fact Sheet.
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mainly guided by relative gain calculations although other sources o f concerns continued
to affect their decisions and policies. This was actually very much consistent with the
realist/neorealist perception o f states as actors in international arena interacting with other
states on the basis o f national interests focusing more on possibility o f change in the
balance o f power and relative gains.
There are numerous instances where states were more concerned with regional
influence and geopolitical supremacy. On other occasions, some Caspian states were
concerned more with economic and political independence from regional powers. If we
were to categorize this in a general way, we could assert that:
•

Great powers in the Caspian game pursued a policy o f regional domination
and influence, i.e., Russia, Turkey and Iran.

•

Small states in the Caspian Sea region followed a policy promising a more
independent future from regional powers.

This has become especially obvious in the study o f the legal status o f the Caspian Sea and
the issue of pipelines which dominated the political agenda for almost more than a
decade. The impact of national interest guided by relative gain consideration has also
been visible in other areas of interstate relationship in the Caspian Sea as has been shown
in the previous chapters which will also be given due consideration in the coming
sections of the conclusion.
In the Caspian context, the sharing o f the Caspian Sea among the bordering states
after the collapse of the Soviet Union is among the first examples that clearly show the
existence o f national interest as an important impediment to the achievement of
cooperation, which eventually affected the development o f Caspian oil resources. On the
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legal status o f the Caspian Sea as a lake or a sea which changes the rules determining the
sharing o f the sea, each littoral state pushed for an option that would serve their interests
best. The establishment o f an alliance between Russia and Iran against the former Soviet
republics is also an indication o f states pursuing self interest policies to maintain their
superior status in the region. The sharing of the Caspian Sea surface and the seabed has
long remained as an issue o f contention; with each side pushing for their own options.
Since the littoral state could not achieve a common solution regarding the use o f mineral
resources lying under the sea, the Caspian oil industry developed at a rather slow speed
compared to the expectations and the potential that it had to offer to the people in the
region.
Another issue area where pursuing policies to maintain supremacy and secure
their national interests has constituted a great obstacle for the development o f Caspian oil
resources is the issue o f pipelines. Since the Caspian Sea is landlocked, construction of
pipelines to export Caspian oil is the only viable option among the others that proved to
be costly and ineffective in the long run.7 Passing o f the pipelines in certain direction is
an issue o f great concern for the littoral states as well as the neighboring countries. Apart
from the economic benefits attached to the passing o f the pipelines from certain
territories, the issue o f control and influence also dominated the thinking o f the involved
actors.
The Caspian pipeline construction has gone through two different phases. In the
early years of oil production, the Caspian states produced limited amount of oil because
o f the capacity o f the oil wells and the investment needed for the production and the

7 Sw apping o il w ith other o il producers and transporting by railroad are am ong the available options for the
Caspian o il producers.
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transportation o f the oil extracted. The number of players in the first round o f the
negotiations were relatively small compared the second phase that involved a large
number o f state and non-state actors. This has contributed to the achievement o f the
cooperation among the actors positively as the stake at hand was not considered so high.
Looking at the issue from a perspective o f relative vs. absolute gain analysis, each party
focused on what they get and not on what the others might, leaving the chances for
compromise very high. The focus on absolute gain, in the early phases o f negotiations
helped to the continuation o f promising future negotiations for the actors involved in the
pipeline debate. Parties involved in these negotiations basically prepared themselves for
the main export pipelines since the issue at hand was not considered very important. In
fact this has been the focal point of early negotiations for pipelines that each state in the
debate did not focus on relative gain calculations.

Given the state o f international

relations and global anarchic environment, relative gain calculations at that time could
have stalled and eventually killed the prospects for future cooperation on pipeline
negotiations. According to Game Theory, cooperation occurs when the involved actors
expect to retrieve higher gain from mutual then unilateral action. Therefore the benefits
of mutual cooperation (CC) relative to mutual defection (DD) are expected to be higher.
In fact, the capacity o f states to cooperate under anarchy, to obligate themselves to
mutually beneficial courses o f action without resort to any ultimate central authority is
essential to the realization of a common good. 8 In addition to these, under iterated
conditions the magnitude o f the differences among pay offs within a class of games can
be an important determinant o f cooperation. The more substantial the gains from mutual

8 O ye, “E xp lain in g C ooperation under Anarchy: H yp oth esis and Strategies,” 1 -2 4 .
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cooperation (CC-DD), the less substantial the gains from unilateral defection (DC-CD),
the greater the likelihood o f cooperation.9
However, the negotiations for the main export pipelines were different in nature
compared to the negotiations for the early oil pipelines. The stake at hand was
considered high, so was the importance attached to the direction o f the main export
pipeline. Each party feared that a loss in this round would seriously damage their
position in the great game o f Caspian pipeline. Zero-sum thinking dominated the Main
Export Pipeline (MEP) negotiations throughout most o f the decade. In the negotiations
for the MEP, relative gain considerations affected the policies o f individual actors. As
the number of actors in the MEP discussions increased, the chances for a common
solution diminished. Existence o f many o f actors with different agenda and interests
stalled the negotiations rendering the development of Caspian oil industry impossible in
such an environment. Regarding the number o f players in the region and especially in the
MEP discussions, the existence of large number o f players negatively affected the
cooperation scenarios because o f the vast varieties o f interests that many o f them were
conflicting in nature. Considering the other examples o f interstate cooperation in the
Caspian Sea region on the issue of Caspian oil and related issues (i.e. Russia-Kazakhstan
pipeline deal with Chevron oil, Russia-Turkmenistan gas deal, Turkmenistan-Iran oil
swaps, Russia-Turkey Blue Stream Project), we could say that the large number of
players did not contribute to cooperation rather it negatively affected the outcome and led
to competition as it became more and more difficult to reach a compromise among so
many divergent policies and interests especially over a single route pushed mainly by the
US and Turkey.
9 Jervis, “C ooperation under the Security D ilem m a ,” 1 6 7 -2 1 4 .
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While Russia favored a northern route, Iran insisted on the profitability o f the
southern direction for the Caspian oil. Turkey and the United States, on the other hand,
supported a western route, whereas the oil companies wanted to choose among the
shortest and the cheapest option. In such an environment, where we have multiple actors
interacting with fundamentally different and conflicting interests, the cooperation among
the actors and development o f the Caspian oil resources has been quite slow to emerge.
Yet, considering the Russian and Iranian reservations, construction o f Baku-Ceyhan years
after its conception, we may conclude that the cooperation on the MEP has not been
achieved the way it was planned. One o f the issues that complicated the interstate
relationship in the transcaspian region is the competition for political control and
influence in the region. Regional and external powers have long been competing with
each other over the control of the region and maintaining a sphere o f influence.
Russia is one o f the countries that has viewed most of the issues in the region
from a geopolitical perspective. Other than the economic gain and prosperity,
maintaining a Russian control in the Caspian region has shaped the Russian policy
formulations toward the affairs o f the Caspian region. Alongside with Russia, the US,
Turkey and Iran also competed for geopolitical supremacy in the region. While small
states o f the Caspian littoral states mainly concerned about the economics o f the oil
development and independence for their underdeveloped economies, the regional and
external powers focused on the geopolitical aspects o f the regional issues.
Turkey, alongside with the US fought against an Iranian and also a Russian drive for
domination in the region. The fight for regional supremacy has complicated the Caspian
oil development in several ways.
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First, the geopolitical rivalry has made the resolution o f the Caspian affairs much
more difficult because the countries fighting for regional influence started viewing the
Caspian affairs from a broader perspective rather than treating it merely an issue related
to the development o f oil reserves in the Caspian region. The clash between Iran and the
United States is a great example to this. For the United States it was never about
excluding Iran as a Caspian region country from the oil business but dealing with Iran
from a broader historical perspective. The long-lasting animosity between Iran and the
United States reflected itself in the affairs o f the Caspian region. The persistent U.S.
attitude towards Iran and the decision to exclude it from any oil business in the Caspian
Sea is an indication o f a broader controversy between these two nations, The U.S. policy
of containment o f Iran continued in the north and the United States pressured the former
Soviet Republics not to consider Iran as a partner in the oil deals.
The Iranian moves in the Caspian Sea should also be viewed from that angle. Iran
for long tried to break the alliance between the US, oil companies and the littoral states
with different proposals for the transportation o f Caspian oil through Iran. The Iranian
policy in the legal status o f the Caspian Sea also reflects a broader Iranian engagement in
the region, as it is also true for the pipeline negotiations. Preventing the achievement o f a
functioning oil industry in the Caspian Sea and also the establishment o f friendly ties
between the littoral states o f the Caspian Sea and the United States has always been in
Iranian interest. Iran already feels contained by its eternal enemy on many flanks. The
United States has a strong hold in the Middle East, Turkey and Afghanistan.
Establishment of a strong American, presence in Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan was
perceived as a big threat to Iran. Under these conditions, we may better understand the
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moves made by the Iranian governments to disrupt the development o f a U.S. alliance in
the Caspian Sea region. It may also shed light to the recent Iranian involvement in Iraq.
Iran may resort to certain measures in Iraq to prevent the establishment o f a strong US
hold in the country.10
The U.S. and the Russian policies in the Caspian could also be viewed from the
same perspective. Russia feels pressured by the advance of western powers in Europe.
The Expansion o f NATO in Eastern Europe and the loosing o f the old republics one by
one on all sides puts Russia in a tough situation. Feeling that the United States is
advancing on Russia on all sides, Russia tried to increase its presence in the Caspian
region. It has never been all about pipelines or sharing of the Caspian Sea on certain
criteria, but it had a lot to do with the maintenance o f Russian influence in the region.
Russia was not concerned too much about gaining more shares in the Caspian Sea but
these issues have served as a tool for Russia to use against its rivals, the United States and
against its close allies in the region.
The impact o f the geopolitical rivalry in the region has been seen clearly over the
negotiations for the construction o f pipelines. The rise o f competition for control and
influence badly affected the development o f Caspian oil reserves. It has especially slowed
down the investments and mass production o f oil as planned at the beginning.
The construction o f Baku-Ceyhan pipeline is an example to this, that it took more then a
decade to complete a project that has initially been planned to be finished within a few
year.
Among the other factors that contributed to the slow development o f oil industry
in the Caspian region is the military conflicts and wars in the Caspian region. These wars
10 D avid Stout, “P entagon B la m es Iran for B om b s U sed in Iraq A gain st U .S . T roop s,” February 15, 2 0 0 7 .
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directly in some occasions indirectly affected the Caspian Sea oil. There were three
major military conflicts in the Caspian region. The war between Nagorno-Karabakh (NK)
Armenians and Azerbaijan did the most damage to the Caspian Sea oil development
projects.11 From the early days o f the conflict, regional and external powers involved in
the mediation efforts alongside with international institutions. The conflicts in the region
had a potential to spread to the whole region with a massive refugee population that it
created afterwards, leaving the war-torn countries in chaos.
As the people in the war zones fled to safe areas, the involvement of external
powers became inevitable. The war between Azerbaijan and Armenia forced Russia,
Turkey and Iran to involve in the settlement o f disputes. Each party supporting another,
finding a solution to the conflict took many years. The efforts o f Minsk Group under
OSCE have been rendered ineffective because o f the Russian maneuvers. Russia,
seeking to maintain a level o f influence and control in the region, wanted to take the
control o f the issue at hand and at the same time to have a reputation in the region.
External powers, including the United States, approached to the conflict from their own
perspective. While it was a golden opportunity for Russia to establish further control in
the region, the United States and Turkey favored the cessation o f hostilities in order to
start oil projects in the region.
As the interest o f western oil companies increased in the Caspian Sea region, the
U.S involvement in the regional conflicts gained momentum. The conflict in Chechnya
and civil unrests in Georgia are also among the factors that contributed to the instability
o f the Transcaucaus region. This has negatively affected the development o f oil industry
in the region. The Caspian states always needed western investment to start oil
11 T he relevant details o f th ese w ars w ere covered in Chapter V .

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

230

production in the offshore oil wells o f the Caspian Sea. For the foreign investment to
flow into the region, stability had to be established. The oil companies had to wait long
enough for the establishment o f a secure and a stable environment. Only after the signing
o f the agreement between Azerbaijan and NK Armenians, brokered by Russia, oil
companies started to invest in the Caspian Sea oil projects.12
As we indicated earlier, these wars also indirectly affected the prospects for
development in the Caspian region. Limited amount of resources have been used up to
finance these costly wars. These wars also left these countries in ruins and produced
thousands o f refugees, which eventually placed further burden on the respective
governments. In addition to these, the resources used for the wars and for the
reconstruction after these wars could have been used for the oil projects or other areas
that needed government support to develop national economies.
The last independent variable studied in this dissertation is the role of
international/ regional organizations (IOs) and institutional establishments in promoting
peace and cooperation in the Caspian Sea region. Examination of the IOs in the region
reveals that success or failure o f IOs in promoting peace and interstate cooperation under
the institutional framework was affected from varieties of factors, including geography
and past experiences o f the countries.
Scholars who study the role of international organizations in international politics
would agree on the fact that the arguments and the findings are extremely diverse and to
some extent confusing. It is related to the dynamic nature o f the issue and the enormity of
its scope. Geographical differences and past experiences o f the member states in
12 T he fam ous Contract o f the Century, a production sharing agreem ent betw een A zerbaijan and a
consortium o f international o il com panies 1994, signed after the agreem ent b etw een A zerbaijan and
A rm enians to end the war.
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international institutions might lead to different outcomes in terms o f its success and
failure in promoting peace and security.
Constructivists, Functionalists and Institutionalists argue that world politics is
increasingly organized around international organizations and regimes. They also argue
that these institutions foster interstate cooperation among the member states through
providing a forum for discussion, increasing transparency and reducing transaction costs.
The same theory also predicts a decline in the militarized conflicts with growing salience
o f non governmental organizations in international relations. While neoliberals subscribe
to much o f the arguments mentioned above, these claims have been contended by
neorealist school. Unlike neoliberals, neorealists argue that international politics is still
dominated by national interest considerations and the international institutions are the
reflection o f the world politics rather than being a decisive factor in it.

1T

Recent studies in the area focus more on the differences o f international
institutions in terms o f their structure, homogeneity, member structure, issue areas and
geography. The differences in these areas may very well affect the effectiveness o f that
particular institution.14
In the Caspian context, the success and or failure of the international and regional
organizations (CIS, GUAM and OSCE in some occasions) depended on varieties of
factors and at the same time suffered from numerous setbacks. One o f the major issues
that determined the final outcome with respect to the effectiveness o f the international
organizations in the Caspian region is the lack o f commitment by the member states to
the organizations. Boehmer, Gartzke and Nordstrom argue that IOs “can promote peace
13 For more on the literature on the subject see Chapter VI.
14 Charles B oehm er, Eric Gartzke and T im othy N ordstrom , “D o Intergovernm ental O rganizations Prom ote
P eace?” W o rld P o litic s 57 (O ctober 20 04): 3 -7 .
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but success depends on attributes present in only the most cohesive and institutionalized
organizations.” 15
The establishment o f Commonwealth o f Independent States by Russia and few
other Slavic states and its eventual growth into a regional organization is an example for
the lack o f commitment which rendered the organization almost useless in serving its
main functions; providing a framework for regional cooperation.
Behind these is the fear o f Russia to use the organization for the re-establishment of
Russian hegemony. In contrasts, the CIS member states have long tried to gain a safe
level o f independence from Russia and acted very cautiously to common
establishments.16
Apart from the lack o f commitment, another reason that explains why
institutionalization failed in the region and why existing institutions did not succeed in
creating an environment conducive to cooperation is the inability o f the Caspian and the
Central Asian states to come up with a comprehensive set of rules and norms that
regional states would agree to abide by in managing their differences. The lack o f a
unified approach on the management o f the regional affairs and the split among member
states in terms o f their inclination towards the West or Russia centered alliance impeded
the establishment o f a strategy that would bring the regional states together. Beside
these, the nature o f the domestic politics in the Caspian states and the historical
experience o f these countries with each other and especially with Russia have precluded
the emergence o f an effective organization that could contribute to regional cooperation,
leading way to a better interstate relationship in terms o f achieving cooperation on the

15 Ibid., 7.
16 For more details on h o w CIS functioned and eventually failed see Chapter VI.
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development o f Caspian oil industry. The success o f IOs in promoting peace and friendly
relations between Caspian states and external powers involved in the Caspian region have
been very limited owing to varieties o f factors indicated above. Compared to the areas
where international institutions have produced positive outcomes in promoting interstate
cooperation, the study o f the Caspian region in terms o f institutional structure reveals the
existing differences that prevent the development o f effective international institutions.
Institutionlists argue that international institutions can lead to cooperation because:
•

International institutions can mitigate the effects o f international anarchy

•

They may help to improve exchange o f information/ transparency therefore
reduce the probability and desirability of defection

•

They can increase the likelihood o f cooperation by decreasing the incentives
for defection.

•

They can create an environment that actors may fear reputational costs.

•

They can link issues and increase the chances o f cooperation.17

In the Caspian context, however, the number o f institutions should be seen very
small compared to the other regions where the number of institutions and membership is
high. Russet and Oneal see a positive correlation between membership in international
institutions and peace among the member states. 18 As Barnett and Finnemore argue, once
the institutions are established, they would develop and gain a personality o f their own
becoming an important mechanism in world politics and contributing to peace and

17 For more details on h o w th ese institutions help to the ach ievem en t o f cooperation, see K eohane, A fter
H egem on y.
18 For an analysis o f Kantian Peace: D em ocracy, E con om ic Interdependence and International Institutions,
see R usset and Oneal, T ria n g u la tin g P e a c e , 1 5 7 -9 6 .
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security.19 Looking at the issue from this perspective, we could assert that the interstate
relationship in the Caspian region could have been more peaceful if the institutions in the
region have had a chance to develop. This would have led to more cooperation among
the Caspian states over the development o f oil industry.
More than a decade after the investments started pouring into the Caspian region,
little progress has been achieved compared to the expectations and proposals put forward
by the governments o f the Caspian states. This is not to ignore the partial success made
in certain areas, including the resolution o f the discussions pertaining to the legal status
o f the Caspian Sea through bilateral agreements in the northern parts o f the sea,
excluding Iran, and the completion o f the huge Baku-Ceyhan pipeline project and finally,
the Caspian Pipeline Consortium that carries most o f the Kazakh oil production to
Novorossiysk; but to highlight the lack o f cooperation among the regional and external
powers in the Caspian Sea compared to what could have been achieved in such a long
period o f time. As it has been shown in this dissertation, the realist/neorealist paradigm
proved to have more explanatory power in the Transcaucasus region while the neoliberal
explanation o f interstate relationship in the Caspian context remained very thin.
If history is any guide, the only thing that does not change is the change itself. This
dissertation has covered the developments related to the nature o f the interstate
relationship in the Caspian Sea region up to date.20 What exactly will happen in the
coming years remains to be seen. As we all accept, history is full o f surprises for those
who study and also for those who live in it.21

19 M ichael Barnett and Martha Finnem ore, R u les f o r the W orld: In tern a tio n a l O rg a n iza tio n s in G lo b a l
P o litic s (Ithaca: C ornell U n iversity Press, 2 0 0 4 ).
20 February 2 0 0 7 .
21 A s it is the case w ith the unexpected collap se o f the S o v iet U nion.
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However, based on the studies o f the past and the current developments, it is
difficult to expect a dramatic change towards a more peaceful interstate relationship in
the Caspian Sea region, as most of the dividing issues remain unresolved. Looking at the
future o f the oil developments in the region, it should be safe to say that, the progress in
the oil industry will largely remain dependent on the quality o f interstate relationship in
the region, while the global trends in oil industry will certainly play a role in determining
the direction o f the developments in the Caspian Sea region.
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